Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.     

A puzzle about mental self-representation and causation

The paper articulates a puzzle that consists in the prima facie incompatibility between three widely accepted theses. The first thesis is, roughly, that there are intrinsically self-representational thoughts. The second thesis is, roughly, that there is a particular causal constraint on mental representation. The third thesis is, roughly, that nothing causes itself. In this paper, the theses are articulated in a less rough manner with the occurrence of the puzzle as a result. Finally, a number of solution strategies are considered, and a preliminary diagnosis is provided.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.     

Learning words: children disregard some pragmatic information that conflicts with mutual exclusivity

Children tend to infer that when a speaker uses a new label, the label refers to an unlabeled object rather than one they already know the label for. Does this inference reflect a default assumption that words are mutually exclusive? Or does it instead reflect the result of a pragmatic reasoning process about what the speaker intended? In two studies, we distinguish between these possibilities. Preschoolers watched as a speaker pointed toward (Study 1) or looked at (Study 2) a familiar object while requesting the referent for a new word (e.g. ‘Can you give me the blicket?’). In both studies, despite the speaker's unambiguous behavioral cue indicating an intent to refer to a familiar object, children inferred that the novel label referred to an unfamiliar object. These results suggest that children expect words to be mutually exclusive even when a speaker provides some kinds of pragmatic evidence to the contrary.     

An experimental method for inquiring into communication

An experimental method for inquiring into the organization of an act of communication is presented, the basic idea being to create an interactional setting where one of the basic prerequisites for successful communication is not satisfied. In this particular design, the subjects interact under the false belief that they are sharing the same ?here'. (In mean the subjects interacted more than a quarter of an hour before any doubt or suspicion about the situation was expressed, indicating that our manipulation had been successful.) During the subjects trying (1) to ?diagnose' their communicative difficulties, and (2) to apply different ?therapeutic tools' in order to improve their communication, one is in a very good position to study the impact from a variety of basic phenomena upon communication. It is argued that this situation may well be applied as a ?standard experimental method'. And an experiment where this method revealed interesting differences in the communication between couples having and couples not having a schizophrenic offspring is discussed.     

The representation of social issues in public discourse and newspaper language: a comment on Gardikiotis,Martin and Hewstone's (2004) study

Gardikiotis, Martin and Hewstone ( 2004 ) investigated the representation of majority versus minority headlines in five British newspapers over a period of five years. They found majority headlines to be twice as frequent as minority headlines. However, they identified headlines with the search words ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ only in the singular form. We argue that in the public discourse the minority, but not the majority is likely to be represented in the plural. Replicating their study with the search words in both singular and plural forms, the strong difference they reported disappeared and minority headlines proved to be just as frequent as majority headlines. However, whereas majority is used almost exclusively in the singular, minority is used almost as frequently in both the singular and plural forms. These findings suggest a more complex social representation in real‐life contexts on the minority pole of the minority‐majority dimension compared to the majority pole. Implications of this asymmetric relationship are discussed in terms of communication theory, social representations theory, and experimental research on minority‐majority groups (in particular in‐group homogeneity). Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?

William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple.

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Globalization, Neo-Liberalism and Community Psychology

A longitudinal analysis (1984–2005) of media language in Norway is presented, demonstrating how the current globalized capitalist market ideology is now permeating this long-established Scandinavian welfare state. This ideological shift carries powerful implications for community psychology, as traditional welfare state values of equal services based on a universalistic principle are set aside, and social and material inequalities are increasingly accepted. The methodology developed in the present study may serve as a “barometer of community changes”, to borrow a metaphor used by Sarason (2000).