Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals

Conclusion If assertibility rules are to be important in semantic theory, hypotheses such as this one will need to beiinvestigated. And Slote's observation (see note 12) that what matters for assertibility is not belief but knowledge will turn out to have powerful consequences.Adams' rule is the first well understood assertibility rule in philosophical semantics. I think we should be led by its successes to look for more. In this paper, I have built on his assertibility rule and offered two more. But it is worth observing, finally, that their interest lies, in part, in the contrast with semantic rules stated in terms of truth conditions. Much recent discussion of assertibility conditions derives from Dummett's anti-realist claim that we should perhaps substitute assertibility conditions for truth conditions in general; see Dummett (1973), Wright (1976). This notion of assertibility is not the one I have been working with here: for the anti-realist notion of an assertibility condition is of a condition whose obtaining provides epistemic warrant for the sentence asserted. Dummett and Wright's assertibility conditions are thus to do with the justification of the belief expressed by a sentence and not directly with the justification for asserting it. ¹⁷ But realists may be interested in a more modest role for assertibility conditions — in my sense — which are not derived, by way of ASS, from truth conditions. Realism need not be the claim that all declarative sentences can be given truth conditions; it requires only the view that truth conditions account for the central class of cases. The proposals in this paper presuppose a realist treatment of the antecedents and consequents of unembedded conditionals, and a realist view of the sentences within the scope of the epistemic modality. What could be more central than that?I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this journal and to its editor for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Experiencing Racial Humor with Outgroups: A Psychophysiological Examination of Co-Viewing Effects

Research on co-viewing (or group viewing) is scarce. Yet, co-viewing has important implications for the viewers’ entertainment experience and the way viewers respond to and evaluate entertainment—especially those with controversial messages. The present study investigated responses to racial humor content among racial in-group and out-group viewing contexts. Specifically, the study examined the extent to which Blacks and Whites would experience discomfort when viewing racial slurs in comedies with in-group compared to out-group members. Employing real-time psychophysiological data and multilevel time series models, the study found a significant increase in emotional arousal (indicated by SCRs) and distraction (indicated by RSA) among Blacks in the context of out-group viewing compared to in-group viewing, but not for Whites. Implications of findings are discussed.     

News Selection Patterns as a Function of Race: The Discerning Minority and the Indiscriminating Majority

This study examines whether White majority and Black minority members differ in selecting news stories that featured either individuals of their own group or dissimilar others. Hypotheses derived from social-cognitive theory, social comparison theory, and distinctiveness theories were tested utilizing unobtrusive observations of news story selections. This selective exposure research design overcomes methodological constraints of previous experimental studies that employed self-reports and forced-exposure techniques to measure responses of Blacks and Whites to race-specific media sources. Our sample consisted of 112 Blacks and 93 Whites, who browsed 10 online news stories while exposure was unobtrusively logged via software. The news site displayed equal numbers of Black and White characters, with the pictures associated with the news stories rotated across participants. Results indicate that Whites showed no preference based on the race of the character featured in the news story. In contrast, Blacks strongly preferred news stories featuring Blacks and spent more than twice the reading time on them compared to exposure to news stories featuring Whites.     

“Group Rights” and Racial Affirmative Action

This article argues against the view that affirmative action is wrong because it involves assigning group rights. First, affirmative action does not have to proceed by assigning rights at all. Second, there are, in fact, legitimate “group rights” both legal and moral; there are collective rights—which are exercised by groups—and membership rights—which are rights people have in virtue of group membership. Third, there are continuing harms that people suffer as blacks and claims to remediation for these harms can fairly treat the (social) property of being black as tracking the victims of those harms. Affirmative action motivated in this way aims to respond to individual wrongs; wrongs that individuals suffer, as it happens, in virtue of their membership in groups. Finally, the main right we have when we are being considered for jobs and places at colleges is that we be treated according to procedures that are morally defensible. Morally acceptable procedures sometimes take account of the fact that a person is a member of a certain social group.     

Ordinal state-trait regression for intensive longitudinal data

In many psychological studies, in particular those conducted by experience sampling, mental states are measured repeatedly for each participant. Such a design allows for regression models that separate between- from within-person, or trait-like from state-like, components of association between two variables. But these models are typically designed for continuous variables, whereas mental state variables are most often measured on an ordinal scale. In this paper we develop a model for disaggregating between- from within-person effects of one ordinal variable on another. As in standard ordinal regression, our model posits a continuous latent response whose value determines the observed response. We allow the latent response to depend nonlinearly on the trait and state variables, but impose a novel penalty that shrinks the fit towards a linear model on the latent scale. A simulation study shows that this penalization approach is effective at finding a middle ground between an overly restrictive linear model and an overfitted nonlinear model. The proposed method is illustrated with an application to data from the experience sampling study of Baumeister et al. (2020, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46, 1631).     

Brand switching and consumer identification with brands in the smartphones industry

Brand loyalty literature has mainly focused on how brands perform under normal market conditions. As the business environment grows more complex, globalised, and innovative, market disruptions become more prevalent. Taking a cognition‐based approach, this paper proposes that customers identify with brands to satisfy self‐definitional needs. A social constructivist perspective, using an inductive and case study strategy, was used. Data generation was based on purposeful sampling, and participants were chosen on the basis of their “lived” experience with the use of smartphones. Four major themes were identified in the purchase of smartphones: identity, satisfaction, brand loyalty, and brand switching. Participants' views suggested that this provides them with a sense of purpose and meaning, defining who they are and why they behave in specified ways in society, which increases their self‐esteem. Brand switching occurs when customers are motivated to review available alternatives in the marketplace due to a change in competitive activities. Socially, switching occurs when a customer's belief in a brand is externally influenced within the social setting. When the boundary between the “in‐group” and the “out‐group” is impermeable and changing, group membership is not realistic; social mobility is not a viable strategy to cope with identity threats.