A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the Quality of Information about the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some Preliminary Research

In a pame-simulation context, tax evasion behavior of 13 subjects was observed. The probability that tax evasion will be detected and fined appears to be a more effective deterrent than the size of such fines, although both the magnitude of finm and their probability affect tax evasion. Vague information about the probability that fines will be imposed enhances the deterrent power of low probability audits and small fines.     

The effect of stress on the suppression of erroneous competing responses

Abstract

Evidence exists that the intention to perform certain cognitive tasks activates, unintentionally, competing responses and computations that intrude on the performance of the intended tasks. For the intended task to be performed effectively, such intrusions must be controlled. Two experiments were carried out to test the hypothesis that stress heightens the difficulty of exercising effective control over erroneous competing responses, a possible explanation of decrements in the performance of cognitive tasks under stress. Participants performed four tasks, which contained features that could potentially prime or activate erroneous responses. The results demonstrated that the interference of these features with performance was more pronounced among stressed than among less-stressed participants. The need for a more comprehensive theory of the effects of stress on information processing is discussed.     

On luck and chance: Need for control as a mediator of the attribution of events to luck

Chance and luck are regarded as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. Whereas chance is deemed utterly uncontrollable, luck elicits, at the very least, an illusion of control. Hence, need for control might be a decisive factor in determining whether an event is attributed to chance or to luck. More specifically, the greater is a person's need for control, the stronger would be that person's tendency to attribute events to luck. This proposition, along with its implications concerning effects of luck attributions on decision making, were tested in three experiments. The results showed that situational circumstances and personality dispositions that heighten individuals' need for control strengthen their tendency to attribute events and outcomes to luck. The results showed, further, that such attributions can affect the process of decision making.     

Some Determinants of the Violation of Rules1

The pattern of a simulated legislator-individual interaction as well as properties inherent in law-enforcement procedures were manipulated to study their effects on the degree of individuals' adherence to laws. The degree of correspondence between the outcomes accruing to a legislator and those attained by an individual, the “fairness” of surveillance methods used by the legislator, and the severity with which he penalized violations of a law were manipulated in a 2³ factorial design. The main findings show that, under circumstances of outcome correspondence, subjects attempted to increase their outcomes without violating the law, as opposed to subjects in noncorrespondent conditions who showed no such attempt. Furthermore, evidence was found to the effect that subjects in noncorrespondent interactions with the legislator actively attempted to hurt the latter by violating his laws. The results also show the existence of a positive relationship between surveillance “unfairness” and the frequency of law violation. This relationship is qualified, however, by a statistical interaction which shows that the differential effects attributable to “fairness” of surveillance are stronger in noncorrespondent than in correspondent conditions. The severity of penalty manipulation yielded a main effect on the frequency of violations–the milder the penalties the more frequent the violations. The pattern of means suggests that the effect of severity of penalties on the frequency of violations is less pronounced in the correspondent than in the noncorrespondent conditions. This interaction, however, failed to reach a conventional level of statistical significance.     

Social influence via threats

Influence via threats was investigated in correspondent relationships (characterized by commonality of interest) and in noncorrespondent relationships (characterized by conflict of interest). In addition, the degree of informational power attributed by the influencee to the influencer and to himself, and the severity of threats used by the influencer were manipulated. The results point to the existence of two qualitatively different processes of influence. In correspondent relationships, threats are viewed as conveying the influencer's belief about the choice of action that would benefit both parties to the relationship. Further, the more severe the threat, the more confident the influencer would appear to be of his choice of action. As a result, the influencee's willingness to rely on the influencer's judgment, as conveyed by the threat, becomes an important aspect of the influence process. Such willingness is affected by the influencee's attribution of informational power to the influencer and to himself. In noncorrespondent relationships, on the other hand, suspicion and mutual distrust preclude reliance on threats as sources of information. Under such circumstances, social influence via threats becomes a simple process of coercion.     

