Prosocial orientation and COVID-19 vaccine willingness in the U.S.

Despite evidence of the safety and effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccines and their wide availability, many in the U.S. are not vaccinated. Research demonstrates that prosocial orientations predict COVID-19 health behaviors (e.g., social distancing) and vaccination intentions, however, little work has examined COVID-19 vaccination willingness in the U.S. since vaccines were approved. Findings from two U.S. samples show that, in contrast to other COVID-19 health behaviors, vaccine willingness in unvaccinated people is unrelated to prosocial orientation. Study 2 demonstrates that the lack of association between vaccine willingness and prosocial orientation in unvaccinated participants was specific to those with stronger beliefs that COVID-19 vaccines are ineffective. Thus, in prosocial people, perceptions of vaccines' ineffectiveness may undermine COVID-19 vaccine willingness.     

Religiosity for Promotion of Behaviors Likely to Reduce New HIV Infections in Uganda: A Study Among Muslim Youth in Wakiso District

The study was done to determine the association between religiosity and behaviors likely to reduce new HIV infections among 1,224 Muslim youth. Respondents with Sujda, the hyperpigmented spot on the forehead due to prostration during prayers, were more likely to abstain from sex, be faithful in marriage, and avoid alcohol and narcotics. Males wearing a Muslim cap were more likely to abstain from sex and avoid alcohol and narcotics. Females wearing the long dress (Hijab) were also more likely to avoid alcohol. This data should be used by stakeholders in promoting behaviors likely to reduce new HIV infections among Muslims.     

The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

Heidegger's primary concern in Being and Time is the question of the meaning of being—a distinctly ontological concern. Yet, with discussions of death, guilt, conscience, anxiety, uncanniness, authenticity, and inauthenticity, Heidegger seems to end up in existential territory. The ontological import of these existential excursions is difficult to discern—indeed, it has not been identified in leading interpretations. In this paper, I aim to highlight the ontological import of Heidegger's analysis of anxiety—it manifests the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic self‐understanding, which is motivated by the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic, average understanding of being. In making this case, I will clarify the sense in which anxiety involves an experience of world‐collapse and show how it functions to reveal the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity.     

Further Ado concerning Dasein's “Undifferentiated Mode”: Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday Dasein from the Possibility of Genuine Failure

In this paper, I argue against the interpretive view that locates an “undifferentiated mode” – a mode in which Dasein is neither authentic nor inauthentic – in Being and Time. Where Heidegger seems to be claiming that Dasein can exist in an “undifferentiated mode”, he is better understood as discussing a phenomenon I call indifferent inauthenticity. The average everyday “Indifferenz” which is often taken as an indication of an “undifferentiated mode”, that is, is better understood as a failure to distinguish between the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. Dasein's average everyday self-understanding is indifferent to this distinction, and I show that this is precisely what renders it inauthentic. Recognizing this distinction, however, is not enough to render Dasein authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility of a non-indifferent inauthenticity and what Heidegger calls the possibility of “genuine failure”. To read an “undifferentiated mode” into Being and Time is to misunderstand its methodological progression from Dasein's average everyday, inauthentic self-understanding to its authenticity – “to the thing itself”. A select few passages may at first seem to indicate otherwise. However, Being and Time – like both being in general and Dasein itself – cannot be properly understood “without further ado”.     

Beyond the Tools of the Trade: Heidegger and the Intelligibility of Everyday Things

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self‐understandings (such as being a gardener, shoemaker, teacher, mother, musician, or philosopher). In this paper, I argue that while such practical self‐understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self‐understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self‐understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility‐constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self‐understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity.     

Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision

By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties’ belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.     

Heidegger on Human Finitude: Beginning at the End

Interpreters generally understand Heidegger's notion of finitude in one of two ways: (1) as our mortality – that, in the end, we are certain to die; or (2) the susceptibility of our self‐ and world‐understanding to collapse – the fragility and vulnerability of human sense‐making. In this paper, I put forward an alternative account of what Heidegger means by ‘finitude’: human self‐ and world‐understanding is non‐transparently grounded in a ‘final end.’ Our self‐ and world‐understanding, that is, begins at the end, and authenticity requires us to interpretively appropriate the full range of this understanding. After laying out this view of finitude, via an analogical appeal to the Socratic account of action and desire in the Gorgias, I discuss its relationship to the two leading views of finitude mentioned above.     

The perception of mirror-reflected objects.

In what ways and under what conditions does an object appear to differ from its enantiomorph (its mirror reflection)? This 'mirror question' or its popular counterpart, "Why does a mirror reverse left and right but not up and down?" is frequently encountered, but an acceptable answer is not to be found in the literature. The question is approached as an experimental problem in visual psychophysics. A mirror optically reverses the axis perpendicular to its surface. What are the perceptual consequences of this stimulus transformation? This question is examined in four experiments by using stimuli of varying complexity and familiarity. Apparent reversals are demonstrated along right-left, front-back, top-bottom, and oblique axes, depending on the perceived asymmetries of the stimulus object. Perceived asymmetry is shown to depend both on structural asymmetries and on canonical axes and orientations defined by social convention. It is concluded that an object appears to differ from its enantiomorph by an apparent reversal along the axis of least perceived asymmetry. Implications for perceptual frames of reference and for the perception of symmetry are discussed.