The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.     

Interpersonal conflict in group therapy: An object relations perspective

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how object relations theory can be used to understand and regulate interpersonal conflict in group psychotherapy. Such concepts as projective identification, intersubjectivity and the analytic third are used to describe how conflict emerges in group psychotherapy and how it can be worked through. Case material is also provided to illustrate concepts and techniques in promoting a group's transition from a paranoid/schizoid to a depressive position. Positive aspects of the concept of projective identification are discussed including its use as a form of communication, a method of reducing anxiety and reintegrating previously dangerous and threatening aspects of the self.The paper was funded by Evan F. Lilly Memorial Trust Grant PV 13,067.     

Selective deficit of conceptual structures in aphasia: Class versus thematic relations

Conceptual structures in aphasia were investigated by means of a nonverbal test. The understanding of class and thematic relationships was demonstrated to be selectively impaired according to varieties of aphasic deficit. Broca's aphasics showed difficulty evaluating a thematic relationship and did not differ from normal controls as far as class relationships were concerned. The opposite happened for Wernicke's aphasics whose defect seems to be selectively restricted to class relationships.     

Psychosis,symbol, affectivity 1: etiopathogenesis and treatment through analytical psychology

This is the first of two papers concerning our study into an integrated approach to psychotic disorders, conducted at the University of Palermo’s Psychiatry Unit Polyclinic over approximately 15 years. Here we will explore and reflect upon the acute psychotic condition mainly from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, while in the second paper we will explore the clinical perspective. From the point of view of psychopathology, and in the light of C.G. Jung’s conceptualization of analytical psychology, as well as calling on contributions from other authors from the systemic-relational and post-psychoanalytic field, we will clarify the ideas developed over these last few years by our team. From a more speculative perspective we will advance new interpretive hypotheses in an attempt to thoroughly understand the nature of the psychotic condition, both on a psychodynamic relational and a neuroscientific level. The paper describes how we revised our understanding of psychosis from a brain disease to a process aimed at the rearrangement of psychic functioning, as anticipated by John Weir Perry nearly 40 years ago.     

The phantom illumination illusion

A novel brightness illusion in planar patterns is reported. The illusion occurs, for example, when surfaces with a luminance ramp shaded from black to white are positioned on a black homogeneous background, so that each white end of the surfaces faces a single point of the plane of the pattern. The illusion consists of the enhancement of the brightness of the background in a relatively wide area around the white ends of the surfaces. A parametric study was conducted in which participants were asked to rate the difference in brightness between the parts of the background inside and outside a virtual circle formed by disks with different luminance ramps. The results show that mean ratings of brightness depended on the luminance of the background, the luminance range of ramps, and the kind of ramp. Discussion of these results with reference to other brightness illusions (assimilation, neon color spreading, anomalous surfaces, visual phantoms, grating induction, and the glare effect) shows that t hephantom illumination illusion derives from processes producing the perception of ambient illumination.     

Additional weight influences the reaching behavior of low-risk preterm infants

The authors investigated the influence of additional weight in the reaching behavior of preterm infants. Nine low-risk preterm and 10 full-term infants age 5-7 months participated. A toy was presented in two procedures: (a) baseline and (b) additional weight (bracelet with weight of 20% of the infant's upper limb mass). The additional weight reduced the straightness index at 5 months, increased the mean velocity and decreased the movement units at all months, and increased unsuccessful grasps at 5 and 7 months in preterm infants. Preterm infants showed less movement units at all months and less unsuccessful grasps at 6 months compared with full-term infants. Weight disturbance seems to change the intrinsic dynamics involved in reaching movements of 5-7-month-old preterm infants.     

Incompatibility Semantics from Agreement

In this paper, I discuss the analysis of logic in the pragmatic approach recently proposed by Brandom. I consider different consequence relations, formalized by classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, and I will argue that the formal theory developed by Brandom, even if provides powerful foundational insights on the relationship between logic and discursive practices, cannot account for important reasoning patterns represented by non-monotonic or resource-sensitive inferences. Then, I will present an incompatibility semantics in the framework of linear logic which allow to refine Brandom’s concept of defeasible inference and to account for those non-monotonic and relevant inferences that are expressible in linear logic. Moreover, I will suggest an interpretation of discursive practices based on an abstract notion of agreement on what counts as a reason which is deeply connected with linear logic semantics.     

Could direct and generative retrieval be two flips of the same coin? A dual-task paradigm study

Cognitive Processing - Autobiographical memories are thought to be retrieved using two possible ways: a generative one, which is effortful and follows a general-to-specific pathway, and a direct...     

Scepticism,defeasible evidence and entitlement

The paper starts by describing and clarifying what Williamson calls the consequence fallacy. I show two ways in which one might commit the fallacy. The first, which is rather trivial, involves overlooking background information; the second way, which is the more philosophically interesting, involves overlooking prior probabilities. In the following section, I describe a powerful form of sceptical argument, which is the main topic of the paper, elaborating on previous work by Huemer. The argument attempts to show the impossibility of defeasible justification, justification based on evidence which does not entail the (allegedly) justified proposition or belief. I then discuss the relation between the consequence fallacy, or some similar enough reasoning, and that form of argument. I argue that one can resist that form of sceptical argument if one gives up the idea that a belief cannot be justified unless it is supported by the totality of the evidence available to the subject—a principle entailed by many prominent epistemological views, most clearly by epistemological evidentialism. The justification, in the relevant cases, should instead derive solely from the prior probability of the proposition. A justification of this sort, that does not rely on evidence, would amount to a form of entitlement, in (something like) Crispin Wright’s sense. I conclude with some discussion of how to understand prior probabilities, and how to develop the notion of entitlement in an externalist epistemological framework.     

Exploring social and personal relationships: The issue of measurement invariance of non‐independent observations

In social psychology, some research questions address a comparison of individuals belonging to different social or relational contexts. As measurement invariance literature has indicated, before comparing two or more groups (gender, cultures, and relationship types), the question of whether a measurement of the construct used for the comparison is invariant must be verified. Measurement invariance helps to assure the validity of the measurement and the construct equivalence across groups. However, when non‐independent data are used for comparison (the same individual provides data for his or her different relationship types), the standard multigroup analyses for testing measurement invariance are not accurate. The current study presents a modified correlated uniqueness model that may be applied in these specific cases. As an example, we analyzed the invariance of the Intimate Disclosure scale and the Conflict scale in mother–child, father–child, and romantic relationships of young adults. Results indicate a partial invariance: only configural invariance, factor loading invariance, and factor covariance invariance were found. The consequences for validity of the measurement are then discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.