Cultural Similarity, Foreign Policy Actions, and Regime Perception: An Experimental Study of International Cues and Democratic Peace

This study examines previous explanations of democratic peace in light of sociocultural factors and foreign policy actions that influence public perceptions of another country. Two experiments assessed the effects of relevant sociocultural and foreign policy action cues on perception of the regime type of a target nation and on public approval of the use of force. The findings suggest that sociocultural cues affect regime perception. Moreover, perceived similarity of a target nation and foreign policy actions are significant determinants of the public approval of the use of force in addition to perceptions of regime type.     

Mathematical models of foreign policy decision-making: Compensatory vs. noncompensatory

There are presently two leading foreign policy decision-making paradigms in vogue. The first is based on the classical or rational model originally posited by von Neumann and Morgenstern to explain microeconomic decisions. The second is based on the cybernetic perspective whose groundwork was laid by Herbert Simon in his early research on bounded rationality. In this paper we introduce a third perspective — thepoliheuristic theory of decision-making — as an alternative to the rational actor and cybernetic paradigms in international relations. This theory is drawn in large part from research on heuristics done in experimental cognitive psychology. According to the poliheuristic theory, policy makers use poly (many) heuristics while focusing on a very narrow range of options and dimensions when making decisions. Among them, the political dimension is noncompensatory. The paper also delineates the mathematical formulations of the three decision-making models.The authors thank Raymond Dacey for his helpful comments.     

Motivational bases in mixed-motive interactions: The effects of comparison levels

The relationship between reward level and the basic motives which underlie strategic choices (competitive and noncompetitive) in a mixed-motive game was examined from two theoretical perspectives. The “regret” interpretation proposed by McClintock and McNeel was compared to an approach based upon Thibout and Kelley's concept of comparison level (CL). Two independent variables, CL and Reward, were manipulated by varying the payoff rates in two playing series of the MDG. Initially, 50 iterations were played for high (4¢ per point) or low ($\text{1}\text{5¢}$ per point) incentive to provide subjects with outcomes upon which to base their CL's. The Reward manipulation was introduced in 150 subsequent trials of the game with subjects playing for 8¢ or 1¢ per point. The results show that the absolute magnitude of reward did not influence the extent of cooperative or competitive behavior. On the other hand, the magnitude of reward relative to CL was significantly associated with the degree of cooperative behavior—supra-CL outcomes yielding a higher frequency of cooperative behavior than infra-CL outcomes.     

Training for Task Performance Under Stress: The Effectiveness of Phased Training Methods

Studies on the training of individuals for task performance in stressful situations have typically considered two approaches. One approach requires that, while training on the task, trainees be exposed to stressors of a kind and intensity characteristic of the situations for which they are being trained ("high fidelity" training). Such an approach might suffer from the interference of stressors with task acquisition. Another approach allows the trainee to train on the task in a stress-free environment or under low-intensity stressors ("low fidelity" training). This approach leaves the trainee insufficiently prepared for task performance under stress. The present study compared these two basic approaches to three forms of "phased" training, which consisted of different combinations of three separate and distinct training phases: a phase which allows the trainee to acquire the task under stress- free conditions; a phase which allows him or her to passively experience the stressor; and a phase in which newly acquired skills are practiced under stress. The results showed that a phased training process which combines the first and third phases just described, is more effective than either "high fidelity" training or "low fidelity" training.     

Variable Credibility Threats: A Procedure for the Enhancement of Deterrence Effectiveness1

This experiment evaluated a procedure whereby tax evasions can be more effectively deterred by dividing the taxpayers' population into two, high- and low-audit probability, categories. The procedure employs a rule that assigns tax evaders to the high-audit probability category and assigns those who abide by the law to a low-audit probability category. A simple empirical simulation showed that the “variable probabilities” procedure prevented tax evasions more effectively than an alternative, “fixed probability” procedure, in which the same audit probability applied to all individuals, regardless of their past record.