Putnam,Searle, and externalism

Summary To sum up, then, both kinds of Putnam's arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searle's discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searle's own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external factors. We are thus led to search elsewhere (i.e., not in the nature of indexical thoughts nor in the mere fact of there being identical thoughts with different intentionalities) for what makes the thoughts in question external. Searle formulates the thesis that intension determines extension as asserting that intension sets certain conditions that anything has to meet in order to fall under its extension. I showed that this is a trivial and implausible understanding of that thesis. Yet, it leads us to distinguish between an intension's setting conditions for falling under its extension and its fully determining such conditions, and thus to see in what sense externalism is true: in the sense that there are intensions that do not fully determine the conditions for falling under their extensions. Rather, they leave indeterminacies. This version of externalism is a moderate one, since though the intensions do not fully determine extensions, they, so to speak, determine their indeterminacies, by specifying the possible external facts that can complete the determination of extension. (The intensions, as I said, function like open sentences, and can be viewed as narrow contents.) So what's in the head plays a much more important role in determining content than Putnam takes it to play. Searle's pointing out that Hilary's concepts elm and beech are different also contributes to seeing this phenomenon: we realize that in that case the difference between the concepts is what is responsible for the fact that the completions of the extension-determinations are different. I think that this way of viewing the facts shows that the externalist turn is not a great revolution, and that with the help of the concept of narrow content we can accept it without abandoning the traditional views about the mind as the source of content, and without being embarrassed by the very idea of (realistic) belief-desire psychology.     

Political periodicals in policy formation

This is an ethnographic report on a conference entitled “The Politics of Publishing” which featured editors and writers from leading magazines and journals of political opinion. The aim of the conference was to articulate the intellectual ground on which each publication is predicated. A further goal of these observations was to seek out a common ground, a consensual series of assumptions, that permits such journals and their leading participants to flourish amidst conflict and opposing viewpoints. The article is less a study of the relationship of knowledge and policy, as such, as much as it is a study of the weaker forms of these terms, namely, information and ideology. These remarks are thus intended as a contribution to the elite impact on mass public opinion at one level, and the cornucopia of political ideas at a somewhat more abstract level. He also serves as Chairman of the Board of Transaction Publishers, located at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA 08903.     

Information Processing in Joined and Severed Trials

The present study was conducted to determine the process by which jurors reach verdicts in trials in which multiple charges are joined in one indictment. The experiment was designed to test the impact of joinder of affenses, similarity of offenses, and evidentiary strength of jurors' ability to process trial evidence. The results gathered from 220 male and female subjects indicated, as previous research has shown, that joined trials lead to more guilty verdicts than severed trials; that the first charge in a joined trial accounts for this "joinder effect," receiving significantly more guilty verdicts than its severed counterpart. When joined trials are composed of similar categories of crimes, guilt verdicts increase and jurors tend to confuse evidence-as shown by a high rate of antidefendant intrusions from case two to case one. More antidefendant cognitions were also found when the cases were similar. Furthermore, case similarity interacted with the evidentiary strength of the charges in joined trials.