Rate, Probability and Matching: Comments on ��The Identities Hidden in the Matching Laws, and Their Uses�� by David Thorne

David Thorne's (2010) article, “The Identities Hidden In The Matching Laws, And Their Uses” performs a valuable service in pointing out alternative expressions of matching. However, some identities tend to obscure rather than illuminate empirical relationships. Three such problematic instances are discussed: interresponse time as a function of interval and ratio schedule parameters; probability equality as implying rate matching; the apparent simplicity of probabilistic functions, as opposed to response rate functions, of reinforcement rate.     

Rate, probability and matching: comments on "The identities hidden in the matching laws, and their uses" by David Thorne

David Thorne's (2010) article, "The identities hidden in the matching laws, and their uses" performs a valuable service in pointing out alternative expressions of matching. However, some identities tend to obscure rather than illuminate empirical relationships. Three such problematic instances are discussed: interresponse time as a function of interval and ratio schedule parameters; probability equality as implying rate matching; the apparent simplicity of probabilistic functions, as opposed to response rate functions, of reinforcement rate.     

Evolution of Cultural Interbehavior in a Turn-Based Matching-to-Sample Procedure

The Psychological Record - Kantor’s (1982) analysis of cultural interbehavior focuses on shared stimulus–response functions that are conventional across individuals and established...     

The Temporal Dynamics of Cooperation

Parties in real-world conflicts often attempt to punish each other's behavior. If this strategy fails to produce mutual cooperation, they may increase punishment magnitude. The present experiment investigated whether delay-reduction - potentially less harmful than magnitude increase - would generate mutual cooperation as interactions are repeated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy, cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. For half of the participants, the delay between their choice and the computer's next choice was long relative to the delay between the computer's choice and their next choice. For the other half, long and short delays were reversed. The tit-for-tat contingency reinforces the other player's cooperation (by cooperating) and punishes the other player's defection (by defecting). Both rewards and punishers are discounted by delay. Consistent with delay discounting, participants cooperated more when the delay between their choice and the computer's cooperation (reward) or defection (punishment) was relatively short. These results suggest that, in real-world tit-for-tat conflicts, decreasing delay of reciprocation or retaliation may foster mutual cooperation as effectively as (or more effectively than) the more usual tactic of increasing magnitude of reciprocation or retaliation.     

ISOLATING BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS OF INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE: NICOTINE EFFECT ON DELAY DISCOUNTING AND AMOUNT SENSITIVITY

Many drugs of abuse produce changes in impulsive choice, that is, choice for a smaller—sooner reinforcer over a larger—later reinforcer. Because the alternatives differ in both delay and amount, it is not clear whether these drug effects are due to the differences in reinforcer delay or amount. To isolate the effects of delay, we used a titrating delay procedure. In phase 1, 9 rats made discrete choices between variable delays (1 or 19 s, equal probability of each) and a delay to a single food pellet. The computer titrated the delay to a single food pellet until the rats were indifferent between the two options. This indifference delay was used as the starting value for the titrating delay for all future sessions. We next evaluated the acute effects of nicotine (subcutaneous 1.0, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.03 mg/kg) on choice. If nicotine increases delay discounting, it should have increased preference for the variable delay. Instead, nicotine had very little effect on choice. In a second phase, the titrated delay alternative produced three food pellets instead of one, which was again produced by the variable delay (1 s or 19 s) alternative. Under this procedure, nicotine increased preference for the one pellet alternative. Nicotine‐induced changes in impulsive choice are therefore likely due to differences in reinforcer amount rather than differences in reinforcer delay. In addition, it may be necessary to include an amount sensitivity parameter in any mathematical model of choice when the alternatives differ in reinforcer amount.     

The Origin and Evolution of the Behavior Analysis Program at the University of Nevada,Reno

The origins of the Behavior Analysis program at the University of Nevada, Reno by way of a self-capitalized model through its transition to a more typical graduate program is described. Details of the original proposal to establish the program and the funding model are described. Some of the unusual features of the program executed in this way are discussed, along with problems engendered by the model. Also included is the diversification of faculty interests over time. The status of the program, now, after 25 years of operation, is presented.     

Commitment and self-control in a prisoner's dilemma game

Humans often make seemingly irrational choices in situations of conflict between a particular smaller-sooner reinforcer and a more abstract, temporally extended, but larger reinforcer. In two experiments, the extent to which the availability of commitment responses-self-imposed restrictions on future choices-might improve self-control in such situations was investigated. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game against a computer that played a tit-for-tat strategy-cooperating after a participant cooperated, defecting after a participant defected. Defecting produced a small-immediate reinforcer (consisting of points convertible to gift cards) whereas cooperating increased the amount of subsequent reinforcers, yielding a greater overall reinforcer rate. Participants were normally free to cooperate or defect on each trial. Additionally, they could choose to make a commitment response that forced their choice for the ensuing five trials. For some participants, the commitment response forced cooperation; for others, it forced defection. Most participants, with either commitment response available, chose to commit repeatedly despite a minor point loss for doing so. After extended exposure to these contingencies, the commit-to-cooperate group cooperated significantly more than a control group (with no commitment available). The commit-to-defect group cooperated significantly less than the control group. When both commitment alternatives were simultaneously available-one for cooperation and one for defection-cooperation commitment was strongly preferred. In Experiment 2, the commitment alternative was removed at the end of the session; gains in cooperation, relative to the control group, were not sustained in the absence of the self-imposed behavioral scaffold.