Inhibition of the LH Surge by Restraint Stress in Cyclic Rats: Studies on the Role of GABAA and GABAB Receptors

There is evidence that stress can alter the activity in the brain of gamma-aminobutyricacid (GABA), a neurotransmitter that has been implicated in the regulation of LH secretion. In the present study the role of GABA in the restraint stress-induced inhibition of the LH surge was investigated in the intact cyclic rat. Intracerebroventricular (icv) administration of the GABAA receptor agonist muscimol (0.1, 0.5 or 1 μg) 5 min before the presumed onset of the pro-oestrous LH surge (at 0900 h) caused a dose dependent suppression of the surge. A single dose of the GABAB receptor agonist baclofen (1 μg; icv) injected at 0855 h postponed the onset of the LH surge, and repeated injections at 0855 and 1130 h suppressed the surge. These data indicate that GABA-ergic activity in the brain can inhibit the LH surge in the cyclic rat via GABAA and GABAB receptors. Pro-oestrous rats were subjected to 5 hrs of restraint starting at 0855 h. Pretreatment with the GABAA receptor antagonist bicuculine (1 μg; icv) at 0840, 0940 and 1040 h or pretreatment with the GABAB receptor antagonist phaclofen (10 μg; icv) at 0840 h were ineffective in preventing the restraint-induced inhibition of the LH surge. The results suggest that GABAA and GABAB receptors are not involved in the inhibitory effect of restraint stress on the LH surge.     

Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers

This paper addresses an anomaly in experimental economics, the rejection of ultimatum offers, and uses a psychological explanation for this essentially economic event. The wounded pride/spite model predicts that informed, knowledgeable respondents may react to small ultimatum offers by perceiving them as unfair, feeling anger, and acting spitefully. Results of a large scale experiment support the model, showing that rejections were most frequent when respondents could evaluate the fairness of their offers and attribute responsibility to offerers. In addition, anger was a better explanation of the rejections than perceptions that the offers were unfair. The discussion addresses the rarely studied but frequently observed emotions that negotiations provoke.     

Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity

This research investigated trust and reciprocity in two experiments using the Trust Game. In the Trust Game, Player 1 can “trust” an unknown Player 2 by sending some portion of a monetary endowment. The amount sent triples on its way to Player 2, who can then “reciprocate” by returning as much as he or she wishes to Player 1. Initial endowments were either $10 or $20 and were known to recipients; amounts sent were experimentally manipulated and varied from $2 to the entire endowment. Although many trusted parties returned enough money to equalize outcomes, trustors only benefited, on average, when they sent all or almost all of their endowments. Results suggested that recipients viewed sending less than everything as a lack of trust and that felt obligations mediated choices to reciprocate. These and other results contrast markedly with traditional, incremental models of the trust process, which suggest that initial trustors should take small risks and build trust gradually.     

Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of anchors and power in negotiations

Most research suggests that negotiators gain value by making first offers in negotiations. The current research examines the proposition that extreme first offers offend their recipients and cause them to walk away, resulting in an impasse. Results across two experiments support this proposition. As a result, extreme offers can be risky: even though they can anchor counteroffers and final outcomes, bringing benefit to the offerer, they only do so when impasses are avoided. In addition, we find support for the proposition that power moderates the relationship between extreme offers and impasses: although low- and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, it is the low-power negotiators who walk away from the negotiation.     

Cognitive control and socially desirable behavior: The role of interpersonal impact

The current research reconciles two contradicting sets of findings on the role of cognitive control in socially desirable behaviors. One set of findings suggests that people are tempted by self-serving impulses and have to rely on cognitive control overriding such impulses to act in socially desirable ways. Another set of findings suggests people are guided by other-regarding impulses and cognitive control is not necessary to motivate socially desirable behaviors. We theorize that the dominant impulse is to behave in a socially desirable manner when the interpersonal impact of an action is salient, and that the dominant impulse is to behave in a self-serving manner when the interpersonal impact of an action is not salient. Studies 1–3 found that impairing participants’ cognitive control led to less socially desirable behavior when interpersonal impact was not salient, but more socially desirable behavior when interpersonal impact was salient. Study 4 demonstrates that behaving in a socially desirable manner causes cognitive control impairment when interpersonal impact is not salient. But, when interpersonal impact is salient, behaving in a self-serving manner impairs cognitive control. We discuss the implications of our findings for understanding and managing socially desirable behaviors.     

Lay beliefs about competition: Scale development and gender differences

Motivation and Emotion - Women are less competitive than men in most contexts studied. This difference has been linked to the gender gap in socio-economic outcomes. To examine whether this gender...     

Power gained,power lost

Changes in power almost invariably lead to changes in behavior. This research investigates the effects of power increases and power decreases for individuals who are in strong or weak positions. We hypothesized that individuals will have strong reactions to gains in power (their demands will increase markedly) but they will act almost as though they do not recognize losses in power (their demands will not drop much) when they lose power. Four experiments track individuals’ actions when they move from ultimatum to dictatorship games, from dictatorship to ultimatum games, or when they have the same power position repeatedly. The data consistently show that people over-react to an increase in power, but that they react appropriately to a loss in power. The discussion explores the behavioral disconnect between increases and decreases in power.     

How important is an apology to you? Forecasting errors in evaluating the value of apologies

Apologies are commonly used to deal with transgressions in relationships. Results to date, however, indicate that the positive effects of apologies vary widely, and the match between people's judgments of apologies and the true value of apologies has not been studied. Building on the affective and behavioral forecasting literature, we predicted that people would overestimate how much they value apologies in reality. Across three experimental studies, our results showed that after having been betrayed by another party (or after imagining this to be the case), people (a) rated the value of an apology much more highly when they imagined receiving an apology than when they actually received an apology and (b) displayed greater trusting behavior when they imagined receiving an apology than when they actually received an apology. These results suggest that people are prone to forecasting errors regarding the effectiveness of an apology and that they tend to overvalue the impact of receiving one.     

Task demands, task interest, and task performance: implications for human subjects research and practicing what we preach

Through the continuous investigation of humans in organizations, we have learned much about motivation, attitudes, and performance. For example, Yukl and others have helped increase our understanding of influence tactics and the effect they have on the performance of subordinates, supervisors, and peers. Some tactics (and combinations of tactics) lead to resistance, some lead to compliance, and some lead to commitment. In this study, we raise the question of whether or not we incorporate our knowledge of these research findings into the design, implementation, and interpretation of our own research studies that require the participation of human subjects. In a survey of 134 subjects from a previous social science study, we found that performance varied across the sample, consistent with the concepts of resistance, compliance, and commitment. In addition, the variance in performance could be explained, in part, by task interest and perceived task demands. Implications are discussed.