Normative Practical Reasoning: Christian Pillar

In the first part I discuss the thesis, advanced by John Broome, that intentions are normatively required by all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. I endorse this thesis, but remain sceptical about Broome's programme of grounding the correctness of reasoning in formal relations between contents of mental states. After discussing objections to the thesis, I concentrate in the second part on the relation between rational action and rational intention. I distinguish between content-related and attitude-related reasons for propositional attitudes like believing, wanting, and intending something. The former appeal to features of the content of the propositional attitude they are reasons for, the latter would be reasons for a propositional attitude because of features of the propositional attitude as a whole, for example the feature of its being beneficial to believe or to want that p . I try to show that the common philosophical reaction to attitude-related reasons, namely to claim that they are merely content-related reasons in disguise, is mistaken. In its most extreme form such a reaction would fail to respect the first-person character of reasoning which manifests itself in, among other things, the fact that a Moore-sentence and its analogue for intentions cannot be a conclusion of reasoning. In the third part I argue that there are attitude-related reasons for intentions, and, in showing how they influence practical deliberation, I find that their existence can be rendered compatible with the thesis that it is rational to intend to do what one thinks one ought to do.     

Influence of Connectives on Language Comprehension: Eye tracking Evidence for Incremental Interpretation

An eye-tracking experiment investigated whether incremental interpretation applies to interclausal relationships. According to Millis and Just's (1994) delayed-integration hypothesis, interclausal relationships are not computed until the end of the second clause, because the processor needs to have two full propositions before integration can occur. We investigated the processing of causal and diagnostic sentences (Sweetser, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) that contained the connective because . Previous research (Traxler, Sanford, Aked, & Moxey, 1997) has demonstrated that readers have greater difficulty processing diagnostic sentences than causal sentences. Our results indicated that difficulty processing diagnostic sentences occurred well before the end of the second clause. Thus comprehenders appear to compute interclausal relationships incrementally.     

Solving the rod-and-frame test in a tachistoscopic presentation: Effects of stimulus size and perceptual style

This research was undertaken to demonstrate, with correlational evidence, that presenting the rod-and-frame test (RIT) with either limited (tachistoscopic) or unlimited (Oltman’s, 1968, portable RFT) exposure time does not significantly affect the ranking of subjects. The underlying hypothesis is that the intersubject variability of performance on the portable RFT is due essentially to differences in sensitivity to the optostatic vection that appears automatically and almost immediately. Results of the tachistoscopic test show that the effect of angular size of the stimulus is similar to that described in the literature for unlimited time situations, and that subjects’ ranking is very similar regardless of the exposure time (W = .80). However, although a difference is observed between the means of low and high achievers in both types of RFT, intraindividual intertask homogeneity (correlation coefficient) is not verified in each of these subgroups. From these results, one can distinguish two processes in the RFT: the first, vections, has to do with the subject’s postural orientation and seems to playa great role in organizing interindividual differences. The second process, a more cognitive one, has a less striking effect and has to do with the selection of reference frames in perceptual organization.