Early explications of family communication patterns (FCP) suggested that a family's communication pattern arises as a result of interactions in which parents and adolescents influence each other. In contrast, empirical research usually treats FCP as parent‐imposed norms that influence socialization outcomes in adolescents, without testing whether adolescents' socialization influences FCP. This study revisits the assumption that adolescents influence FCP, using data from a longitudinal quasi‐experimental evaluation of a school‐based civics curriculum intervention (N = 313 parent‐adolescent pairs). Results show that the intervention‐stimulated adolescents to initiate discussion of politics at home and that these adolescent‐initiated discussions influenced adolescents' and parents' perceptions of FCP 6 months later. 相似文献
According to the Body‐Specificity Hypothesis (BSH), people implicitly associate positive ideas with the side of space on which they are able to act more fluently with their dominant hand. Though this hypothesis has been rigorously tested across a variety of populations and tasks, the studies thus far have only been conducted in linguistic and cultural communities which favor the right over the left. Here, we tested the effect of handedness on implicit space‐valence mappings in Tibetan practitioners of Bön who show a strong religious preference for the left, in comparison to an English group. Results showed that Bön right‐handers tended to implicitly associate positive valence more strongly with their dominant side of space despite strong explicit associations between the left and goodness in their religion. This pattern of results found in Bön participants was indistinguishable from that found in English speakers. The findings of the present study support the BSH, demonstrating that space‐valence mappings in people's minds are shaped by their bodily experience, which appears to be independent of space‐valence mappings enshrined in cultural conventions. 相似文献
G. Priest's anti-consistency argument (Priest 1979, 1984, 1987) and J. R. Lucas's anti-mechanist argument (Lucas 1961, 1968, 1970, 1984) both appeal to Gödel incompleteness. By way of refuting them, this paper defends the thesis of quartet compatibility, viz., that the logic of the mind can simultaneously be Gödel incomplete, consistent, mechanical, and recursion complete (capable of all means of recursion). A representational approach is pursued, which owes its origin to works by, among others, J. Myhill (1964), P. Benacerraf (1967), J. Webb (1980, 1983) and M. Arbib (1987). It is shown that the fallacy shared by the two arguments under discussion lies in misidentifying two systems, the one for which the Gödel sentence is constructable and to be proved, and the other in which the Gödel sentence in question is indeed provable. It follows that the logic of the mind can surpass its own Gödelian limitation not by being inconsistent or non-mechanistic, but by being capable of representing stronger systems in itself; and so can a proper machine. The concepts of representational provability, representational maximality, formal system capacity, etc., are discussed. 相似文献
Five experiments examined whether recognizable stimuli predominate in binocular rivalry. It was found that a face predominated more than did a pattern equated for spatial frequency, luminance, and contrast; an objective reaction time procedure confirmed predominance of the face. The face was still liable to fragmentation as stimulus size increased. Observers tracked exclusive dominance of a picture of a camouflaged figure (a Dalmatian dog) prior to and then following discovery of the figure's presence; control observers received the same protocol with a scrambled version of the dog stimulus. Compared with control results, predominance of the dog picture was higher even before observers knew of the camouflaged figure. Inversion of the dog figure reduced its predominance. Binocular rivalry is sensitive to object-related, configural properties of a stimulus. 相似文献
Galef and his colleagues have repeatedly shown that one rat may transfer information regarding the type of food it has consumed to other conspecifics. Such experiments typically have been conducted in wire-mesh cages or a wooden maze. The present experiments sought to extend this paradigm to the open-field foraging situation having six food patches to choose from. Following interaction with a demonstrator that had consumed either a cocoa or a cinnamon diet, single observers (Experiment 1) were tested in the foraging situation. Food-consumption scores indicated that observers consumed significantly more of their specific demonstrator’s diet than a second diet that was available also. Experiment 2 involved the simultaneous testing of two observers in the foraging laboratory. In Experiment 3 two observers were once again tested, but each had been provided a different food-type message prior to foraging. Positive results, mirroring those of Experiment 1, were obtained in both Experiments 2 and 3. The results of these three experiments underscore the robustness of this phenomenon and its generalizability to other testing conditions.
With a sample of 18 capital cases tried in Kentucky, South Carolina, and California, we attempted to replicate an earlier study which showed that significantly more defense challenges for cause were granted under conditions of sequestered, individual voir dire than when voir dire was conducted under less enhanced conditions. In the current sample, sequestered, individual voir dire again resulted in more defense removals for cause than obtained with less extensive voir dire. We present data on the defense removals for cause partitioned into five categories according to the reason for the challenge and analyze the effects of jury selection consultants on the various indices of voir dire as well as final sentence. 相似文献
This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency. 相似文献