Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers

This paper addresses an anomaly in experimental economics, the rejection of ultimatum offers, and uses a psychological explanation for this essentially economic event. The wounded pride/spite model predicts that informed, knowledgeable respondents may react to small ultimatum offers by perceiving them as unfair, feeling anger, and acting spitefully. Results of a large scale experiment support the model, showing that rejections were most frequent when respondents could evaluate the fairness of their offers and attribute responsibility to offerers. In addition, anger was a better explanation of the rejections than perceptions that the offers were unfair. The discussion addresses the rarely studied but frequently observed emotions that negotiations provoke.     

An experimental test of three choice shift hypotheses*

The present experiment pitted three choice shift hypotheses against each other in an attempt to eliminate one or more of the hypotheses and find support for those remaining. Ss responded three times to the 12 CDQ items, once as a pretest and twice following presentation of homogeneous sets of three arguments which advocated either a risky or a cautious position. The risk-as-value, relevant arguments, and conformity/attitude change hypotheses generated three separate predictions for the Ss' responses. Results mirrored the prediction of the relevant arguments hypothesis: New information, whether contained in cautious or risky arguments, caused a shift toward the type of argument presented. The risk-as-value and the conformity/attitude change hypotheses could not explain the present data.     

Bad Drives Psychological Reactions, but Good Propels Behavior: Responses to Honesty and Deception

ABSTRACT— Research across disciplines suggests that bad is stronger than good and that individuals punish deception more than they reward honesty. However, methodological issues in previous research limit the latter conclusion. Three experiments resolved these issues and consistently found the opposite pattern: Individuals rewarded honesty more frequently and intensely than they punished deception. Experiment 2 extended these counterintuitive findings by revealing a divergence between evaluation and behavior: Evaluative reactions to deception were stronger than those to honesty, but behavioral intentions in response to honesty were stronger than those in response to deception. In addition, individuals wanted to avoid deceivers more than they wanted to approach honest actors. Experiment 3 found that punishment, but not reward, frequencies were sensitive to costs. Moderated-mediation tests revealed the role of different psychological mechanisms: Negative affect drove punishments, whereas perceived trustworthiness drove rewards. Overall, bad appears to be stronger than good in influencing psychological reactions, but good seems to be stronger than bad in influencing behavior.     

Adaptation and communicative design.

Two theoretical frameworks that examine the nature of adaptability and mutual influence in interaction, interpersonal deception theory and interaction adaptation theory, were used to derive hypotheses concerning patterns of interaction that occur across time in truthful and deceptive conversations. Two studies were conducted in which senders were either truthful or deceptive in their interactions with a partner who increased or decreased involvement during the latter half of the conversation. Results revealed that deceivers felt more anxious and were more concerned about self‐presentation than truthtellers prior to the interaction and displayed less initial involvement than truthtellers. Patterns of interaction were also moderated by deception. Deceivers increased involvement over time but also reciprocated increases or decreases in receiver involvement. However, deceivers were less responsive than truthtellers to changes in receiver behavior. Finally, partner involvement served as feedback to senders regarding their own performance.     

Intravention: Third-Party Intervention with Clout

This study examined the dispute-resolution behavior of the "intravenor," a distinct third-party role in organizational dispute resolution. Unlike a mediator, whose involvement in the dispute is at the whim of the disputants, the intravenor can control the outcome of the dispute. Unlike an arbitrator, who is compelled to dictate the outcome of the dispute, the intravenor may or may not impose an outcome. The experiment reported here examined the impact of four variables on third party behavior: The third party′s role (intravenor versus mediator), the third party′s beliefs about the disputants reaching agreement (cooperative versus uncooperative disputants), the third party′s self-interest in the outcome, and the third party′s concern about the disputants′ outcome (interest in the disputant′s mutual welfare). The results suggest that intravention spawns a distinctive pattern of third-party behavior: Intravenors imposed outcomes in 66% of the cases, but more when they viewed the disputants as uncooperative than cooperative. Only 44% of the imposed outcomes reflected the disputants′ underlying interests, but this was greater when the intravenor had high compared to low concern for the disputants′ aspirations. Intravenors were more likely than mediators to use forceful, pressure tactics, and were more confident and saw themselves as more influential. Taken together, the results provide the basis for an integrated model of third-party intervention in organizational dispute resolution.     

