Response inhibition during perceptual decision making in humans and macaques

Response inhibition in stop signal tasks has been explained as the outcome of a race between GO and STOP processes (e.g., Logan, 1981). Response choice in two-alternative perceptual categorization tasks has been explained as the outcome of an accumulation of evidence for the alternative responses. To begin unifying these two powerful investigation frameworks, we obtained data from humans and macaque monkeys performing a stop signal task with responses guided by perceptual categorization and variable degrees of difficulty, ranging from low to high accuracy. Comparable results across species reinforced the validity of this animal model. Response times and errors increased with categorization difficulty. The probability of failing to inhibit responses on stop signal trials increased with stop signal delay, and the response times for failed stop signal trials were shorter than those for trials with no stop signal. Thus, the Logan race model could be applied to estimate the duration of the stopping process. We found that the duration of the STOP process did not vary across a wide range of discrimination accuracies. This is consistent with the functional, and possibly mechanistic, independence of choice and inhibition mechanisms.     

Metacognition in monkeys during an oculomotor task

This study investigated whether rhesus monkeys show evidence of metacognition in a reduced, visual oculomotor task that is particularly suitable for use in fMRI and electrophysiology. The 2-stage task involved punctate visual stimulation and saccadic eye movement responses. In each trial, monkeys made a decision and then made a bet. To earn maximum reward, they had to monitor their decision and use that information to bet advantageously. Two monkeys learned to base their bets on their decisions within a few weeks. We implemented an operational definition of metacognitive behavior that relied on trial-by-trial analyses and signal detection theory. Both monkeys exhibited metacognition according to these quantitative criteria. Neither external visual cues nor potential reaction time cues explained the betting behavior; the animals seemed to rely exclusively on internal traces of their decisions. We documented the learning process of one monkey. During a 10-session transition phase, betting switched from random to a decision-based strategy. The results reinforce previous findings of metacognitive ability in monkeys and may facilitate the neurophysiological investigation of metacognitive functions.