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Anthony Peressini 《Philosophical Psychology》2014,27(6):862-889
Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people's understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness. 相似文献
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The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the confirmation of mathematical theories in recent times has been the subject
of significant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with
a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical
theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the
prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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