How to Feel Good Without Feeling Good About Yourself (or The Art of Living)

In this article, I will discuss three realities of the activating event (A) and argue the importance of making staying in the moment a key concept of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. I will also discuss the unlikelihood of reaching personal happiness and inner peace with a concept of self-worth. I will then provide two equations for happiness that help us achieve the ultimate goal of inner peace and will virtually guarantee that we feel good without feeling good about ourselves.     

Is the inversion effect in rhesus monkeys face-specific?

This study investigated the face inversion effect in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Face stimuli consisted of ten black-and-white examples of unfamiliar rhesus monkey faces, brown capuchin faces, and human faces. Two non-face categories included ten examples of automobiles and abstract shapes. All stimuli were presented in a sequential matching-to-sample format using an automated joystick-testing paradigm. Subjects performed significantly better on upright than on inverted presentations of automobiles, rhesus monkey and capuchin faces, but not human faces or abstract shapes. These results are inconsistent with data from humans and chimpanzees that show the inversion effect only for categories of stimuli for which subjects have developed expertise. The inversion effect in rhesus monkeys does not appear to be face-specific, and should therefore not be used as a marker of specialized face processing in this species. Received: 18 November 1998 / Accepted after revision: 9 May 1999     

Examining the Spatiotemporal Disruption to Gaze When Using a Myoelectric Prosthetic Hand

The aim of this study was to provide a detailed account of the spatial and temporal disruptions to eye-hand coordination when using a prosthetic hand during a sequential fine motor skill. Twenty-one able-bodied participants performed 15 trials of the picking up coins task derived from the Southampton Hand Assessment Procedure with their anatomic hand and with a prosthesis simulator while wearing eye-tracking equipment. Gaze behavior results revealed that when using the prosthesis, performance detriments were accompanied by significantly greater hand-focused gaze and a significantly longer time to disengage gaze from manipulations to plan upcoming movements. The study findings highlight key metrics that distinguish disruptions to eye-hand coordination that may have implications for the training of prosthesis use.     

Within-modality and cross-modality attentional blinks in a simple discrimination task

Following up on studies of the "attentional blink," we studied interference between successive target stimuli in visual and auditory modalities. In each experiment, stimuli were two tones and four dots, simultaneously presented for 1,800 msec. Targets were brief intensity changes in either a tone or a dot. Subjects gave unspeeded responses. In four experiments, our results showed interference between targets in the same modality, but not across modalities. We conclude that, under our experimental conditions, restrictions in concurrent target identification are largely modality specific.     

THE SECOND SPHERE AND THE STORY OF NO STORY

The author discusses Roy Schafer's ideas of the second self and second reality, as well as his consistent theme of storyteller and story. The latter theme is also explored in the context of more recent psychoanalytic influences, such as Bionian thought, trauma theory, the French approach, and the interpersonal perspective. To illustrate the idea of the nonstory in today's clinical encounters, the author presents two clinical vignettes.     

Revisiting Harmless Discrimination

In a co-authored piece with Adam Slavny, I argued that any promising account of the wrongness of discrimination must focus not only on the harmful outcomes of discriminatory acts but also on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action. In this brief paper, I defend this conclusion against an objection that has recently been pressed against our view by Richard Arneson. This task is important not only because Arneson’s objection is an intriguing one, but also -- and more importantly -- because my response sheds further light on the content and structure of an attractive theory of wrongful discrimination, as well as on more fundamental ideas in moral philosophy.

     

Robust representations of individual faces in chimpanzees (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Pan troglodytes</Emphasis>) but not monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Macaca mulatta</Emphasis>)

Being able to recognize the faces of our friends and family members no matter where we see them represents a substantial challenge for the visual system because the retinal image of a face can be degraded by both changes in the person (age, expression, pose, hairstyle, etc.) and changes in the viewing conditions (direction and degree of illumination). Yet most of us are able to recognize familiar people effortlessly. A popular theory for how face recognition is achieved has argued that the brain stabilizes facial appearance by building average representations that enhance diagnostic features that reliably vary between people while diluting features that vary between instances of the same person. This explains why people find it easier to recognize average images of people, created by averaging multiple images of the same person together, than single instances (i.e. photographs). Although this theory is gathering momentum in the psychological and computer sciences, there is no evidence of whether this mechanism represents a unique specialization for individual recognition in humans. Here we tested two species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), to determine whether average images of different familiar individuals were easier to discriminate than photographs of familiar individuals. Using a two-alternative forced-choice, match-to-sample procedure, we report a behaviour response profile that suggests chimpanzees encode the faces of conspecifics differently than rhesus monkeys and in a manner similar to humans.