Loneliness and the sexual behavior of sexual minority men in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Canadian provincial governments instituted a variety of public health measures that included social distancing and isolation, which may have had unintended consequeses. According to the Loneliness and Sexual Risk Model, gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (GBM) often cope with loneliness through risky sexual behaviors. Previous studies have demonstrated that COVID-19 measures such as social distancing and isolation led to increases in loneliness; thus, these measures may also have led to elevated sexual risk-taking among some GBM. Participants were recruited from an ongoing cohort study on GBM health and well-being, and were included in the current analysis if they had completed relevant study questions (n = 1134). GBM who reported lower levels of social support pre-COVID-19, were younger, and lived alone each reported greater loneliness during the first year of COVID-19. Although feelings of loneliness did not predict sexual risk-taking within the first year of COVID-19, loneliness did predict greater sexual risk-taking 6 months later. Additionally, younger GBM and those living alone were more likely to engage in sexual risk-taking at both COVID-19 data collection points. These findings offer some support of the Loneliness and Sexual Risk Model; however, it is possible that the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a temporary suspension of this association, as many GBM took steps to protect themselves and partners in the context of COVID-19.     

Introduction

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

On maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics

We extend to the predicate frame a previous characterization of the maximal intermediate propositional constructive logics. This provides a technique to get maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics starting from suitable sets of classically valid predicate formulae we call maximal nonstandard predicate constructive logics. As an example of this technique, we exhibit two maximal intermediate predicate constructive logics, yet leaving open the problem of stating whether the two logics are distinct. Further properties of these logics will be also investigated.Presented by H. Ono     

Individual cognitive style affects flood-risk perception and mitigation intentions

Risk perception of natural hazards has been widely studied as one of the potential determinants of people's behaviors and behavioral intentions. However, individual differences can also affect risk perception. The present work focused on the link between an individual cognitive mindset (i.e., level of holism) and flood-risk perception. It also assessed the consequences of such a link on public and personal mitigation intentions, taking into account the sense of connection with the environment, the psychological distance from the adverse event, and the role played by previous personal experience with flooding. Our study (N = 191) showed that the individual cognitive style predicted risk perceptions and personal (for both experienced and no-experience groups) and public (only for experienced group) mitigation intentions, through the mediation of the sense of connection with the environment and the psychological distance from the adverse event. Results are discussed in terms of their practical implications for public communication and policies about environmental hazards.     

A dynamic investigation of cognitive dedifferentiation with control for retest: evidence from the Swiss Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest Old

Empirical examinations of the hypothesis of dedifferentiation of cognitive abilities in old and very old age (a) do not account for possible retest effects, which consequently may yield biased estimates of age effects, and (b) focus on time-independent relations (e.g., number of latent constructs, correlations between latent or measured variables). The authors applied a structural equation model with statistical control for retest effects to investigate the dynamic relations between a marker of perceptual speed (cross out) and a marker of verbal fluency (category-fruits). Longitudinal data are from 5 waves of the Swiss Interdisciplinary Longitudinal Study on the Oldest Old (N = 377, baseline age range = 79.5- 84.5 years). The authors found that, independently of retest effects, performance on the cross-out task affected changes in performance on the category task while the opposite did not hold true. This analytical technique could be applied to various markers of broad fluid-mechanic and broad crystallized-pragmatic components of cognition.     

Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency

This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.     

Rethinking the focusing effect in decision-making

According to Legrenzi et al. [Cognition 49 (1993) 37], in making a choice people consider only the alternatives explicitly represented in their mental model of the decision situation. Their idea has found empirical support in the "focusing effect": Individuals focus on the alternatives explicitly stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities. In their original study, Legrenzi and colleagues considered only one factor to account for the explicit representation of an alternative--i.e., its explicit verbal formulation in the decision problem. Recent theories of relevance and information gain can help articulate their original idea, suggesting that individuals explicitly represent relevant alternatives, whether or not they are explicitly formulated in the decision problem. In three experiments we first replicated Legrenzi et al.'s original experiment, and then showed that the explicit verbal mention of an alternative is neither sufficient nor necessary to focus on it. The results suggest that individuals are able to consider relevant alternatives, even when they are not made explicit in the verbal formulation of a decision problem.     

Proof-Theoretic Modal PA-Completeness III: The Syntactic Proof

This paper is the final part of the syntactic demonstration of the Arithmetical Completeness of the modal system G; in the preceding parts [9] and [10] the tools for the proof were defined, in particular the notion of syntactic countermodel. Our strategy is: PA-completeness of G as a search for interpretations which force the distance between G and a GL-LIN-theorem to zero. If the GL-LIN-theorem S is not a G-theorem, we construct a formula H expressing the non G-provability of S, so that ⊢_GL-LIN ∼ H and so that a canonical proof T of ∼ H in GL-LIN is a syntactic countermodel for S with respect to G, which has the height θ(T) equal to the distance d(S, G) of S from G. Then we define the interpretation ξ of S which represents the proof-tree T in PA. By induction on θ(T), we prove that ⊢_PA S^ξ and d(S, G) > 0 imply the inconsistency of PA. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.