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James R. Mensch 《Husserl Studies》1991,8(2):107-127
For over a decade John Searle's ingenious argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence has held a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. This is not just because of its striking central example and the apparent simplicity of its argument. As its appearance in Scientific American testifies, it is also due to its importance to the wider scientific community. If Searle is right, artificial intelligence in the strict sense, the sense that would claim that mind can be instantiated through a formal program of symbol manipulation, is basically wrong. No set of formal conditions can provide us with the characteristic feature of mind which is the intentionally of its mental contents. Formally regarded, such intentionally is an irreducible primitive. It cannot be analyzed into non-intentional (purely syntactic, symbolic) components. This paper will argue that this objection is based on a misunderstanding. Intentionality is not simply something given which is incapable of further analysis. It only appears so when we mistakenly abstract it from time. When we regard its temporal structure, it shows itself as a rule-governed, synthetic process, one capable of being instantiated both by machines and men. 相似文献
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James Mensch 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,42(4):449-463
In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence,
assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive. In this article,
I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering
a number of examples. In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather
at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality
and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure. 相似文献
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James Mensch 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(1):31-47
“Public space” is the space where individuals see and are seen by others as they engage in public affairs. Hannah Arendt links this space with “public freedom.” The being of such freedom, she asserts, depends on its appearing. It consists of “deeds and words which are meant to appear, whose very existence hinges on appearance.” Such appearance, however, requires the public space. Reflecting on Arendt’s remarks, a number of questions arise: What does the dependence of freedom on public space tell us about the nature of freedom? How does public freedom relate to the freedom of a private individual? Does the latter also depend on its appearing? Which is generatively prior: freedom or public space, i.e., the actions that publicly manifest freedom or the space required for their appearance? How does public power shape this space? In this article, I approach these questions through a phenomenological study of public space. 相似文献
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Continental Philosophy Review - As Merleau-Ponty points out, our sense of time is that of passage. This demands that we think of time both as extended—that is, as including the past and the... 相似文献
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Continental Philosophy Review - This article examines the concept of existence underlying Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy—a concept is that Heidegger largely shares. Can such a... 相似文献
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Jennifer Mensch 《European Journal of Philosophy》2011,19(3):431-453
Abstract: This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant's system. Part one develops Kant's attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant's epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom's relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant's subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe's contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself. 相似文献
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Continental Philosophy Review - René Girard speaks of the return of the religious as a “return of the sacred… in the form of violence.” This violence was inherent in the... 相似文献
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James Mensch 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(1):109-118
Situating the Self By Seyla Benhabib Polity Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 266. ISBN 0–7456–1059–5. £11.95 pbk. A Descartes Dictionary By John Cottingham Basil Blackwell, 1993. Pp. 187. ISBN 0–631–18538–0. £12.99 pbk. A reply to Baker and Morris By John Cottingham Truth and Objectivity By Crispin Wright Harvard University Press, 1992. Pp. x + 247. ISBN 0–674–91086–9. £19.95. 相似文献