The Cost of Detecting Deception: Judging Veracity Makes Eyewitnesses Remember a Suspect Less Accurately but With More Certainty

The current study extends previous research demonstrating the detrimental effects of divided attention during encoding on eyewitness memory. Previous data indicate that judging the veracity of a suspect causes witnesses to scrutinize him or her carefully and requires relatively high cognitive effort. We therefore hypothesized that performing this task while simultaneously observing the suspect should impair witnesses' memory for his or her appearance and message while ironically inflating their certainty and other testimony‐relevant judgments. Our results supported these predictions. Moreover, inducing witnesses to be suspicious about the suspect's truthfulness (Experiment 1) and motivating them to judge veracity as accurately as possible (Experiment 2) amplified the memory impairment effect and further increased several testimony‐relevant ratings. Additionally, compared with witnesses who incorrectly identified the suspect in a line‐up, those who made a correct decision expressed greater certainty about their line‐up accuracy and also provided higher ratings on some other testimony‐relevant measures. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A cross-modal weapon focus effect: The influence of a weapon's presence on memory for auditory information

To examine whether a weapon's presence impairs witnesses' memory for auditory information (as it impairs memory for visual information), we conducted two experiments in which undergraduates watched one version of a videotape depicting a male target who held either a weapon or a neutral object and conversed with a female character. The semantic content of his remarks was either easy or difficult to comprehend. The weapon's presence did not affect voice identification accuracy or memory for the target's vocal characteristics (e.g., pitch, loudness, speech rate) but did worsen memory for semantic content in the Difficult Comprehension condition. Our results can be explained by multiple resource models of attention, which propose separate resource “pools” for different sensory modalities.     

Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?

In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (The Journal of Philosophy, 100(12), 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue, that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We argue that Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution does not deny compositionality. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.     

Slut Shaming in a School Bullying Case: Evaluators Ignore Level of Harm When the Victim Self-Presents as Sexually Available

To investigate slut shaming (condemnation aimed at presumably sexually active females) as a form of bullying, we asked 142 U.S. college students acting as disciplinary committee members to decide a case involving two female high school students. We manipulated the victim’s self-presentation (sexually available, control) and the level of harm she suffered (mild anxiety, PTSD). Although evaluators typically make more pro-victim judgments when the level of harm is higher rather than lower, we expected participants to ignore harm when the victim self-presented as sexually available. As predicted, participants in the control condition made higher probability of guilt estimates and harsher sentence recommendations when the victim experienced PTSD versus mild anxiety. In contrast, harm level did not influence participants’ judgments in the sexually available condition. Additional analyses demonstrated that participants attributed relatively more responsibility to the sexually available than to the control victim, and the effect of the victim’s self-presentation on guilt estimates was mediated by attributions about the cause of the harm. The results correspond with previous findings that evaluators blame bullying victims whom they believe made themselves targets. We suggest that school districts revise their policies as necessary to avoid encouraging slut shaming and that evaluators receive training to help them apply the legal definition of bullying to specific situations.     

Are Propositions Essentially Representational?

Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.