The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant,the Sublime,and Being Human

Serious doubts have been raised about the coherence of theories of the sublime and the usefulness of the concept. By contrast, the sublime is increasingly studied as a key function in Kant's moral psychology and in his ethics. This article combines methodological conservatism, approaching the topic from within Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment, with reconstruction of a conception of human agency that is tenable on Kantian grounds. I argue that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible and useful, and the experience of the sublime is significant for our self‐conception as agents. However, the chief interest in the sublime is not moral.     

VIOLENT SPLITS OR HEALTHY DIVIDES? COPING WITH INJUSTICE THROUGH FAULTLINES

In 2 studies, we investigated how groups with strong divisions may, paradoxically, help members to cope with injustice. We tested our theoretical predictions using a survey methodology and data from 57 (Study 1) and 36 (Study 2) workgroups across different industries. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that group faultlines weakened the positive relationship between perceived interpersonal injustice and psychological distress. Cooperative behaviors within subgroups mediated the interactive effect of faultlines and injustice with psychological distress.     

Finite Agents,Sublime Feelings: Response to Hanauer

Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my article “The Pleasures of Contra‐purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human” (2014) puts pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology of the sublime. My aim in that article was to present an analysis of the sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?” (2007). I argued that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to capture the experience of failure that characterizes the sublime without committing us to ontologically transcendent items. In a significant departure from Kant, however, my account does not require references to our moral vocation to explain the pleasure we take in the sublime; the pleasure comes from getting the right measure of our agency. For Hanauer, trouble for my analysis comes both from the discursive presentation of the sublime, its focus on judgment, and from the removal of references to our moral vocation.