Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Personality and the Policy Positions of Politicians

Politicians’ support of or opposition to concrete policies is uniquely consequential for policymaking, public opinion, and a host of other societal outcomes. Explaining their policy positions is therefore a major research agenda in political science. Here, we evaluate the role of politicians’ personality traits, measured with the Big Five typology, in shaping how liberal or conservative their economic and social policy positions are. While existing research establishes this link among nonelites, it is far from obvious that the same holds for politicians, who have systematically different personality profiles, and whose positions are constrained by party lines. Using an in-person study of 893 legislators in five countries who completed personality questionnaires and provided detailed issue positions, we find that Openness to Experience is strongly and positively predictive of politicians’ liberal positions on both economic and social policies, but a null relationship for Conscientiousness. We also find that Extraversion predicts more conservative economic (but not social) policy positions. We discuss implications for the role of elites’ individual characteristics in policymaking.     

Making sense of ‘on denoting’

The widely held assumption about what motivated On Denoting is irreconcilable with Russell's position shortly beforehand; but discarding it leaves one with a carefully worked out solution whose problem is missing. The real motivation is to be found in a notoriously obscure passage in OD, in which Russell exposes a decisive (though easily overlooked) flaw in his former theory of denoting; a flaw which also cripples Frege's theory of sense and reference. A comprehensive account of this passage is the chief concern of the present paper. Recognizing the critical role of this argument of Russell's leads to a more credible account of his argumentation in that essay. It also suggests that the fundamental standpoint underlyingThe Principles of Mathematics remains intact. In this light, the appropriation of OD to the philosophy of language may be misguided.     

Calibration of probability assessments by professional blackjack dealers, statistical experts, and lay people

The question addressed in this study is whether experts are better calibrated than lay people. We investigated how well people are calibrated when they assess the probabilities of card combinations in the game of blackjack. Three groups of subjects were used: professional dealers, statistical experts, and control subjects. The results showed that experience and statistical expertise do not make people better calibrated in this task. It is argued that the concept of calibration is not wholly appropriate to describe the obtained deviations from the normatively correct responses. This is illustrated by a discriminant analysis performed on the signed deviation scores, which resulted in an almost perfect separation of the three groups, although they were overlapping with respect to calibration.     

On the reciprocity of proximity relations

The degree of reciprocity of a proximity order is the proportion, P(1), of elements for which the closest neighbor relation is symmetric, and the R value of each element is its rank in the proximity order from its closest neighbor. Assuming a random sampling of points, we show that Euclidean n-spaces produce a very high degree of reciprocity, $\text{P(1) ≥}\text{1}\text{2}$, and correspondingly low R values, E(R) ≤ 2, for all n. The same bounds also apply to homogeneous graphs, in which the same number of edges meet at every node. Much less reciprocity and higher R values, however, can be attained in finite tree models and in the contrast model in which the “distance” between objects is a linear function of the numbers of their common and distinctive features.     

The linear utility model for optimal selection

A linear utility model is introduced for optimal selection when several subpopulations of applicants are to be distinguished. Using this model, procedures are described for obtaining optimal cutting scores in subpopulations in quota-free as well as quota-restricted selection situations. The cutting scores are optimal in the sense that they maximize the overall expected utility of the selection process. The procedures are demonstrated with empirical data.     

Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Research suggests that the integrative complexity of political rhetoric tends to drop during election season, but little research to date directly addresses if this drop in complexity serves to increase or decrease electoral success. The two present studies help fill this gap. Study 1 demonstrates that, during the Democratic Party primary debates in 2003–2004, the eventual winners of the party nomination showed a steeper drop in integrative complexity as the election season progressed than nonwinning candidates. Study 2 presents laboratory evidence from the most recent presidential campaign demonstrating that, while the complexity of Obama's rhetoric had little impact on college students' subsequent intentions to vote for him, the complexity of McCain's rhetoric was significantly positively correlated with their likelihood of voting for him. Taken together, this research is inconsistent with an unqualified simple is effective view of the complexity‐success relationship. Rather, it is more consistent with a compensatory view: Effective use of complexity (or simplicity) may compensate for perceived weaknesses. Thus, appropriately timed shifts in complexity levels, and/or violations of negative expectations relevant to complexity, may be an effective means of winning elections. Surprisingly, mere simplicity as such seems largely ineffective.