Humean dispositionalism

Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and that manifestations of powers are identified with certain kinds of causal processes. From these assumptions, the modal features of powers are explained in terms of internal relations between powers themselves and the process-types in which powers are manifested.     

Relevant Restricted Quantification

The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.     

Neither Dichotomies Nor Dualisms; Simply Genesis

Our starting point is an article by Uchoa Angela Branco published in 2009 in Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Sciences (vol. 43, pp. 350–355) and titled “Why Dichotomies can be Misleading while Dualities Fit the Analysis of Complex Phenomena”. She criticizes the dualist uses of the distinction between subject and object, or between subjectivist and objectivist perspectives. However we subscribe to the criticism, we argue that some kind of distinction between objectual and subjectual realities is neccesary. Our argument is grounded on the classic constructivist Psychology, especially that of James Mark Baldwin’s genetic logic. We assess two theoretical perspectives -the systemic and the structuralist ones- that, in our view, are at risk of falling into objectivism because they tend to reduce subjectual activity to objectivistic or formalistic kinds of explanation. Based on a critical recovery of some ideas of the French philosopher Michel Serres, we propose that subjects and objects must be understood as interpenetrated realities in perpetual construction.