Modifying Beliefs and Attitudes to Exceeding the Speed Limit: An Intervention Study Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior1

This study builds on previous theory of planned behavior (TPB) studies in which we identified the beliefs and values which predict intention to commit driving violations. Four short experimental videos were developed in order to assess the effectiveness of an intervention grounded in the TPB. Three of the videos featured the major constructs of the TPB model. The fourth video featured anticipated regret, an addition to the TPB model which had previously been shown to add significantly to its predictive performance (Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 1995). Results indicated that two of the videos brought about statistically significant belief changes with respect to scores on TPB items, and significant changes in general attitudes toward speeding. Discussion centers on the problems encountered in operationalizing the TPB constructs and on the potential of theory-based interventions to induce attitude change.     

Gender and culture differences in emotion

In this article, the authors report a secondary analysis on a cross-cultural dataset on gender differences in 6 emotions, collected in 37 countries all over the world. The aim was to test the universality of the gender-specific pattern found in studies with Western respondents, namely that men report more powerful emotions (e.g., anger), whereas women report more powerless emotions (e.g., sadness, fear). The authors expected the strength of these gender differences to depend on women's status and roles in their respective countries, as operationalized by the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM; United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2002). Overall, the gender-specific pattern of women reporting to experience and express more powerless emotions and men more powerful emotions was replicated, and only some interactions with the GEM were found.     

The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations

Three experiments investigated the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In the course of a computer-mediated negotiation, participants received information about the emotional state (anger, happiness, or none) of their opponent. Consistent with a strategic-choice perspective, Experiment 1 showed that participants conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one. Experiment 2 showed that this effect was caused by tracking--participants used the emotion information to infer the other's limit, and they adjusted their demands accordingly. However, this effect was absent when the other made large concessions. Experiment 3 examined the interplay between experienced and communicated emotion and showed that angry communications (unlike happy ones) induced fear and thereby mitigated the effect of the opponent's experienced emotion. These results suggest that negotiators are especially influenced by their opponent's emotions when they are motivated and able to consider them.     

Anchoring,Familiarity, and Confidence in the Detection of Deception

Anchoring in judgments is the tendency for the final judgment to be biased toward the initial estimate through insufficient adjustment. In the context of the detection of deception, it has been used to explain phenomena such as negative absolute leakage and the truthfulness bias. We examined the influence of order of judgment type on attitude ratings, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias. Receivers of communications should tend to anchor their judgments on the sender's attitudinal position if asked to make attitude judgments first and on the sender's behavior if asked to make truthfulness judgments first. The results partly support these predictions. Negative absolute leakage, accuracy, and the truthfulness bias were not significantly different for those who made attitude judgments before truthfulness judgments. However, results show that accuracy decreased as the session continued and there was no difference in the confidence with which truth and deception judgments were made, but there was a positive relation between confidence and truthfulness bias.     

Making sense of emotion in stories and social life

Abstract

This paper is concerned with some limitations of the vignette methodology used in contemporary appraisal research and their implications for appraisal theory. We focus on two recent studies in which emotional manipulations were achieved using textual materials, and criticise the investigators' apparent implicit assumption that participation in everyday social reality is somehow comparable to reading a story. We take issue with three related aspects of this cognitive analogy between life and its narrative representation, by arguing that emotional reactions in real life are not necessarily mediated by symbolic processes, that people are involved participants of real life rather than neutral observers, and that in real life people's evaluations and emotions are typically part of an ongoing dialogue rather than the expression of a soliloquy. Results from these studies of emotional vignettes therefore tend to overestimate the importance of constructive, abstract, and individualistic processes in the everyday causation of social emotions. In real life, people do not necessarily have to calculate, transform, or internally represent the meaning of the dynamic situation in order to make emotional sense of what is happening to them in the social world.     

Type a behaviour pattern as a risk factor after myocardial infarction: A review

Abstract

This paper is a response to Eiser's (1996) call for a unifying theoretical perspective that would bridge the gap between 'individualistic and ‘social’ approaches to studying human social behaviour in general, and health behaviour in particular. While agreeing with Eiser's premise that it makes no sense to study cognition, affect, and behaviour independently of social context, the present paper takes issue with certain features of his argument that a connectionist approach provides the needed unifying theoretical framework. It is suggested that if connectionism can describe the psychological processes underlying social behavior better than non-connectionist theories, this would provide more compelling evidence of its value than claims that it affords new theoretical insights.     

Regret and Responsibility Resolved? Evaluating Ordóñez and Connolly's (2000) Conclusions

T. Connolly, L. D. Ordo;aan;atez, and R. Coughlan (1997, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 70, 73-85) argued, on the basis of 5 experiments, that regret need not be related to a sense of responsibility for the regretted outcome. We (M. Zeelenberg, W. W. van Dijk, & A. S. R. Manstead, 1998, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74, 254-272) showed in 2 experiments that this conclusion was premature, because it was based on an indirect measure of regret (i.e., overall happiness with the decision outcome). When regret was directly measured, the predicted effects of responsibility were found. L. D. Ordo;aan;atez and T. Connolly (2000, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 81, 132-142) replicated our findings in 2 experiments. Based on their findings they arrived at 4 conclusions. In this rejoinder we first discuss Ordó?ez and Connolly's new studies and we then discuss the validity of their 4 conclusions. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

“Fury,us”: Anger as a basis for new group self-categories

We tested the hypothesis that shared emotions, notably anger, influence the formation of new self-categories. We first measured participants' (N = 89) emotional reactions to a proposal to make university assessment tougher before providing feedback about the reactions of eight other co-present individuals. This feedback always contained information about the other individuals' attitudes to the proposals (four opposed and four not opposed) and in the experimental condition emotion information (of those opposed, two were angry, two were sad). Participants self-categorised more with, and preferred to work with, angry rather than sad targets, but only when participants' own anger was high. These findings support the idea that emotions are a potent determinant of self-categorisation, even in the absence of existing, available self-categories.     

Distinctiveness threat and prototypicality: combined effects on intergroup discrimination and collective self-esteem

The combined influence on ingroup bias of threat to group distinctiveness and prototypicality as a group member was examined in two studies. It was predicted, in line with social identity theory, that threat to group distinctiveness would lead to more ingroup bias. In addition, on the basis of self-categorization theory it was predicted that protypical and peripheral group members would react differently to a threat to their group distinctiveness. Only group members who define themselves as prototypical group members should be motivated to defend their threatened distinctiveness by engaging in increased ingroup bias. This hypothesis was first supported in a modified minimal group setting in which threat was operationalized as overlapping group boundaries. These results were then replicated in a second study, using better-established groups, for whom distinctiveness threat was manipulated in terms of intergroup similarity. Moreover, some support was found in Study 2 for the prediction that the opportunity to engage in intergroup differentiation can, under restricted conditions, enhance group-related self-esteem. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd     

We feel, therefore we are: emotion as a basis for self-categorization and social action

Building on intergroup emotion research, we test the idea that intergroup emotion influences self-categorization. We report two studies using minimal (Study 1) and natural (Study 2) groups in which we measured participants' emotional reactions to a group-relevant event before manipulating the emotional reactions of other ingroup members and outgroup members (anger vs. happiness in Study 1; anger vs. indifference in Study 2). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) the fit between participants' own emotional reactions and the reactions of ingroup members would influence self-categorization, and (b) the specific content of emotional reactions would shape participants' willingness to engage in collective action. This willingness was greater when emotional reactions were not only shared with other group members, but were of anger (consistent with group-based action) rather than happiness or indifference (inconsistent with group-based action). Implications for the relationship between emotion and social identities are discussed.