Cognitive Bias in Spider-Phobic Children: Comparison of a Pictorial and a Linguistic Spider Stroop

The relation between spider fear in children and cognitive processing bias toward threatening information was examined. It was investigated whether spider fear in children is related to a cognitive bias for threatening pictures and words. Pictorial and linguistic Stroop stimuli were administered to 28 spider phobic and 30 control children aged 8–12. Spider-phobic children showed a moderate bias for threatening words. Surprisingly, no bias was found for spider pictures, while the spider-phobic children judged the pictures as more aversive. Moreover, in a recent similar study in adults (Kindt & Brosschot, 1997), a strong relation between spider phobia and bias toward threat words and pictures was found. Several explanations are given to account for this divergence.     

Fear generalization in humans: Impact of verbal instructions

Fear generalization lies at the heart of many anxiety problems, but little is known about the factors that can influence this phenomenon. The present study investigated whether verbal instructions about specific stimulus features can influence conditioned fear generalization. All participants were fear conditioned to a yellow triangle, using an electric shock. Participants had received pre-experimental instructions saying that the shapes (or colours) of the stimuli were informative for the occurrence of shock (group Shape and group Colour, respectively). Next, generalization was tested to presentations of a blue triangle (same shape) as well as a yellow square (same colour). Fear reactions were measured through skin conductance and online ratings of shock-expectancy. The results showed strongest generalization to the same shape stimulus in group Shape, versus the same colour stimulus in group Colour. Hence, the same learning experience can have opposite effects in terms of fear generalization, depending on verbally transmitted information about the relative importance of individual stimulus features.     

Stability of Cognitive Bias for Threat Cues in Phobia

The present study examined whether the cognitive bias for threat is a stable phenomenon in spider phobics and not in nonphobic controls. The rationale of this study was that the use of emotional bias for individual assessment in clinical practice requires stability of this phenomenon. In order to assess the stability of the emotional bias, the spider Stroop task was administered twice to spider phobics and controls, with a time lag of 3 weeks. In two experiments, spider phobics (n_{exp. 1} = 20; n_{exp. 2} = 33) and controls (n_{exp. 1} = 24; n_{exp. 2} = 25) were selected on basis of a structured interview. In the second experiment, subjects anticipated exposure to a real-life spider. Emotional bias was inferred from color-naming latencies on spider words versus control words. In line with our prediction, the bias for threat was stable in spider phobic individuals but not in controls. This stability could not be attributed to a general cognitive characteristic because a standard Stroop task did not differentiate between the spider phobics and the controls. The results support the view that cognitive processing of threat in anxiety is stable. It is proposed to use both the emotional bias and its stability as measures of the constraints on the flexibility of the cognitive fear-network.     

Anxiety and Threat Perception Abnormalities in Normal Children

The current study examined the relationship between childhood anxiety and threat perception abnormalities. Children (N = 105) were exposed to stories reflecting three types of anxiety: social anxiety, separation anxiety, and generalized anxiety. From children's reactions to the stories, a number of threat perception indices were derived. Children's level of anxiety was assessed by means of questionnaires and a structured diagnostic interview. Results indicated that high levels of anxiety, as measured by questionnaires and interview, were accompanied by a high frequency of threat perception, high ratings of threat, a high frequency of threatening interpretations, high levels of negative feelings and cognitions, and an early detection of threat. Furthermore, results seemed to suggest that threat perception abnormalities were mediated by children's general level of anxiety rather than by levels of specific anxiety symptoms.     

Gender equality in 4‐ to 5‐year‐old preschoolers’ early numerical competencies

Numerical competencies acquired in preschool are foundational and predictive for children's later mathematical development. It remains to be determined whether there are gender differences in these early numerical competencies which could explain the often‐reported gender differences in later mathematics and STEM‐related abilities. Using a Bayesian approach, we quantified the evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis of gender differences versus the null hypothesis of gender equality. Participants were 402 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children attending preschool in Flanders (Belgium). Children were selected via stratified cluster sampling to represent the full range of socioeconomic backgrounds. All children completed eight numerical tasks (verbal counting, object counting, numeral recognition, symbolic comparison, nonsymbolic comparison, nonverbal calculation, number order, dot enumeration). Results supported the gender equality hypothesis, and this evidence was substantial for seven of the eight numerical tasks. Preschoolers’ early numerical competencies are characterized by gender equality. They probably do not explain later‐reported gender differences.     

Selective attention and threat: quick orienting versus slow disengagement and two versions of the dot probe task

The dot probe task is often used to assess attentional bias in anxiety, but some aspects need clarification. First, the results, which are traditionally summarized in an attentional bias index, do not allow for distinguishing between different selective attention processes; orienting and disengagement. Second, different versions of the dot probe task have been used with unknown relative merits. Participants (N=133) completed two versions of the dot probe task: the detection task (i.e. is there a probe?) and the differentiation task (i.e. what sort of probe is it?). The analysis carried out allowed for a differentiation between orienting and disengagement. The main finding was that trait anxiety is related to disengagement difficulties and not to speed of orienting. Concerning the relative merits of the two dot probe task versions, the results suggest that the detection task may be superior to the differentiation task. Implications for past and future research are discussed.     

