Toward a Multicultural Model of the Stress Process

Stress and coping models are potentially useful frameworks for multicultural counseling and research because of their focus on the effects of social environmental factors on human functioning. This article attempts to expand a “standard” model of the stress process (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) to include a number of culture-relevant dimensions. Cultural factors are discussed that influence each component of the stress model including (a) the types and frequency of events experienced, (b) appraisals of the stressfulness of events, (c) appraisals of available coping resources, (d) selection of coping strategies, and (e) manifestations of adaptational difficulties. Implications of the expanded model for both research and counseling practice are discussed. Los modelos de estrés y la adaptación al estrés tienen la potencia para ser cuadros útiles en la consejería e investigación multicultural por su enfoque sobre los efectos de factores ambientales sociales en la función humana. Este artículo intenta extender un modelo “normal” del proceso de estrés (Lazarus y Folkman, 1984) para incluir un número de dimensiones culturalmente pertinentes. Se discuten los factores culturales que influyen en cada componente del modelo de estrés, incluyendo: los tipos y la frequencia de los eventos experimentados, la apreciación del nivel de estrés de acontacimientos, la apreciación de los recursos de adaptación disponibles, la selección de estrategias de adaptación, y las manifestaciones de dificultades de adaptación. Se discuten las implicaiones del modelo extendido para la investigación y la práctica de consejeria.     

RESTRAINT ON REASONS AND REASONS FOR RESTRAINT: A PROBLEM FOR RAWLS' IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASON

Abstract:  It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls' ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes.