Interactive measurement, idiothetic inquiry, and the challenge to conventional "nomotheticism"

Paunonen and Jackson (this issue) have commented critically on certain technical features of the idiothetic framework for personality research proposed by Lamiell (1981, 1982) In the present article, we offer our own views on each of the three major issues raised by Paunonen and Jackson, and in so doing seek to explain why we take their arguments to be adequate neither as a critique of the idiothetic approach nor as a defense of traditional “nomotheticism”     

On the utility of looking in the “wrong” direction1

In his reply to Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee (1980), Shweder (1980) fails to address an important question: Did the behavior report task used by Lamiell et al. meet his requirements for a “diffieult memory condition,” or did it not? In light of the nature of the illusory correlation hypothesis and Lamiell et al.'s findings, it is explained that for any of three possible answers to this question (yes, no, or maybe) the integrity of the illusory correlation hypothesis in its present form is compromised. It is also explained that further research on the hypothesis is likely to be pointless, because Lamiell et al.'s findings suggest that it is not salvageable in any form. Finally, it is explained that the incompatibility between lay persons' usage of personality concepts and the study of individual differences does not lead inextricably to the conclusion that the former have no legitimate role to play in a science of personality.     

Why was there no place for personalistic thinking in 20th century psychology?

The present article identifies two major impediments to personalistic thinking in 20th century psychology: (1) positivism, and (2) a methodological commitment for which the term ‘statisticism’ has been coined. After explaining both that and why these two traditions have been so fundamentally inhospitable to Stern's ideas, it is suggested in the paper's conclusion that the gradual demise of these heretofore dominant -isms renders more favorable the prospects for personalistic thinking in 21st century psychology.     

La psychologie contemporaine des « traits » dans le cadre de la recherche néogaltonienne : comment elle est censée fonctionner et pourquoi en réalité elle ne fonctionne pas

For its epistemic integrity as a framework for scientific personality studies, contemporary trait psychology requires the assumption that aggregate statistical patterns gleaned from correlational studies of individual differences constitute an epistemic “window” onto what is transpiring with the individuals comprising that aggregate. This assumption is the cornerstone of the “neogaltonian” paradigm for psychological research (Danziger, 1987) in terms of which Cronbach (1957) famously called for a merger of scientific psychology's experimental and the correlational disciplines. In the present contribution, this perspective on personality studies is submitted to close critical scrutiny and shown to be scientifically untenable. It is argued that a viable science of personality will be one focused on persons and not on individual differences variables.     

Statisticism in personality psychologists’ use of trait constructs: What is it? How was it contracted? Is there a cure?

‘Statisticism’ is meant to characterize a way of thinking in psychology that invests virtually boundless trust in the aptness of statistical concepts and methods to reveal the ‘lawfulness’ of human psychological functioning and behavior. In the article, I discuss how statisticism came to infect the thinking of mainstream 20th century personality investigators and how – if at all – the discipline might be cured. Unfortunately, mainstream thinking within the sub-discipline of personality psychology has long sanctioned an understanding of the statistical findings issuing from studies of individual differences in personality traits that is faithful to neither of the so-called ‘frequentist’ or ‘subjectivist’ traditions. Instead, such findings are widely regarded as a scientifically acceptable warrant for claims to knowledge about objective states of affairs existing for individuals within the samples one has studied. I suggest that the prospects for eradicating dubious fruits of this form of statisticism will hinge importantly on (a) the ability of theoretically and philosophically-oriented psychologists to re-instill within the discipline a healthy respect for the power of conceptual analysis more generally, and, following this, (b) concern within the discipline for the fact that the deep and abiding conceptual problem described above in fact does exist.     

On the relationship between conceptual schemes and behaviour reports: A closer look1

The validity of the assertion that rated and self-reported behavior is “almost entirely under the influence of preexisting conceptual schemes” is questioned. It is argued that the approach previously used to test this thesis is inadequate, and an alternative approach is described. A comparison of findings obtained using the two approaches suggests that the thesis is in need of revision: The presumed correspondence is neither as high nor as consistent as it may be thought to be. Some implications of the present findings for future research in social cognition and in personality are discussed.     

Detecting (in)consistencies in personality: reconciling intuitions and empirical evidence

After Mischel's (1968) critique of the traditional concept of personality, others have attempted to resolve the apparent discrepancy between intuitive (and theoretical) notions of consistency in the behavior patterns of individuals, and the available empirical evidence, much of which seems to suggest that the intuitive/theoretical notions are erroneous. Virtually all of these attempts have been grounded ultimately in some variation of the individual differences paradigm that has long dominated empirical personality research. In contrast, the present article suggests that this apparent discrepancy results from an attempt to reconcile essentially idiographic intuitions with aggregate empirical findings. Going beyond previous conceptual discussions of this point, the present article offers an empirical illustration of the problem, and suggests that the intuitions vs. empirical evidence discrepancy regarding questions of (in)consistencies in personality reflects the "incorrectness" of neither, but rather the fact that the intuitions and empirical evidence speak to fundamentally different questions. The implications of this fact for programmatic, theoretically oriented personality research are emphasized.     

Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologist: Some preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions

Despite significant advances over the past three decades in our understanding of the implicit personality theorist, some important questions remain, particularly as regards the nature of the underlying reasoning process by which subjectively meaningful personality impressions are formulated and expressed. The present article seeks to address this issue, with particular attention being given to the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning. Preliminary empirical evidence is offered to suggest that, at least under certain conditions, lay persons formulate and express subjective personality impressions on the basis of a reasoning process that is essentially dialectical in nature. Some major implications of this point of view for the study of the intuitive personologist are discussed. The limitations of the evidence presented, and the need for further research are also noted.