Dissociation and memory fragmentation: experimental effects on meta-memory but not on actual memory performance

The relation between state dissociation and fragmentary memory was investigated by assessing both actual memory performance and meta-memory. From a sample of 330 normal subjects, two subsamples were selected on basis of trait dissociation, as measured by the Dissociative Experience Scale. Twenty subjects scoring above 30 and 20 subjects scoring below 10 were selected. Subjects watched an extremely aversive film, after which state dissociation was measured by the Peri-traumatic Dissociative Experience Scale. Four hours later memory fragmentation was assessed in two ways. Actual fragmentation was measured by a sequential memory task, and perceived fragmentation (meta-memory) was measured using a visual analogue scale. Subjects who tended to dissociate during the film judged their recollections of the film as more fragmentary. Although this finding is in line with clinical reports given by trauma victims, it was not sustained by objective evidence. That is, no effect was observed of state dissociation on the sequential memory task. The present findings suggest that the claim that dissociation induces memory fragmentation may have to be confined to meta-memory. Implications of this divergence between actual memory and meta-memory are discussed.     

Repeated checking causes memory distrust

This paper attempts to explain why in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) checkers distrust in memory persists despite extensive checking. It is argued that: (1) repeated checking increases familiarity with the issues checked; (2) increased familiarity promotes conceptual processing which inhibits perceptual processing; (3) inhibited perceptual processing makes recollections less vivid and detailed and finally; (4) reduction in vividness and detail promotes distrust in memory. An interactive computer animation was developed in which participants had to perform checking rituals on a virtual gas stove. Two separate experiments were carried out with n=39 (Experiment I) and n=40 (Experiment II) healthy participants. In both studies, the control group and the experimental group were given the same pre-test and post-test on the virtual gas stove. In between, the experimental group engaged in 'relevant checking', i.e. checking the gas stove, while the control group engaged in 'irrelevant checking', i.e. checking virtual light bulbs. In both experiments there were powerful effects of repeated 'relevant checking': while actual memory accuracy remained unaffected, the vividness and detail of the recollections were greatly reduced. Most pertinently, in both experiments relevant checking undermined confidence in memory. No such effects were observed in the control group. One might argue that the pre-test/post-test design may have made the control group anticipate a memory assessment at the post-test and that this artifact made them relatively alert producing memory confidence at post test that was artificially high. A third experiment was carried out (n=2 x 20) in which no pre-test was given while, other than that, Experiment III was identical to the first two experiments. Results confirmed earlier findings: compared to the irrelevant checking control group, recollections in the relevant checking group were non-vivid, non-detailed while confidence in memory was low. The theory and data suggest an answer to the question 'why memory distrust persists despite repetitive checking'. In people who check extensively, memory distrust may persist as a result of repetitive checking. OCD checking may be motivated by the wish to reduce uncertainty, but checking appears to be a counter-productive safety strategy. Rather than reducing doubt, checking fosters doubt and ironically increases meta-memory problems.     

Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction

In earlier experiments using interactive computer animation with healthy subjects, it was found that displaying compulsive-like repeated checking behavior affects memory. That is, checking does not alter actual memory accuracy, but it does affect 'meta-memory': as checking continues, recollections are experienced as less vivid and less detailed while confidence in memory is undermined. This procedure provides a model of OCD checking and suggests that checking is a counterproductive strategy to reduce memory distrust. The present experiment was carried out to specify the phenomenological quality of memory distrust after checking and to see if repeated checking produces a shift in the memory source that is used to decide about the outcome of checking: from 'remembering' to 'knowing' (Tulving, 1985). Using the same interactive computer-animation, the earlier findings on vividness, detail and confidence were replicated. In addition, it was found that checking made participants endorse quotations from OCD patients (Reed, 1985) expressing a specific ambivalence about memory: 'It is as though the memory is there, but is isn't definite enough', 'I remember doing it in a way, but it's all fuzzy....' And 'I can remember that I've done it. But the memory isn't clear somehow'. This finding adds to the validity of the experimental model. Furthermore, after checking subjects' beliefs about the outcome of checking became based on (general) knowing instead of (specific) remembering. It is suggested that OCD checkers feel a general and relatively strong need to be certain about the veracity of recollections and that they have high standards for memory performance. This may explain earlier findings that OCD checkers have a general tendency to distrust their episodic memory. A need for certainty and a critical attitude towards memory performance may not be problematic or abnormal. It is suggested that clinical problems arise when the patient tries to fight memory distrust by repeated checking. The latter does not reduce distrust but rather increases distrust and the patient may get trapped in a spiral of mutually reinforcing checking behavior and memory distrust.