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Many contemporary philosophers rate error theories poorly. We identify the arguments these philosophers invoke, and expose
their deficiencies. We thereby show that the prospects for error theory have been systematically underestimated. By undermining
general arguments against all error theories, we leave it open whether any more particular arguments against particular error
theories are more successful. The merits of error theories need to be settled on a case-by-case basis: there is no good general
argument against error theories. 相似文献
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David Liggins 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2019,98(1):3-25
Restrictionism is a response to the Liar and other paradoxes concerning truth. Restrictionists—as I will call proponents of the strategy—respond to these paradoxes by giving up instances of the schema <p> is true iff p. My aim is to show that the current unpopularity of restrictionism is undeserved. I will argue that, whilst cautious versions of the strategy may face serious problems, a radical and previously overlooked version of restrictionism provides a strong and defensible response to the paradoxes. 相似文献
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There is a recent and growing trend in philosophy that involves deferring to the claims of certain disciplines outside of
philosophy, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and linguistics. According to this trend—deferentialism, as we will call it—certain disciplines outside of philosophy make claims that have a decisive bearing on philosophical disputes,
where those claims are more epistemically justified than any philosophical considerations just because those claims are made
by those disciplines. Deferentialists believe that certain longstanding philosophical problems can be swiftly and decisively
dispatched by appeal to disciplines other than philosophy. In this paper we will argue that such an attitude of uncritical
deference to any non-philosophical discipline is badly misguided. With reference to the work of John Burgess and David Lewis,
we consider deference to mathematics. We show that deference to mathematics is implausible and that main arguments for it
fail. With reference to the work of Michael Blome-Tillmann, we consider deference to linguistics. We show that his arguments
appealing to deference to linguistics are unsuccessful. We then show that naturalism does not entail deferentialism and that
naturalistic considerations even motivate some anti-deferentialist views. Finally, we set out deferentialism’s failings and
present our own anti-deferentialist approach to philosophical inquiry. 相似文献
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David Liggins 《Synthese》2016,193(2):531-548
There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper I reconsider the debate by using the notion of grounding, or non-causal dependence. First of all, I investigate what proponents of the indispensability argument should say about the grounding of relations between physical objects and mathematical ones. This reveals some resources which nominalists are entitled to use. Making use of these resources, I present a neglected but promising response to the indispensability argument—a liberalized version of Field’s response—and I discuss its significance. I argue that if it succeeds, it provides a new refutation of the indispensability argument; and that, even if it fails, its failure may bolster some of the fictionalist responses to the indispensability argument already under discussion. In addition, I use grounding to reply to a recent challenge to these responses. 相似文献
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David Liggins 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):151-160
The Brock-Rosen problem has been one of the most thoroughly discussed objections to the modal fictionalism bruited in Gideon
Rosen’s ‘Modal Fictionalism’. But there is a more fundamental problem with modal fictionalism, at least as it is normally
explained: the position does not resolve the tension that motivated it. I argue that if we pay attention to a neglected aspect
of modal fictionalism, we will see how to resolve this tension—and we will also find a persuasive reply to the Brock-Rosen
objection. Finally, I discuss an alternative reading of Rosen, and argue that this position is also able to fend off the Brock-Rosen
objection. 相似文献
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David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
相似文献
David LigginsEmail: |
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Philosophical Studies - In the ‘ordinary business of life’, everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: ‘There are some beautiful chairs in my... 相似文献
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