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Justin Klocksiem 《Philosophical Studies》2016,173(5):1309-1334
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Justin Klocksiem 《Philosophical Studies》2011,153(3):335-349
Several prominent ethical philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that there exist instances or types of value that are
of crucial moral significance but which cannot legitimately be compared with one another. Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker,
for example, argue that it can sometimes be rational to regret having chosen the all-things-considered better of two alternatives,
and that this sense of regret entails that the goodness of the worse option is not made up for by and is therefore incommensurable
with that of the better. Joseph Raz and others have made similar points. In this paper, I propose a theory of value that is
monistic in that it countenances just one sort of morally crucial value, but pluralistic in that several distinct properties
bearer this value. I then explain how this view avoids incommensurable values without doing violence to the core intuitions
that seemed to necessitate them, and how it fits into a larger conception of morality, right conduct, and moral psychology. 相似文献
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Justin Klocksiem 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(3):293-303
According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial,
however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false.
One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable
quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers
representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued that such operations cannot be sensibly applied to pleasure and pain,
and that sentences expressing such operations must be false or meaningless. The purpose of this paper is to present, explain,
and rebut several versions of this argument. In the first section, I present a generic version of the argument. In the second
section, I present a defense of its key premise based on a case involving comparisons of relief from pain, and explain why
I think it fails. In the third section, I present and rebut another defense, based on a pair of analogies with temperature.
In the final section, I present a third defense, based on an analogy with spatial distances. I then present my reasons for
rejecting it. Along the way, I explain my reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - This paper raises an objection to two important arguments for reductive ethical naturalism. Reductive ethical naturalism is the view that ethical properties reduce to the... 相似文献
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The Journal of Value Inquiry - 相似文献
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