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HOW TO PREDICT FUTURE DURATION FROM PRESENT AGE 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration. 相似文献
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In this paper, we show that presentism—the view that the way things are is the way things presently are—is not undermined by the objection from being-supervenience. This objection claims, roughly, that presentism has trouble accounting for the truth-value of past-tense claims. Our demonstration amounts to the articulation and defence of a novel version of presentism. This is brute past presentism, according to which the truth-value of past-tense claims is determined by the past understood as a fundamental aspect of reality different from things and how things are. 相似文献
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Brian Kierland 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):381-407
There is a theory that one ought morally to do the best one can, when ‘best’ is suitably interpreted. There are also some
examples in which, although every agent involved does the best she can, the group composed of them does not. Some philosophers
think that these examples show the theory to be wrong. In particular, they think that such examples motivate a view which
incorporates a requirement of cooperativeness in a particular way, though they disagree as to the exact nature of this requirement.
This paper will argue both that such views are problematic and that the examples do not motivate departure from the original
theory. 相似文献
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We argue that any superluminal theory Tis empirically equivalent to a non-superluminaltheory T , with thefollowing constraints onT : T preservesthe spacetime intervals between events as entailedby T, T is naturalistic (as longas T is), and all the events which have causesaccording to T also have causes according toT. Tim Maudlin (1996) definesstandard interpretations of quantum mechanicsas interpretations `according to which there wasa unique set of outcomes in Aspect's laboratory,which outcomes occurred at spacelike separation, andMaudlin claims that standard interpretations must benon-local in the sense that there are superluminalinfluences. We show (even assuming Aspect's experimentis ideal) that Maudlin's claim is false. 相似文献
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In the space of possible worlds, there might be a best possible world (a uniquely best world or a world tied for best with some other worlds). Or, instead, for every possible world, there might be a better possible world. Suppose that the latter is true, i.e., that there is no best world. Many have thought that there is then an argument against the existence of God, i.e., the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being; we will call such arguments no-best-world arguments. In this paper, we discuss ability-based objections to such arguments; an ability-based objection to a no-best world argument claims that the argument fails because one or more of its premises conflict with a plausible principle connecting the applicability of some type of moral evaluation to the agent’s possession of a relevant ability. In particular, we formulate and evaluate an important new ability-based objection to the most promising no-best world argument. 相似文献
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We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate
certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration
(ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox
gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that principles that base your
current opinions on your current opinions about your future opinions need not make reference to the particular times in the future at which you believe you will have those opinions, but they do need to make reference to the particular degrees of belief you believe you will have in the future.
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Samuel RuhmkorffEmail: |
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