Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Intentionality

Philosophia - This paper argues for the conjunctive thesis of naïve realism and phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experiences. Naïve realism holds that the phenomenology of...     

School-Based Intervention Program Based on Cognitive Behavioral Therapy for Japanese Students Affected by the Hiroshima Heavy Rain Disaster of July 2018

This study examined the effects of a group cognitive behavioral intervention on senior school students affected by the Hiroshima heavy rain disaster and investigated the effects of reducing depression by enhancing resilience. A total of 229 second-grade senior school students affected by the Hiroshima heavy rain disaster participated in the study. The intervention was performed in the following order: psychological education on daily stress, problem-solving training for daily stress, psychological education on traumatic reactions derived from traumatic experiences, and instruction on the merits of utilizing information acquired from the intervention in daily life. The results showed that the high-depression group's depression score was reduced by the intervention. Resilience score was increased both in the high- and low-depression groups as a result of the intervention. Therefore, the intervention program used in this study was proven effective in reducing depression and improving resilience. Prospectively, strategies for psychological support during and after large-scale disasters should be established by applying the findings obtained in this research.     

Where is the Fundamental Disagreement Between Naive Realism and Intentionalism?

This paper aims to reveal the source of the dispute between naive realism and intentionalism. To accomplish this task, it examines Adam Pautz’s challenge to naive realism, according to which a naive intuition about visual phenomenology, which is the only workable case for naive realism, is problematic. It argues that naive realists can address the challenge from Pautz by rejecting his assumption that naive realists and intentionalists agree on the nominal definition of visual phenomenology. The paper then argues that the reason naive realists want to preserve the naive intuition is its irresistibility rather than its reliability. Given this, it concludes that the disagreement between naive realism and intentionalism is rooted in what philosophical projects they tackle. Naive realists are engaged in the philosophical project of delineating a coherent view of the actual world in which the irresistible naive intuition can be true; the intentionalist philosophical project differs from it.