Why Freedom Implies Equality

ABSTRACT Equality and freedom have been represented as conflicting values. In this paper, I propose to argue that the idea of freedom has clear egalitarian implications.
Freedom is commonly represented as being negative or positive, but it has both senses in ordinary usage, and the distinction fails adequately to explain the relationship between views on freedom and poverty. An alternative representation of the concept distinguishes individual freedom, based on the autonomous individual, from social freedom, which sees freedom as a social relationship.
Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom.
Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution.     

Just War: theory and application

ABSTRACT How should just war theory be applied to assess a community's claim to defend itself? The IRA's claim to be fighting a just war to end British rule in Northern Ireland is upheld against the objection (e.g. by Simpson in this Journal, 1986) that they have a right only to self-defence against indigenous tyranny. Under just war theory no unclarity concerning the alien status of British rule could render the IRA claim unjustifiable: only the well-grounded denial of its alien status might serve (though this is doubtful). But if that denial is argued for by identifying a separate British community in Ireland then the IRA must be granted a right to repel alien occupation of nationalist areas. However the IRA's rejection of the ‘two communities’ view can be defended; for what constitutes a single community is subject to moral considerations. Accordingly a genuine community's claim to self-defence is against being wronged, rather than harmed. It is concluded that just war theory cannot be applied without antecedent moral judgements identifying the community potentially wronged.     

Two and One-Half Decades of Leadership in Measurement and Evaluation

This article explores the role of professional organizations, such as the American Association for Counseling and Development's (AACD) Association for Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development (AMECD) division, and the possible futures of such groups. It is suggested that AMECD and similar groups are experiencing a similar set of social and professional pressures. Aspects of the missions of creating and disseminating measurement and evaluation expertise are discussed. It is suggested that the explosion in knowledge has created new tensions involving special challenges for members of AMECD and related groups. Nevertheless, some remarkable recent accomplishments can be readily identified, and are noted here.     

A new objectively scored version of the Defence Mechanism Test

Kragh's Defence Mechanism Test has proved its worth in a number of applied settings but has hitherto required skilled time-consuming interpretation. Two studies are reported which validate an "objectively scored" version of the test developed using G-analysis. In the first, it was found that this version of the test could successfully predict the performance of trainee pilots. The second study examined the construct validity of this version of the test. It was found that the predictive factor from Study I re-emerged within a sample of students, where it correlated positively with scores on a test of perceptual defence and the Shrewdness (N) scale of the 16PF, and negatively with two of the identification scales of the Defence Mechanism Test. This factor was tentatively identified as one of general defensiveness. It is concluded that this form of the test deserves consideration when selecting individuals for stressful occupations.     

A Feminist Ethic and the New Romanticism Mothering as a Model of Moral Relations

This paper claims that recent attempts to draw on the maternal experiences of women in order to articulate an ethic of care and compassion is a new romanticism. Like earlier romantic views, it is both attractive and potentially dangerous. The paper examines the basic claims of this new romanticism in order to identify both its strengths and weaknesses. I conclude that there are at least two versions of this new romanticism, one that relies primarily on the experiences of child-bearing in grounding” an ethic of care and compassion, and a second that relies primarily on child-rearing. I suggest that the former version of the new romanticism is deeply flawed be-cause such a view ought to be unacceptable to women and will be inaccessible to men.