Saving the worst for last: The effect of time horizon on the efficiency of negotiating benefits and burdens

Three experiments explored the effect of outcome delays—longer time horizons for the realization of outcomes—on the efficiency of negotiated agreements. We hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between a longer temporal distance to the consequences of negotiated agreements and the efficiency of those agreements. Outcome delays did increase the efficiency of the negotiated agreements. In addition, type of resource, burden or benefit, moderated this relationship. Because negotiating for burdens is more difficult than negotiating for benefits in the present, the salutary discounting effects of outcome delays were greater for burdens. The multifaceted effects of time on negotiations are discussed.     

Regulatory focus at the bargaining table: promoting distributive and integrative success

The authors demonstrate that in dyadic negotiations, negotiators with a promotion regulatory focus achieve superior outcomes than negotiators with prevention regulatory focus in two ways. First, a promotion focus leads negotiators to claim more resources at the bargaining table. In the first two studies, promotion-focused negotiators paid more attention to their target prices(i.e., their ideal outcomes) and achieved more advantageous distributive outcomes than did prevention-focused negotiators. The second study also reveals an important mediating process: Negotiators with a promotion focus made more extreme opening offers in their favor. Second, a promotion focus leads negotiators to create more resources at the bargaining table that benefit both parties. A third study demonstrated that in a multi-issue negotiation, a promotion focus increased the likelihood that a dyad achieved a jointly optimal or Pareto efficient outcome compared to prevention-focused dyads. The discussion focuses on the role of regulatory focus in social interaction and introduces the notion of interaction fit.     

Future Thinking in Disadvantaged Situations: The Role of Outcome Delays and Competitive Issues in Negotiation

Extant literature suggests that delaying the outcomes of negotiations can have salutary effects on the joint outcomes of participants. However, this literature has not examined the impact that outcome delays have on the success of individual negotiators. We argue that in situations where a player's preference on an issue involves a lack of legitimacy, an outcome delay may advantage the presentation of that issue. In addition, we suggest that this effect is more likely to be present in situations where competition is high, specifically, where the parties have few opportunities for cooperation. An experimental dyadic negotiation exercise involving 306 undergraduate participants was conducted to test these hypotheses. Results suggest that the introduction of an outcome delay helps to reduce the negative effects of a legitimacy disadvantage in the absence of alternate opportunities for collaboration.