Mood and realism of confidence judgements of one''s own answers to general knowledge questions

This study examines the effect of a depressed mood on the realism of subjects' confidence judgements of the correctness of answers to general knowledge questions. Research conducted on how mood influences cognitive processes gives reason to expect that a depressed mood might increase the realism of individuals' confidence ratings. Sixty subjects were divided into three conditions, two of which were given mood induction, one condition into an elated-happy mood and one condition into a depressed-sad mood. As evidenced by subjects' responses to mood scales only the depressed condition was affected by the mood induction. All subjects answered 93 general knowledge questions and rated their confidence in the correctness of the answer given. Subjects were instructed to think aloud when answering the last 31 questions. The conditions did not differ with respect to the proportion of questions answered correctly, mean level of confidence, nor with respect to three measures of the realism in subjects' confidence ratings (calibration, over/underconfidence and resolution). The results were the same when questions answered with and without think aloud instructions were analysed separately.     

Vollmer on Allport-some short comments

In an earlier issue of this journal, Fred Vollmer criticizes Allport's rejection of operational definitions (Vollmer, 1974), He states that it is useless to postulate an internal structure behind or within the observations made of personality. These observations constitute personality. Thus psychologists should only study the observed phenomena and operational definitions are important tools in this endeavour. In this reply we want to show that his views are confused and try to point out the roots of this confusion.     

THE EFFECTS OF INTERRATER AND SELF-OTHER AGREEMENT ON PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT FOLLOWING UPWARD FEEDBACK

This study investigated (a) whether performance improvement following upward feedback is related to self-other rating discrepancies, (b) how self-ratings change after feedback, and (c) whether agreement among raters influences performance improvement. Self-ratings and subordinate ratings were collected from 1,888 managers at 2 points in time 1 year apart. Using polynomial regression equations, we determined that managers who overrated themselves relative to how others rated them tended to improve their performance from 1 year to the next, and underraters tended to decline. This is consistent with what would be predicted by self-consistency theory (Korman, 1976). Self-ratings tended to decrease for overraters and increase for underraters, but this effect was not constant throughout the range of self-ratings. Agreement among subordinate raters was negatively related to performance improvement, but this is likely a reflection of differential regression to the mean.     

On the difficulty of distinguishing “good” and “poor” perceivers: A social relations analysis of empathic accuracy data

Two studies were conducted to explore the reasons why replicable individual‐difference correlates of empathic accuracy have proved so difficult to find. In Study 1, we examined sources of variance in empathic accuracy data using the Social Relations Model (Kenny, 1988, 1994; Kenny & Albright, 1987; Malloy & Kenny, 1986). The results revealed substantial perceiver variance only in the type of research design in which a relatively large set of individual perceivers inferred the thoughts and feelings of the same set of target persons. In Study 2, we found evidence that even in this apparently optimal type of research design, the significant individual‐difference correlates of empathic accuracy were fewer and subject to more unexpected qualifications than the results of Davis and Kraus's (1997) meta‐analysis would suggest. So far, the “best candidate” predictor of empathic accuracy appears to be verbal intelligence, but it remains to be seen whether it and two other recently proposed predictors of interpersonal accuracy will survive the test of replicability.     

Detection of errors in statistical problem solving

Ten subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The subjects were instructed after each substep of his/her problem solving, to check in various ways the solution of the previous substep. The subjects detected 25 out of a total of 56 errors when they solved the problems. About half of the detected errors were computational errors. Nine errors were eliminated in response to the checking instructions. The think aloud data indicated that subjects' most common way of detecting their own errors was by noting that computations resulted in extreme values. Subjects also detected errors by (a) "spontaneous discovery"; (b) discontent with other aspects of a solution than the numerical value of the answer; (c) repeating a solution. The last mentioned type of error detection only occurred when subjects responded to the checking instructions. Finally it was found that subjects had a strong tendency to respond to the checking instructions either in a routinized or in a non-elaborated way. It was discussed how the formulation of checking instructions can be improved in order to avoid this effect.     

Caring for the Carers: A Note on Counseling for the Wider Impact of AIDS

AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Symdrome) affects the psychological functioning not only of people with AIDS but also of those who care for them. In this article we describe the provision of counseling for voluntary curers, using personal construct counseling. Some of the problems in providing such counseling are considered.     

On the relation between justification of solution method and correctness of solution in statistical problem solving

The relation between the justification of a choice of solution method and the correctness of that choice in statistical problem solving was investigated. In the first of two studies 16 subjects were asked to think aloud while solving two statistical problems. The results showed that an incorrect choice of solution method was more common when subjects did not justify their choice of solution as compared to when they justified their choice with domain-specific knowledge. Study 2 employed an experimental design. A group of 20 subjects were instructed to provide a justification for each choice of solution method, while another group of 20 subjects received no such instructions. The results showed no difference between the groups with respect to number of correct choices of solution method. A qualitative analysis of the justifications in the instructed group showed that the justifications for incorrect solution methods were more often incorrect than subjects' justifications for correct solution methods. The results in Study 2 suggested that the association found between incorrect choice of solution method and lack of justification in Study 1 was not in the first place due to a strategical deficiency on the part of the subjects but due to a lack of domain-specific knowledge.     

Confidence in own and others' knowledge

A person's confidence judgement of a statement reflects his/her degree of belief in the correctness of that statement. Deficient ability to assess the correctness of statements (or beliefs) can have serious consequences in many situations. This study compares the realism (calibration) of subjects' confidence ratings in two situations ( n = 64). The first situation was when the subjects confidence rated their own answers to general knowledge questions. The second was when the subjects gave confidence ratings of another person's answers to general knowledge questions. The results show that subjects were more poorly calibrated and were more overconfident in the second situation, i.e. when they gave confidence ratings of answers given by another person, compared with when they rated their own answers. The data further indicates that the results can not be explained in terms of the amount of cognitive processes invested when making the confidence judgements. For example, the subjects rated the other person's answers to questions they had answered themselves, and to questions they had not seen before. No differences in confidence or in calibration and other measures of judgmental realism were found between these two categories of questions. Nor did instructions to imagine the thought process of the other person improve any of these measures. The subjects disagreed with the other person's answer on 23% of all occasions. Significantly poorer calibration was shown where subjects disagreed with the other person than where they agreed. Contents of a social nature attended to by the subjects may have affected the results. The results, when related to previous research in the area, give rise to the question of how the social situation can be arranged to achieve the best calibration.     

The influence of temporal distance on justice and care morality

Agerström, J., Björklund, F. & Allwood, C. M. (2010). The influence of temporal distance on justice and care morality. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 51, 46–55.
The primary goal of this study was to examine whether changes in the temporal distance of a moral dilemma affect how it is perceived and subsequently resolved. Based on Construal Level Theory ( Trope & Liberman, 2003 ), it was predicted that the relative weight of abstract justice features should increase and the relative weight of concrete care features should decrease with temporal distance. The results showed that females became increasingly justice-oriented with greater temporal distance. However, this was not the case for males who were unaffected by temporal distance. This interaction was conceptually replicated in a follow-up experiment in which abstraction was manipulated directly by a mindset manipulation. The present results suggest that temporal distance is a contextual factor that can alter the extent to which moral judgments and reasoning are based on justice and care, although this effect seems to be moderated by gender.