Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics?

I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view Pearson did hold gives a deeper understanding of NPT tests than their typical formulation as accept-reject routines, against which criticisms of NPT are really directed. The Pearsonian view that emerges suggests how NPT tests may avoid these criticisms while still retaining what is central to these methods: the control of error probabilities.A portion of this research was carried out during tenure of a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend Fellowship; I gratefully acknowledge that support. A version of this paper was presented at the 1987 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. This paper benefited from discussions and communications with George Barnard and Isaac Levi. I thank Harlan Miller for helpful comments on earlier drafts.     

Philosophy of Education is Bent

Troubled times in education means that philosophers of education, who seem to never stop making defenses of our field, have to do so with more flexibility and a greater understanding of how peripheral we may have become. The only thing worse than a defensive philosopher is a confident and certain philosopher, so it may be that our very marginality will give us renewed energies for problematizing education. Occupying our marginal position carefully and in concert with other marginal inquiries, I think, will do our field good. Because of its attention to what it takes to be willing to learn and to approach theoretical and real world obstacles with open if cautious interest, philosophy of education is about holding concepts and movements in tension, bending the implications of commonplace, commonsensical ideas about education, and carefully examining the all of these maneuvers for the exclusions they wittingly and unwittingly produce. Problematizing the certainties derived from majoritarian positions, be it whiteness, Westernness, or any other dominant perspective, can provide us with a diversity of claims to scrutinize and epistemological positions to be wary of.     

If I imagine it,then it happened: The Implicit Truth Value of imaginary representations

Imagination sometimes leads people to behave, feel, and think as though imagined events were real even when they know they were not. In this paper, we suggest that some understanding of these phenomena can be achieved by differentiating between Implicit Truth Value (ITV), a spontaneous truth evaluation, and Explicit Truth Value (ETV), a self-reported truth judgment. In three experiments, we measure ITV using the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008), which has been used to assess which of two autobiographical events is true. Our findings demonstrate that imagining an event, like experiencing an event, increases its ITV, even when people explicitly acknowledge the imagined event as false (Experiments 1a and 1b). Furthermore, we show that imagined representations generated from a first-person perspective have higher ITV than imagined representations generated from a third-person perspective (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that implicit and explicit measures of truth differ in their sensitivity to properties underlying truth judgment. We discuss the contribution of characterizing events according to both ITV and ETV to the understanding of various psychological phenomena, such as lying and self-deception.     

Rational suicide?

Abstract

Two competing paradigms of suicide imply different views of whether suicide can be rational. The first, the “received orthodoxy” of mental health professionals for more than a century, views all suicides as irrational and holds that suicidal persons should always be prevented from ending their own lives. The second grants that most suicides are irrational, but claims suicide may sometimes be a rational option. Lokhandwala and Westefeld's argument manifests the conflict between these two paradigms: After initially granting that suicide may be a rational option for some people, they in effect urge mental health professionals to presume in practice that any suicidal patient is irrational. Patients for whom suicide might indeed be rational will be ill-served by mental health professionals who follow Lokhandwala and Westefeld's advice.     

The development of depth perception from motion parallax in infancy

North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota Little is known about infants' perception of depth from motion parallax, even though it is known that infants are sensitive both to motion and to depth-from-motion cues at an early age. The present experiment assesses whether infants are sensitive to the unambiguous depth specified by motion parallax and, if so, when this sensitivity first develops. Eleven infants were followed longitudinally from 8 to 29 weeks. Infants monocularly viewed a translating Rogers and Graham (1979) random-dot stimulus, which appears as a corrugated surface to adult observers. Using the infant-control habituation paradigm, looking time was recorded for each 10-sec trial until habituation, followed by two test trials: one using a depth-reversed and one using a flat stimulus. Dishabituation results indicate that infants may be sensitive to unambiguous depth from motion parallax by 16 weeks of age. Implications for the developmental sequence of depth from motion, stereopsis, and eye movements are discussed.