What is Genetic Information,and why is it Significant? A Contextual,Contrastive, Approach

abstract Is genetic information of special ethical significance? Does it require special regulation? There is considerable contemporary debate about this question (the ‘genetic exceptionalism’ debate). ‘Genetic information’ is an ambiguous term and, as an aid to avoiding conflation in the genetic exceptionalism debate, a detailed account is given of just how and why ‘genetic information’ is ambiguous. Whilst ambiguity is a ubiquitous problem of communication, it is suggested that ‘genetic information’ is ambiguous in a particular way, one that gives rise to the problem of ‘significance creep’ (i.e., where claims about the significance of certain kinds of genetic information in one context influence our thinking about the significance of other kinds of genetic information in other contexts). A contextual and contrastive methodology is proposed: evaluating the significance of genetic information requires us to be sensitive to the polysemy of ‘genetic information’ across contexts and then examine the contrast in significance (if any) of genetic, as opposed to nongenetic, information within contexts. This, in turn, suggests that a proper solution to the regulatory question requires us to pay more attention to how and why information, and its acquisition, possession and use, come to be of ethical significance.     

Making Sense of Spin

‘Spin’ is a pejorative term for a ubiquitous form of communication. Spin is viewed by many as deceptive, and by others as bending or twisting the truth. But spin need not be deceptive and the metaphors are less than clear. The aim here is to clarify what spin is: spin is identified as a form of selective claim‐making, where the process of selection is governed by an intention to bring about promotional perlocutionary effects. The process of selection may pertain to aspects of some situation or phenomenon; or to the lexis used in making the claims. Not all selective promotional communication is spin. Spin involves a distinctive kind of dissociation between the speaker's first‐order interpretation and the constructed interpretation or claim offered to others. With these clarifications in place the discussion turns to the complex connections between spin, truthfulness and deception. Aspect‐selective spin can be truthful, and it need not be deceptive in its intentions or effects, but may risk deceiving audiences. Lexical spin is less readily truthful, and both forms of spin prudentially require a distinctive kind of concealment of the speaker's intentions. The account developed here does not address normative questions about whether, or how, spin might be wrong, but aims to provide a clear and adequate account of spin as a basis for addressing normative questions about spin.     

Spirituality and mental health status among Northern Plain tribes

Spirituality measures often show positive associations with preferred mental health outcomes in the general population; however, research among American Indians (AIs) is limited. We examined the relationships of mental health status and two measures of spirituality – the Midlife Development Inventory (MIDI) and a tribal cultural spirituality measure – in Northern Plains AIs, aged 15–54 (n?=?1636). While the MIDI was unassociated with mental health status, the tribal cultural spirituality measure showed a significant relationship with better mental health status. Mental health conditions disproportionately affect AIs. Understanding protective factors such as cultural spirituality that can mitigate mental health disorders is critical to reducing these health disparities.     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.     

A Meta‐Analytic Investigation of Job Applicant Faking on Personality Measures

This study investigates the extent to which job applicants fake their responses on personality tests. Thirty‐three studies that compared job applicant and non‐applicant personality scale scores were meta‐analyzed. Across all job types, applicants scored significantly higher than non‐applicants on extraversion (d=.11), emotional stability (d=.44), conscientiousness (d=.45), and openness (d=.13). For certain jobs (e.g., sales), however, the rank ordering of mean differences changed substantially suggesting that job applicants distort responses on personality dimensions that are viewed as particularly job relevant. Smaller mean differences were found in this study than those reported by Viswesvaran and Ones (Educational and Psychological Measurement, 59 (2), 197–210), who compared scores for induced “fake‐good” vs. honest response conditions. Also, direct Big Five measures produced substantially larger differences than did indirect Big Five measures.     

Effects of Applicant's Adverse Medical History on College Students' Ratings of Job Applications1

The purpose of this experiment was to determine if the existence of high blood pressure or allergies would decrease the likelihood of a person obtaining a job. Forty-eight college students rated hypothetical job applicants with allergies, high blood pressure, or no adverse physical condition for either a high-stress manager trainee position or a low-stress bookkeeper position. For the manager trainee position, applicants with either high blood pressure or allergies were rated significantly lower than the applicants with no adverse physical condition. For the bookkeeper position there were no significant differences between the ratings of the individuals with the different physical conditions. These results suggest that any adverse physical condition may have a negative prototype associated with it; however, a job applicant's physical condition may have different consequences depending upon the type of job for which he/she is applying. The effect of the stress level of the different jobs on the ratings was discussed.     

Telepsychiatry with rural American Indians: issues in civil commitments

The use of live interactive videoconferencing to provide psychiatric care, telepsychiatry, has particular relevance for improving mental health treatment to rural American Indian reservations. There is little literature on civil commitments in telepsychiatry and none specifically addressing this topic among American Indians. This article reviews telepsychiatry in the mental health care of American Indians, civil commitments and telepsychiatry in general, and the current state of civil commitments in American Indian communities. We conclude by considering commitment through telepsychiatry in rural reservations and offering guidelines to assist practitioners in navigating this challenging landscape. Civil commitments of American Indian patients residing in rural reservations can be successfully accomplished through videoconferencing by thoughtful and informed clinicians. However, much more work is needed in this area, including research into the cultural attitudes and perspectives towards commitments and further inquiry regarding potential legal precedents, as well as case reports and examples of this work.     

Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the "This Universe" Objection

Abstract: When it is suggested that the fine-tuning of the universe for life provides evidence for a cosmic designer, the multiple-universe hypothesis is often presented as an alternative. Some philosophers object that the multiple-universe hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine-tuned for life. We suggest the "This Universe" objection is no better than the "This Planet" objection. We also fault proponents of the "This Universe" objection for presupposing that we could not have existed in any other universe and that the values of the free parameters of the Universe could have been different. Lastly, we reflect on why fine-tuning for life needs explaining