Heidegger's Contrasting Notion of Worldview in the Early,Middle, and Later Writings

Heidegger sharply distinguishes philosophy from worldview. In this he was quite unlike Hegel, Dilthey, Nietzsche, and Jaspers, who more or less equated the two, but instead followed the lead of Husserl. Nevertheless, Heidegger did not accept Husserl's unqualified reduction of philosophy to science. Early on, 1919–1922, Heidegger's concern for facticity was tied to a thinking of worldview. Conversely, Heidegger's Being and Time (1933–34/2010a Heidegger, M. (2010a). Being and truth (G. Fried and R. Polt Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. (Original work published 1933–34) [Google Scholar]) considered worldview to be a fixed interpretation of the universe of beings, as opposed to philosophy as the study of Being, and suggested that fundamental ontology could demonstrate the condition of possibility for something like worldview. Later, Heidegger extended his historico-ontological critique of the Western philosophical tradition to include worldview. Worldview was now the notional equivalent of the modern subject's picturing or representing of beings as a whole to herself/himself, a fallout of the technological understanding of being. This article provides a historical précis of the notion of worldview in Heidegger's thinking and, at the same time, argues that philosophy cannot be absolutely separated from worldview in Heidegger's works.