Interactive-Virtual Reality (IVR) Exercise: An Examination of In-Task and Pre-to-Post Exercise Affective Changes

In this research, we examine the influence of imposed vs. self-chosen interactive/virtual reality (IVR) exercise on affect response following, as well as during, exercise. Our sample included 131 university students who were assigned to one of three 10-min conditions: (a) self-selected interactive/virtual reality (IVR) exercise, (b) externally imposed IVR exercise, or (c) regular exercise. Exercise intensity was standardized in terms of metabolic benchmarks. Mood benefits were observed pre-to-post exercise regardless of condition. During exercise, however, higher pleasure ratings were reported by participants in the self-selected IVR exercise condition. The implications of the immediate mood effects of self-selected IVR exercise are discussed.     

Review of Wisdom won from Illness,Essays in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis by Jonathan Lear,Havard University press, 2017

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness

A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is “immune to error through misidentification.” To this end, the body's double involvement in consciousness is considered: it can experience objects intentionally and itself non-intentionally. Specifically, pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness, by contrast with the consciousness of the body that happens to be one's own, consists in experiencing one's body as the point of convergence of action and perception. Neither proprioception alone nor intention alone is sufficient to underlie this pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness. Rather, it is made possible thanks to a sensori-motor integration, allowing a sensitivity to the sensory consequences of one's action, through action monitoring.     

Two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’

The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about which modes of givenness are involved.

Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.     

Semi‐parametric proportional hazards models with crossed random effects for psychometric response times

The semi‐parametric proportional hazards model with crossed random effects has two important characteristics: it avoids explicit specification of the response time distribution by using semi‐parametric models, and it captures heterogeneity that is due to subjects and items. The proposed model has a proportionality parameter for the speed of each test taker, for the time intensity of each item, and for subject or item characteristics of interest. It is shown how all these parameters can be estimated by Markov chain Monte Carlo methods (Gibbs sampling). The performance of the estimation procedure is assessed with simulations and the model is further illustrated with the analysis of response times from a visual recognition task.     

Are the symptoms of cannabis use disorder best accounted for by dimensional, categorical, or factor mixture models? A comparison of male and female young adults

Despite the consensus that criteria for cannabis abuse and dependence and symptoms of withdrawal are best explained by a single latent liability, it remains unknown whether alternative models provide a better explanation of these criteria. A series of latent factor, latent class, and hybrid factor mixture models were fitted to data from 872 recent cannabis users from the Minnesota Twin Family Study who completed Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., revised, and 4th ed.) diagnostic criteria for cannabis abuse, dependence, and symptoms of withdrawal. Despite theoretical appeal, results did not support latent class or factor mixture modeling. Instead, symptoms of abuse, dependence, and withdrawal were better summarized by a single latent factor Cannabis Use Disorder (CUD) for male and female young adults. An almost 2-fold sex difference in item endorsement was best explained by a single mean difference on the CUD factor, indicating that young men have a greater latent liability toward expressing CUD.