Assessing intentional binding with the method of constant stimuli

Intentional binding describes the phenomenon that actions and their effects are perceived to be temporally approximated. We introduced a new method of duration estimation to the research field, the method of constant stimuli. Participants freely chose to press one of two keys or experienced passive key presses. After an interval of 250ms or 600ms a visual effect occurred. In Experiment 1, each key produced an effect after a specific interval. In Experiment 2, both keys produced an effect after the same interval that varied between sessions. Participants compared the duration of the action-effect interval with a tone of varying duration. To assess intentional binding, we compared the perceived duration of the action-effect interval between the active and passive condition. We showed intentional binding for 600ms, but not for 250ms action-effect intervals in both experiments. Thus, the method of constant stimuli is suitable to assess intentional binding.     

Task switches under Go/NoGo conditions and the decomposition of switch costs

Alternating switches between two simple S-R tasks are combined with Go/NoGo tasks. Non-switches after Go trials are assumed to selectively profit from stimulus driven repetition benefits, whereas switches after NoGo trials are assumed to be selectively delayed by stimulus driven negative priming. Intentionally driven reconfiguration costs are assessed by RT differences between switches after Go trials (no negative priming) and non-switches after NoGo trials (no repetition benefits). Experiment 1 indicates that with short preparation time repetition benefits, negative priming costs, and intentional components contribute approximately additively to switch costs. Experiment 2 confirms that the delay of switches after NoGo trials is indeed due to negative priming. Experiments 3 and 4 show that repetition benefits and intentional components of switch costs are properly assessed only if the settings assure that participants reconfigure the required task set in NoGo as well as Go trials.     

On the masking and disclosure of unconscious elaborate processing. A reply to Van Opstal, Reynvoet, and Verguts (2005)

We have recently argued that unconscious numerical stimuli might activate responses by a match with prespecified action trigger codes (action trigger account) rather than by semantic prime processing (elaborate processing account). [Van Opstal, F., Reynvoet, B., and Verguts, T. (2005). How to trigger elaborate processing? A comment on Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003). Cognition] replicate one piece of evidence for our inference—an inefficiency of primes not presented in target format (verbal or Arabic). But this was found only with letter masks and not with hash masks. The authors conclude that letter masks block unconscious prime processing, and that elaborate processing can account for unconscious priming effects if all its (sometimes subtle) side conditions are considered. We agree that the type of mask in general is an important factor in priming studies but we note that (i) the authors' mask-blocking hypothesis is not well supported by the data, (ii) clear evidence for semantic prime processing in their study is lacking and, (iii) differences in mask efficiency (rather than mask type) might account for the conflicting results. To corroborate this inference we replicate van Opstal et al.'s results with letter masks but reduced mask efficiency. Altogether their data do not challenge the action-trigger account nor do they strongly support the elaborate processing view.     

Consciousness and cognitive control

The implementation or change of information processing routines, known as cognitive control, is traditionally believed to be closely linked to consciousness. It seems that we exert control over our behavior if we know the reasons for, and consequences of, doing so. Recent research suggests, however, that several behavioral phenomena that have been construed as instances of cognitive control can be prompted by events of which actors are not aware. Here we give a brief review of this research, discuss possible reasons for inconsistencies in the empirical evidence, and suggest some lines of future research. Specifically, we suggest to differentiate cognitive control evoked either because of explicit or because of implicit control cues. While the former type of control seems to work outside of awareness, the latter type of control seems to be restricted to consciously registered events that call for control.     

Impact of contingency manipulations on accessory stimulus effects

Accessory tone stimuli facilitate response performance despite being irrelevant for the current task. In order to investigate which processes are affected by accessory stimuli, we presented accessory tones in a simple response time (RT) task while varying the contingencies between accessory stimulation and either responses(Experiment 1) or stimulus conditions (Experiment 2). Accessory tones speeded up responding to a larger degree when they were conjointly presented within go compared with no-go trials. In contrast, contingency variation with stimulus conditions did not alter the impact of accessory stimuli. Additionally, accessory tones increased response force. Thus, we conclude that in simple RT tasks accessory tones influence response-related stages such as response selection and response execution rather than perceptual processes.     

Response specific temporal expectancy: Evidence from a variable foreperiod paradigm

When a stimulus-response event is frequently paired with a specific foreperiod, response performance for this event is improved after this foreperiod. This phenomenon is referred to as specific temporal expectancy. In four experiments, we investigated whether stimulus- or response-related processing benefits from specific temporal expectancy. In a speeded choice reaction task, different features of the imperative stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods in such a way that only in some experiments were the responses also frequently paired with foreperiods. Participants revealed evidence for specific temporal expectancy when responses were frequently paired with foreperiods, but not when only the stimuli were frequently paired with foreperiods. We concluded that specific temporal expectancy affects response-related processing.     

Evidence for task-specific resolution of response conflict

When a target requires different responses to a relevant and to an irrelevant task in a task-switching paradigm, there is response conflict. This target-induced response conflict was combined with conflict caused by a subliminally presented prime presented prior to the target. We found that target-related conflict reduced prime-induced conflict effects within the same trial. However, target-related conflict modified prime-related conflict effects according to the irrelevant stimulus-response (S-R) rule, but not according to the relevant S-R rule. Moreover, trial-to-trial modulations of the target congruency effect were observed in task repetition trials, but not in task switch trials. These results indicate that conflict resolution mechanisms, at least under the present circumstances, operate in a strictly task-specific manner.     

Variable action effects: response control by context-specific effect anticipations

The ideomotor principle (IMP) claims that bidirectional associations between actions and their contingent effects are acquired so that voluntary actions are accessed by the anticipation of intended effects. Until now, evidence for the IMP exists only for stable action-effect relations. The present paper explores whether the IMP also holds true for the initiation of actions for which no unconditional contingent action-effect relations exist. Participants responded with left and right key presses in two different contexts. They selected the responses according to the vertical (context A) or horizontal (context B) position of a target. Responses were followed by short/fast movements of the target in context A and comparatively long/slow movements in context B. Consequently, each response produced short and long effects equally often in both contexts. Nevertheless, RTs decreased in contexts with short effects and increased in contexts with long effects. Data confirm that action-effect associations were acquired context-specifically and that the same actions were accessed by different effect anticipations.     

No anticipation–no action: the role of anticipation in action and perception

This paper reviews psychophysical evidence for the existence and the nature of two types of anticipation in goal-oriented action. The first one relates to attained changes of the perceptual world, thus to action goals. These anticipations determine appropriate motor output. We argue that goal codes do not only serve as a reference unit, against which currently produced behavioral effects are compared. Rather voluntary actions appear to be planned literally in terms of intended behavioral effects. The second type of anticipation relates to the environmental conditions that have to be met to bring an intended effect into being. These anticipations serve to trigger selected actions, when appropriate execution conditions are encountered. Altogether, the behavioral evidence portrays a remarkable automaticity of goal-oriented action. Once a goal exists (wherever it might come from), corresponding efferent output is generated and executed under appropriate conditions.