Oh death,where is thy sting? Reflections on dealing with dying patients

This paper examines the reactions of physicians and other health-professionals when they become involved in decisions about the death of their patients. The way people understand the condition of death has a profound influence on attitudes towards death and dying issues. Four traditional views of death are explored. The problem that physicians have in helping patients die (be it by hastening death through pain control, assisting patients in suicide or by more active means) is analyzed. Physicians, in dealing with such patients, must be mindful of their own, and their patients beliefs as well as mindful of the community in which such dying takes place. They must try to reconcile these often divergent views but can neither paternalistically deny patients their rational will, hide themselves behind an appeal to the law or go against their own deeply held moral views. When such views cannot be reconciled, compassionate transfer to a more compatible physician may be necessary.     

Of community,organs and obligations: Routine salvage with a twist

This paper makes the assumption that organ transplantation is, under some conditions at least, a proper use of communal medical resources. Proceeding from this assumption, the author: (1) sketches the history of the problem; (2) briefly examines the prevalent models of communal structure and offers an alternate version; (3) discusses notions of justice and obligation derived from these different models; (4) applies these to the practice of harvesting organs for transplantation; and then (5) offers a different process for harvesting organs from the newly dead. If community is viewed as united by a set of shred goals and common values among which the value of community itself is important, then certain reciprocal obligations among members obtain. I suggest that routine salvage of organs from the newly dead be instituted but that it be routine salvage “with a twist”: rather early in life all members of the community are given the opportunity to refuse but their refusal carries the reciprocal condition that they cannot later become the recipients of that which they refuse to others.     

Error monitoring dysfunction across the illness course of schizophrenia

Response monitoring abnormalities have been reported in chronic schizophrenia patients, but it is unknown whether they predate the onset of psychosis, are present in early stages of illness, or are late-developing abnormalities associated with illness progression. Response-synchronized event-related potentials (ERP) recorded during a picture-word matching task yielded error-related negativity (ERN), correct-response negativity (CRN), and error positivity (Pe) from 84 schizophrenia patients (SZ), 48 clinical high risk patients (CHR), and their age-matched healthy controls (HC; n = 110 and 88, respectively). A sub-sample of 35 early illness schizophrenia patients (ESZ) was compared to 93 age-matched HC and the CHR patients (after statistically removing the effects of normal aging). Relative to HC, 1) SZ, ESZ, and CHR had smaller ERNs, and 2) SZ and ESZ had larger CRNs and smaller Pes. Within the SZ, longer illness duration was associated with larger CRNs but was unrelated to ERN or Pe. CHR and ESZ did not differ on ERN or CRN, although Pe was smaller in ESZ than CHR. These results indicate that while ERN, CRN, and Pe abnormalities are present early in the illness, only the ERN abnormality is evident prior to psychosis onset, and only the CRN abnormality appears to worsen progressively over the illness course. Brain regions subserving response monitoring may be compromised early in the illness and possibly during its clinical prodrome.     

The uncertainty of certainty in clinical ethics

Physicians accept fallibility in technical matters as a condition of medical practice. When it comes to moral considerations, physicians are often loathe to act without a good deal more certitude and seem less willing to accept error. This article argues that ethics is intrinsic to medical decision making, that error is the inevitable risk of any action and that inaction (clearly action by default) carries even greater risk of error. Whether in the moral or the technical sphere, error must be accepted by physicians as part of the learning process which informs and enriches future decisions. Moral virtue, it is concluded, resides more in the making of a decision and in the agony of making it than it does in the potentially fallible decision itself.     

Families, communities, and making medical decisions

In his carefully crafted article, which, it is hoped, will stimulate further dialogue about this issue, David J. Doukas reviews some of the literature on this subject. He does not seem to differentiate between the family's role in decision making for competent or incompetent patients. His interest is prior to that: it is in working out a general agreement prior to the time that such an agreement may be needed. He favors a family covenant, one in which trust accumulates over time, and he offers a model of such a covenant. At first blush, the notion of covenant rather than the notion of contract seems far more suited to the medical milieu. I have no problem with the idea of covenant and trust, but I have serious reservations about its implementation....     

Physicians and patients: Moral agency in a pluralistic world

This paper examines the role of the physician in a pluralistic community. A personal and communal sense of identity must resolve a vast array of often conflicting backgrounds and contexts in order to function smoothly. Physicians are neither entitled to impose their own moral views on their patients nor expected to surrender their own moral agency. Several illustrative cases are given. The solution of inevitable conflicts is embodied within the context of the situation, but since irreconcilable differences remain, a resolution is not always possible. Tolerance for such differences and ways of dealing with them allows the integrity of both parties to remain intact.