No indication that the ego depletion manipulation can affect insight: a comment on DeCaro and Van Stockum (2018)

Abstract

Recently, DeCaro and Van Stockum have suggested that ego depletion following intensive self-control can improve insight problem-solving; this finding was interpreted in terms of insight relying on decreased control over attention and memory. However, DeCaro and Van Stockum used three variants of the single matchstick arithmetic problem. Experiment 1 involved low sample and non-standard problem application, while the more powered Experiment 2 yielded a surprisingly low solution rate. These facts made both studies problematic and called for their replication. In the two present studies, the DeCaro and Van Stockum ego-depletion manipulation and their matchstick problems were administered to a total of 316 people. Furthermore, various other insight problems, subjective ratings of insight experience, analytical problems and executive control tests were applied. The key result was that no reliable effect of ego depletion could be found for any of these measures.     

Do we need a new theory of truthmaking? Some comments on Disjunction Thesis, Conjunction Thesis, Entailment Principle and explanation

In the paper we discuss criticisms against David Armstrong’s general theory of truthmaking by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Peter Schulte and Benjamin Schnieder, and conclude that Armstrong’s theory survives these criticisms. Special attention is given to the problems concerning Entailment Principle, Conjunction Thesis, Disjunction Thesis and to the notion of explanation.     

Women are not less field independent than men—the role of stereotype threat

Prior research has shown that females are less field independent (FI) than males. However, when gender identity is salient, performance on tests assessing constructs similar to FI may be hindered, because of stereotype threat. This study examined the impact of stereotype threat on gender differences in FI. We expected that (a) reporting one's own gender prior to FI testing and (b) having an opposite‐gender experimenter would activate stereotype threat, and in turn result in lower performance on a test of FI among females. Overall, 170 participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a between‐participants design varying the participant's gender, experimenter's gender and timing of the gender question (before vs. after test). Results showed that reporting one's gender before the FI test led to lower FI performance among females. Furthermore, females achieved higher FI when experimenters were females and gender questions were administered after the FI test.     

Embedded Pragmatic Effects and Conversational Implicatures

In a recent paper Mandy Simons has argued that in a Gricean framework there is room for embedded pragmatic effects. One of her goals has been to demonstrate that an argument put forward by François Recanati to the effect that it is not possible to apply Gricean reasoning to generation of local pragmatic effects is mistaken. In his commentary Recanati maintains that the view suggested by Simons can be called Gricean only in a very broad sense and insists that the process responsible for local effects is essentially different from the one which generates conversational implicatures. In my view their exchange highlights important issues concerning the way in which local pragmatic effects are generated and is worthy of a careful analysis. In what follows I critically examine Simons’s and Recanati’s views and then suggest the view that in the light of this analysis seems to me the most adequate. In particular, I argue—against Recanati—that during the interpretation process interpreters construct literal propositional nuclei, which usually fell short of being truth-evaluable but which play an important role in the interpretation. I claim that the view that assumes that such literal propositions are constructed in the process of interpretation is more universal and may be used to analyse a wider range of examples than the view that does not postulate such constructions. Nevertheless, I maintain—against Simons—that the global and local pragmatic inferences are importantly different.