Color logic of apparent motion

Two shapes of either the same or different color will seem to be in smooth apparent motion with like-colored mates, at proper conditions of flash timing and spacing. An experiment is reported in which the condition was tested for unlike-colored pairs, for example red-green alternated with green-red. The question of interest was how the visual system would resolve the disparity of color. An 'intelligent' solution would rotate the shapes in three dimensions. Like-colored and unlike-colored parts were found to move and transform similarly, however, the resolution being dependent more upon timing than upon color. The motion of intelligence as it might be applied to vision is discussed in light of these results.     

AQUINAS'S ARGUMENT AGAINST SELF-HATRED

Aquinas's argument against the possibility of genuine self‐hatred runs counter to modern intuitions about self‐hatred as an explanatorily central notion in psychology, and as an effect of alienation. Aquinas's argument does not deny that persons experience hatred for themselves. It can be read either as the claim that the self‐hater mistakes what she feels toward herself as hatred, or that, though she hates what she believes is her “self,” she actually hates only traits of herself. I argue that the argument fails on both readings. The first reading entails that all passions are really self‐love, and so is incompatible with Aquinas's own “cognitivist” view of what it is that distinguishes specific passions in experience. The second reading entails that persons have no phenomenal access to “self,” rendering self‐reference—how it is that the self can be an intentional object of conscious mental states—a mystery. Augustine's claim, which Aquinas accepts on authority, that all sin originates in inordinate self‐love seems to entail the impossibility of genuine self‐hatred because both thinkers fail to distinguish between two distinct forms of self‐love: amor concupiscentiae and amor benevolentiae.     

USING STIMULUS EQUIVALENCE PROCEDURES TO TEACH NAME-FACE MATCHING TO ADULTS WITH BRAIN INJURIES

On pretests, 3 men with brain injuries matched dictated names of three therapists to written names, but did not match dictated or written names to photos, produce correct names in response to photos, locate offices given written names, or name therapists on sight. Match-to-sample training established conditional relations between dictated names and photos. Posttests showed the emergence of untrained conditional relations involving photos and written names, indicating development of three classes of equivalent stimuli (each containing a dictated name, photo, and written name). For 1 participant, conditional relations involving photos of office nameplates were also examined, but did not emerge pre- or posttraining. Two participants produced names orally when given photos and sorted written names and faces together after training; the 3rd participant was unavailable for these posttests. After training, 1 participant located and named all three therapists in their offices.     

Representation by counsel: Right or obligation?

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California (1975), courts have generally permitted defendants to represent themselves, as long as they are competent to do so. The problem lies in the definition of competency to waive counsel, which has been vaguely defined by the courts. Little is known about the frequency of, or reasons for, attempts to waive counsel, about the process of forensic evaluation of such competency, and about the success of such attempts. The authors briefly review the case law on competency to waive representation, report on a longitudinal prospective study of these issues in a population of defendants referred to an inpatient forensic facility for evaluation of all types of competency related to their criminal prosecutions, and discuss the significance of the issue for forensic clinicians. A key question for courts, lawyers, and clinicians is whether a competency evaluation can be invoked to overcome a defendant's constitutional rights to self-representation and bail.     

Aristotle on Necessary Verticality,Body Heat,and Gendered Proper Places in the Polis: A Feminist Critique

Feminist critics have charged that Aristotle's mistaken and harmful remarks about women and slaves show inconsistency or bias-driven arbitrariness. However, this analysis shows that these remarks function within a consistent and coherent theoretical corpus. Thus, both Aristotle's hierarchical and dualistic first principles and the methodology on which his entire corpus is based must be unreliable. Moreover, consistency and coherence must be insufficient warrants of theoretical insightfulness. Aristotle's mistakes suggest caveats for feminist philosophical reconstruction.     

Suggestiveness in photospread line-ups: Similarity induces distinctiveness

The present research examined whether line-ups based on target (‘suspect’) face similarity are biased or suggestive. Four experiments are described in which subjects constructed photographic line-ups by selecting foils similar in appearance to a target. Later, another group of subjects who had not seen the faces before (mock witnesses) were asked to pick out the targets from the line-ups. All four experiments showed that mock witnesses selected the target significantly more often than expected by chance, thereby demonstrating suggestiveness. Three alternative line-up construction methods were also evaluated. In these methods, foil selection was based not only on target similarity but also on similarity with one or more of the other line-up faces. Results showed that alternative line-up targets were not selected significantly more often than chance, suggesting that bias was reduced. An overall analysis showed that the alternative line-ups were significantly less suggestive than target-based line-ups. The results indicate that foil selection procedures that incorporate foil-to-foil similarity produce fairer line-ups than those exclusively based on target similarity.     

Just health care (II): Is equality too much?

In a previous essay I criticized Engelhardt's libertarian conception of justice, which grounds the view that society's obligation to assure access to adequate health care for all is a matter of beneficence [1]. Beneficence fails to capture the moral stringency associated with many claims for access to health care. In the present paper I argue that these claims are really matters of justice proper, where justice is conceived along moderate egalitarian lines, such as those suggested by Rawls and Daniels, rather than strong egalitarian lines. Further, given the empirical complexity associated with the distribution of contemporary health care, I argue that what we really need to address the relevant policy issues adequately is a theory of health care justice, as opposed to an all-purpose conception of justice. Daniels has made an important start toward that goal, though there are some large policy areas which I discuss that his account of health care justice does not really speak to. Finally, practical matters of health care justice really need to be addressed in a ‘non-ideal’ mode, a framework in which philosophers have done little.     

The role of visual information in the processing of

Visual information provided by a talker’s mouth movements can influence the perception of certain speech features. Thus, the “McGurk effect” shows that when the syllable /bi/ is presented audibly, in synchrony with the syllable /gi/, as it is presented visually, a person perceives the talker as saying /di/. Moreover, studies have shown that interactions occur between place and voicing features in phonetic perception, when information is presented audibly. In our first experiment, we asked whether feature interactions occur when place information is specified by a combination of auditory and visual information. Members of an auditory continuum ranging from /ibi/ to /ipi/ were paired with a video display of a talker saying /igi/. The auditory tokens were heard as ranging from /ibi/ to /ipi/, but the auditory-visual tokens were perceived as ranging from /idi/ to /iti/. The results demonstrated that the voicing boundary for the auditory-visual tokens was located at a significantly longer VOT value than the voicing boundary for the auditory continuum presented without the visual information. These results demonstrate that place-voice interactions are not limited to situations in which place information is specified audibly. In three follow-up experiments, we show that (1) the voicing boundary is not shifted in the absence of a change in the global percept, even when discrepant auditory-visual information is presented; (2) the number of response alternatives provided for the subjects does not affect the categorization or the VOT boundary of the auditory-visual stimuli; and (3) the original effect of a VOT boundary shift is not replicated when subjects are forced by instruction to \ldrelabel\rd the /b-p/auditory stimuli as/d/or/t/. The subjects successfully relabeled the stimuli, but no shift in the VOT boundary was observed.