Competition between antecedent and between subsequent stimuli in causal judgments

In the analysis of stimulus competition in causal judgment, 4 variables have been frequently confounded with respect to the conditions necessary for stimuli to compete: causal status of the competing stimuli (causes vs. effects), temporal order of the competing stimuli (antecedent vs. subsequent) relative to the noncompeting stimulus, directionality of training (predictive vs. diagnostic), and directionality of testing (predictive vs. diagnostic). In a factorial study using an overshadowing preparation, the authors isolated the role of each of these variables and their interactions. The results indicate that competition may be obtained in all conditions. Although some of the results are compatible with various theories of learning, the observation of stimulus competition in all conditions calls for a less restrictive reformulation of current learning theories that allows similar processing of antecedent and subsequent events, as well as of causes and effects.     

Cues trained apart compete for behavioral control in rats: convergence with the associative interference literature

Contemporary theories of associative learning require cues be trained in compound for cue competition (interference) to occur. That is, Cues A and X should compete for behavioral control only if training consists of AX-outcome (O) trials and not if each cue is separately paired with O (i.e., X-O and A-O). Research with humans challenges this view by showing that A-O trials interpolated between training and testing of a X-O association impair responding to X (i.e., retroactive interference). In six conditioned suppression studies with rats, the authors demonstrate that two cues trained apart can each interfere with the potential of the other to predict the outcome. The authors conclude that this type of interference (a) reflects a failure to retrieve the target association due to priming at test of the interfering association and (b) is attenuated if the outcome is of high biological significance. These findings parallel previous reports in verbal learning research and suggest that a similar associative structure underlies some types of associations in nonverbal subjects.     

The role of outcome inhibition in interference between outcomes: A contingency‐learning analogue of retrieval‐induced forgetting

Current associative theories of contingency learning assume that inhibitory learning plays a part in the interference between outcomes. However, it is unclear whether this inhibitory learning results in the inhibition of the outcome representation or whether it simply counteracts previous excitatory learning so that the outcome representation is neither activated nor inhibited. Additionally, these models tend to conceptualize inhibition as a relatively transient and cue‐dependent state. However, research on retrieval‐induced forgetting suggests that the inhibition of representations is a real process that can be relatively independent of the retrieval cue used to access the inhibited information. Consistent with this alternative view, we found that interference between outcomes reduces the retrievability of the target outcome even when the outcome is associated with a novel (non‐inhibitory) cue. This result has important theoretical implications for associative models of interference and shows that the empirical facts and theories developed in studies of retrieval‐induced forgetting might be relevant in contingency learning and vice versa.     

Competition Between Outcomes

In both Pavlovian conditioning and human causal judgment, competition between cues is well known to occur when multiple cues are presented in compound and followed by an outcome. More questionable is the occurrence of competition between outcomes when a single cue is followed by multiple outcomes presented in compound. In the experiment reported here, we demonstrated blocking (a type of stimulus competition) between outcomes. When the cue predicted one outcome, its ability to predict a second outcome that was presented in compound with the first outcome was reduced. The procedure minimized the likelihood that the observed competition between outcomes arose from selective attention. The competition between outcomes that we observed is problematic for contemporary theories of learning.     

Contrasting cue-density effects in causal and prediction judgments

Many theories of contingency learning assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that predicting whether an outcome will occur should be easier than making a causal judgment. Previous research suggests that outcome predictions would depart from normative standards less often than causal judgments, which is consistent with the idea that the latter are based on more numerous and complex processes. However, only indirect evidence exists for this view. The experiment presented here specifically addresses this issue by allowing for a fair comparison of causal judgments and outcome predictions, both collected at the same stage with identical rating scales. Cue density, a parameter known to affect judgments, is manipulated in a contingency learning paradigm. The results show that, if anything, the cue-density bias is stronger in outcome predictions than in causal judgments. These results contradict key assumptions of many influential theories of contingency learning.     

Backward blocking: the role of within-compound associations and interference between cues trained apart

Most theoretical accounts of backward blocking place heavy stress on the necessity of the target cue having been trained in compound with the competing cue to produce a decrement in responding. Yet, other evidence suggests that a similar reduction in responding to the target cue can be observed when the outcome is later paired with a novel cue never trained in compound with the target cue (interference between cues trained apart). The present experiment shows that pairing another nonassociated cue with the same outcome may be sufficient to produce a decremental effect on the target cue, but the presence of a within-compound association between the target and the competing cue adds to this effect. Thus, both interference between cues trained apart and within-compound associations independently contribute to backward blocking.     

Depressive Realism: Wiser or Quieter?

The Psychological Record - Depressive realism consists of the lower personal control over uncontrollable events perceived by depressed as compared to nondepressed individuals. In this article, we...     

ILLUSION OF CONTROL:

Abstract— Experiments in which subjects are asked to analytically assess response-outcome relationships have frequently yielded accurate judgments of response-outcome independence, but more naturalistically set experiments in which subjects are instructed to obtain the outcome have frequently yielded illusions of control. The present research tested the hypothesis that a differential probability of responding p (R), between these two traditions could be at the basis of these different results. Subjects received response-independent outcomes and were instructed either to obtain the outcome (naturalistic condition) or to behave scientifically in order to find out how much control over the outcome was possible (analytic condition). Subjects in the naturalistic condition tended to respond at almost every opportunity and developed a strong illusion of control. Subjects in the analytic condition maintained their p (R) at a point close to 5 and made accurate judgments of control. The illusion of control observed in the naturalistic condition appears to be a collateral effect of a high tendency to respond in subjects who are trying to obtain an outcome, this tendency to respond prevents them from learning that the outcome would have occurred with the same probability if they had not responded.     

Predictions and causal estimations are not supported by the same associative structure

Studies performed by different researchers have shown that judgements about cue-outcome relationships are systematically influenced by the type of question used to request those judgements. It is now recognized that judgements about the strength of the causal link between a cue and an outcome are mostly determined by the cue-outcome contingency, whereas predictions of the outcome are more influenced by the probability of the outcome given the cue. Although these results make clear that those different types of judgement are mediated by some knowledge of the normative differences between causal estimations and outcome predictions, they do not speak to the underlying processes of these effects. The experiment presented here reveals an interaction between the type of question and the order of trials that challenges standard models of causal and predictive learning that are framed exclusively in associative terms or exclusively in higher order reasoning terms. However, this evidence could be easily explained by assuming the combined intervention of both types of process.