Women with Beards and Men in Frocks: Gender Nonconformity in Modern American Film

The present study examines the portrayal of gender nonconformity in 36 American films released from 2001 to 2011. Mainstream and independent films with at least one character portrayed in a gender transgressive way were chosen for analysis. The films were coded at two levels: (1) the entire film, and (2) the individual characters. The entire films were coded for mainstream versus independent production, genre, and screen time of gender nonconforming characters. The characters were coded for the type of gender transgression, the characters’ demographics, and their purposes in the plot. The most common purpose of the non-conforming characters was humor, especially in mainstream films. Exploring identity was a much less common purpose and these films were far more likely to be independent films. The non-conforming characters were far more likely to identify as a static identity, man or woman, rather than anything else. Gender identity was almost always presented as something simple, static and binary.     

Quantum entanglement and nonideal measurements: A critique of Margenau's objections to the projection postulate

I defend the projection postulate against two of Margenau's criticisms. One involves two types of nonideal measurements, measurements that disturb and measurements that annihilate. Such measurements cannot be characterized using the original version of the projection postulate. This is one of the most interesting and powerful objections to the projection postulate since most realistic measurements are nonideal, in Margenau's sense. I show that a straightforward generalization of the projection postulate is capable of handling the more realistic kinds of measurements considered by Margenau. His other objection involves the EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) situation. He suggests that there is a significant potential for violations of the no-superluminalsignals requirement of the special theory of relativity, if projections occur in this situation and others like it. He also suggests that what is paradoxical about this situation disappears if the projection postulate is rejected. I show that it is not possible to use measurements on pairs of spatially-separated systems whose states are entangled to transmit information superluminally, and generalize this result to include nonideal measurements. I also show that EPR's dilemma does not really depend on the projection postulate.I would like to thank three anonymous referees, two from Synthese and one from Foundations of Physics, for their critical comments on preliminary versions of this essay, and for bringing to my attention several articles concerning quantum mechanics and the impossibility of faster-than-light communication.     

Bohm's Ontological Interpretation and its Relations to Three Formulations of Quantum Mechanics

The standard mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics is specified. Bohm's ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is then shown to be incapable of providing a suitable interpretation of that formulation. It is also shown that Bohm's interpretation may well be viable for two alternative mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics, meaning that the negative result is a significant though not a devastating criticism of Bohm's interpretation. A preliminary case is made for preferring one alternative formulation over the other. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Non-monotonic Probability Theory and Photon Polarization

A non-monotonic theory of probability is put forward and shown to have applicability in the quantum domain. It is obtained simply by replacing Kolmogorov’s positivity axiom, which places the lower bound for probabilities at zero, with an axiom that reduces that lower bound to minus one. Kolmogorov’s theory of probability is monotonic, meaning that the probability of A is less then or equal to that of B whenever A entails B. The new theory violates monotonicity, as its name suggests; yet, many standard theorems are also theorems of the new theory since Kolmogorov’s other axioms are retained. What is of particular interest is that the new theory can accommodate quantum phenomena (photon polarization experiments) while preserving Boolean operations, unlike Kolmogorov’s theory. Although non-standard notions of probability have been discussed extensively in the physics literature, they have received very little attention in the philosophical literature. One likely explanation for that difference is that their applicability is typically demonstrated in esoteric settings that involve technical complications. That barrier is effectively removed for non-monotonic probability theory by providing it with a homely setting in the quantum domain. Although the initial steps taken in this paper are quite substantial, there is much else to be done, such as demonstrating the applicability of non-monotonic probability theory to other quantum systems and elaborating the interpretive framework that is provisionally put forward here. Such matters will be developed in other works.     

Carnap and Achinstein on evidence

Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense of the term evidence. This is accomplished by finding faults in the notion of potential evidence, and by defending positive relevance against Achinstein's examples.I am especially indebted to Peter Achinstein, Edwin Allaire and Bob Kane for many valuable suggestions. I would also like to thank my colleagues Donald Becker and Jean Kazez for their constructive criticisms and other useful suggestions. (The defense of the positive-relevance notion of evidence provided here fulfills an obligation made in an earlier essay (Kronz, 1988).)