The Empathy‐Prospect Model and the Choice to Help1

This paper presents a model of the cognitive processes that precede decisions to help another person. The empathy‐prospect model predicts that potential helpers make decisions in much the same way as decision makers in other contexts do (i.e., they evaluate prospects) and that perceptions of need and the empathic reactions and intentions to help that they generate will be stronger for people observing losses rather than gains. The model also predicts that intentions to help should increase when (a) the predicament is serious, (b) money is not involved, or (c) help entails few costs for the potential altruist. The results from 2 experiments provide clear support for these predictions. The findings suggest that (a) the gains or losses of another person contribute to perceptions of that person's needs and feelings of empathy, (b) empathy is the primary proximal determinant of prosocial motivations, and (c) potential losses that are serious accentuate altruistic reactions.     

The generalist bias

This research introduces the generalist bias – a tendency to reward and select people with general skills when complementary, specialized skills are needed. Five studies investigated its effects. Study 1 confirmed the existence of the bias in a context-free experiment. Study 2 showed that the compensation of players in NBA teams was related to their two- rather than their three-point scoring. Study 3 showed that basketball fans favored all-around players even when three-point shooters would better complement a team’s needs. Study 4 showed that the generalist bias occurred in HR recruiting, and Study 5 showed that companies often recruited specialists to handle multiple, unrelated jobs. In addition, studies 3 and 4 also showed that joint evaluations (comparing specialists and generalists side-by-side) strengthened the generalist bias, whereas separate evaluations weakened it.     

Striving for the moral self: the effects of recalling past moral actions on future moral behavior

People's desires to see themselves as moral actors can contribute to their striving for and achievement of a sense of self-completeness. The authors use self-completion theory to predict (and show) that recalling one's own (im)moral behavior leads to compensatory rather than consistent moral action as a way of completing the moral self. In three studies, people who recalled their immoral behavior reported greater participation in moral activities (Study 1), reported stronger prosocial intentions (Study 2), and showed less cheating (Study 3) than people who recalled their moral behavior. These compensatory effects were related to the moral magnitude of the recalled event, but they did not emerge when people recalled their own positive or negative nonmoral behavior (Study 2) or others' (im)moral behavior (Study 3). Thus, the authors extend self-completion theory to the moral domain and use it to integrate the research on moral cleansing (remunerative moral strivings) and moral licensing (relaxed moral strivings).     

Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity

This research investigated trust and reciprocity in two experiments using the Trust Game. In the Trust Game, Player 1 can “trust” an unknown Player 2 by sending some portion of a monetary endowment. The amount sent triples on its way to Player 2, who can then “reciprocate” by returning as much as he or she wishes to Player 1. Initial endowments were either $10 or $20 and were known to recipients; amounts sent were experimentally manipulated and varied from $2 to the entire endowment. Although many trusted parties returned enough money to equalize outcomes, trustors only benefited, on average, when they sent all or almost all of their endowments. Results suggested that recipients viewed sending less than everything as a lack of trust and that felt obligations mediated choices to reciprocate. These and other results contrast markedly with traditional, incremental models of the trust process, which suggest that initial trustors should take small risks and build trust gradually.     

Mind games: the mental representation of conflict

Perception and misperception play a pivotal role in conflict and negotiation. We introduce a framework that explains how people think about their outcome interdependence in conflict and negotiation and how their views shape their behavior. Seven studies show that people's mental representations of conflict are predictably constrained to a small set of possibilities with important behavioral and social consequences. Studies 1 and 2 found that, when prompted to represent a conflict in matrix form, more than 70% of the people created 1 of 4 archetypal mixed-motive games (out of 576 possibilities): Maximizing Difference, Assurance, Chicken, and Prisoner's Dilemma. Study 3 demonstrated that these mental representations relate in predictable ways to negotiators' fixed-pie perceptions. Studies 4-6 showed that these mental representations shape individuals' behavior and interactions with others, including cooperation, perspective taking, and use of deception in negotiation, and through them, conflict's outcomes. Study 7 found that the games that people think they are playing influence how their counterparts see them, as well as their counterparts' negotiation expectations. Overall, the findings document noteworthy regularities in people's mental representations of outcome interdependence in conflict and illustrate that 4 archetypal games can encapsulate fundamental psychological processes that emerge repeatedly in conflict and negotiation.