A latent variable model approach to estimating systematic bias in the oversampling method

The method of oversampling data from a preselected range of a variable’s distribution is often applied by researchers who wish to study rare outcomes without substantially increasing sample size. Despite frequent use, however, it is not known whether this method introduces statistical bias due to disproportionate representation of a particular range of data. The present study employed simulated data sets to examine how oversampling introduces systematic bias in effect size estimates (of the relationship between oversampled predictor variables and the outcome variable), as compared with estimates based on a random sample. In general, results indicated that increased oversampling was associated with a decrease in the absolute value of effect size estimates. Critically, however, the actual magnitude of this decrease in effect size estimates was nominal. This finding thus provides the first evidence that the use of the oversampling method does not systematically bias results to a degree that would typically impact results in behavioral research. Examining the effect of sample size on oversampling yielded an additional important finding: For smaller samples, the use of oversampling may be necessary to avoid spuriously inflated effect sizes, which can arise when the number of predictor variables and rare outcomes is comparable.     

Paying it forward: how helping others can reduce the psychological threat of receiving help

This paper shows that receiving help could be psychologically harmful for recipients, and passing on help to others after receiving help (“helping forward”) is a good strategy to improve and restore help recipients' self‐competence. Participants (N = 87) received autonomy‐ or dependency‐oriented help and anticipated helping forward or not. Compared to receiving autonomy‐oriented help, receiving dependency‐oriented help negatively affected participants' self‐competence and their evaluation of the helper. Anticipation of future helping increased the liking for and evaluation of the helper. After paying help forward, participants felt more self‐competent than before helping, and this effect was more pronounced among former recipients of dependency‐oriented help. These results show that helping forward can negate the psychological threat associated with receiving help.     

To teach or to tell? Consequences of receiving help from experts and peers

Previous research has stressed the positive effects of receiving autonomy‐oriented help over dependency‐oriented help but has overlooked a potential downside in terms of recipients' evaluations of the helper. Participants in the current experiment (n = 77) requested help while working on difficult puzzles and received either autonomy‐ or dependency‐oriented help from either an expert or a peer. In line with previous findings, receiving autonomy‐oriented help led to more self‐competence and positive feelings than dependency‐oriented help. However, in support of our prediction, participants also felt angrier, had less respect for and less trust in the peer who provided autonomy‐oriented help than the peer who provided dependency‐oriented help. No differences in the evaluation of the expert helper were found. These findings highlight the importance of considering both the helpers' characteristics and the type of help provided when investigating the psychological consequences of receiving help. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of the Big Five personality factors in vigilance performance and workload

Using the five‐factor personality model, the present study explored the influence of personality factors on sustained attention and perceived workload. Ninety‐six college‐aged participants were administered a 12 minute vigilance fast event rate task. Following the vigil, participants were asked to first, rate their perceived workload of the task using the NASA‐TLX, and then second, complete the NEO‐PI‐R personality inventory. Traditional measures of hits, false alarms, and reaction times were examined as well as the signal detection indices of perceptual sensitivity and response bias. Extraversion correlated with false alarms (r = 0.181; eta² = 0.055) and conscientiousness correlated with both false alarms (r = ?0.275, eta² = 0.097) and perceptual sensitivity (r = 0.227, eta² = 0.052). With regard to perceived workload, neuroticism was related to perceived frustration (r = 0.238, eta² = 0.057). The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical implications, impact of task parameters, and practical applications. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

De-idealizing Disagreement,Rethinking Relativism

Relativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a (largely) implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels of idealization. We defend two claims. First, philosophical discussions of disagreement need to be de-idealized. Second, once a less idealized account of disagreement is available, both our conception of judgement and our understanding of relativism need to be revised. Our example is a case study in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). This case study gives a less idealized account of disagreement that conceptualizes judgements as situated (rather than brute or rule-governed). We argue that this conception can and should be applied to cases of gustatory and epistemic disagreement. The payoff will be a reformulation of relativism in terms of rationally resolvable yet contingent disagreements.     

Wilhelm Windelband and the problem of relativism

This paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important episode in the history of that problem. The paper distinguishes between three phases in Windelband’s thinking and shows that his views about relativism changed in close connection with his conception of history. The early Windelband thought that historicism was compatible with absolute validity because he was firmly convinced of historical progress. The mature Windelband rejected progress as a means for justifying validity and put the problem of relativism into sharp relief. In response to the failure of his mature philosophy to fend off relativism, the later Windelband strengthened the role of history again. The paper concludes that Windelband’s significance lies not in his arguments against relativism, but rather in having furthered philosophical understanding of the problems at stake.