Experiencing Range in an Electric Vehicle: Understanding Psychological Barriers

Range of electric vehicles (EVs) has long been considered a major barrier in acceptance of electric mobility. We examined the nature of how range is experienced in an EV and whether variables from other adaptation contexts, notably stress, have explanatory power for inter‐individual differences in what we term comfortable range. Forty EVs were leased to a sample of users for a 6‐month field study. Qualitative and quantitative analyses of range experiences were performed, including regression analyses to examine the role of stress‐buffering personality traits and coping skills in comfortable range. Users appraised range as a resource to which they could successfully adapt and that satisfied most of their daily mobility needs. However, indicators were found that suggested suboptimal range utilisation. Stress‐buffering personality traits (control beliefs, ambiguity tolerance) and coping skills (subjective range competence, daily range practice) were found to play a substantial role in comfortable range. Hence, it may be possible to overcome perceived range barriers with the assistance of psychological interventions such as information, training, and interface design. Providing drivers with a reliable usable range may be more important than enhancing maximal range in an electric mobility system.     

Experimentelle Untersuchungen über phänomenale Identität

Ohne Zusammenfassung Mit 117 Abbildungen im Text.     

“John thinks that Mary thinks that…” attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children

Understanding of second-order belief structures by 5- and 10-year-old children was assessed in acted stories in which two characters (John and Mary) were independently informed about an object's (ice-cream van's) unexpected transfer to a new location. Hence both John and Mary knew where the van was but there was a mistake in John's second-order belief about Mary's belief: “John thinks Mary thinks the van is still at the old place”. Children's understanding of this second-order belief was tested by asking “Where does John think Mary will go for ice cream?” Correct answers could only be given if John's second-order belief was represented, since all shortcut reasoning based on first-order beliefs would have led to the wrong answer. Results suggested unexpected early competence around the age of 6 and 7 years, shown under optimal conditions when inference of second-order beliefs was prompted.     

Psychological risk factors in cardiovascular diseases

Recent research has shown that psychological risk factors play an important role in the pathogenesis of cardiovascular diseases. The so-called ‘coronary prone behaviour pattern’ predominates, an important part of which is the ‘Type A behaviour pattern’. This is characterized by a marked ambition, a constant feeling of being under pressure, due to latent aggression and to a striving to dominate. For cerebrovascular diseases the so-called ‘pressured pattern’ as a risk factor has been found to be typical which is comparable to the Type A behaviour. Psychological risk factors and their components are not equally important for different vascular diseases. Besides the explanation of the question as to how far psychological processes really are involved in the development of vascular diseases, the research on psychological risk factors serves as a foundation for psychosomatic theories.     

The nature of adaptation in distance perception based on oculomotor cues

In previous work by the senior authors, brief adaptation to glasses that changed the accommodation and convergence with which objects were seen resulted in large alterations in size perception. Here, two further effects of such adaptation are reported: alterations in stereoscopic depth perception and a change when distance is represented by a response of S’s arm. We believe that the three effects are manifestations of one primary effect, an alteration of the relation between accommodation and convergence on the one hand and the distance they represent in the nervous system (registered distance) on the other. This view was supported by the results of two experiments, each of which demonstrated that the alterations in stereoscopic depth perception could be obtained after adaptation periods which had provided no opportunity to use stereoscopic vision, and that the adaptation effect was larger for depth perception than for size perception when it was obtained under the same conditions; the latter finding was expected if both effects resulted from the same change in registered distance. In three of the five experiments here reported, the variety of cues that could represent veridical distance during the adaptation period was limited. In one condition of adaptation, only the pattern of growth of the retinal images of objects that S approached and the kinesthetic cues for S’s locomotion served as cues to veridical distance. In two other conditions S remained immobile. In one of these, only the perspective distortion in the projection of the scene that S viewed mediated veridical distance, and in the other one familiar objects of normal size were successively illuminated in an otherwise totally dark field, conditions from which opportunities to use stereoscopic vision were again absent. After exposure to each of these adaptation conditions, adaptive changes in perceived size and larger ones in perceived stereoscopic depth were obtained. Because we found that familiar size may serve as the sole indicator of veridical distance in an adaptation process, we concluded that it can function as a perceptual as distinguished from an inferential cue to distance.     

Adaptation in distance perception based on oculomotor cues

Accommodation and convergence primarily serve to adjust the eyes to the distance of the object viewed, but, once made, these oculomotor adjustments serve as cues for the object’s distance. Experiments are reported that show that the relation between oculomotor adjustments and the distances they signify can be changed by adaptation to glasses that cause alteration in the oculomotor adjustments with which objects are viewed. This changed relation manifested itself in marked alterations of size perception. Wearing, for 30 min, glasses that caused a change in accommodation and convergence corresponding to a smaller object distance and equivalent to 1.5 lens diopters caused subsequent mean size increases that ranged from 50% to 65%. Adaptation to glasses that changed oculomotor adjustments in the same amount but in the opposite direction resulted in decreases in perceived sizes that varied from 18% to 40%, dependent on the distance of the test object. These were the results of size estimates obtained before and after the adaptation period under conditions where only accommodation and convergence served as cues for distance. A newly developed test of size perception was also used, in which S adjusted the size of the projected image of an array of familiar objects on a screen until the size of the objects appeared normal. Again, such adjustments were made before and after the adaptation period, and size differences were obtained that were in the direction to be expected of adaptation and varied in amount between 12% and 33%, dependent on the distance of the screen. The reason for the different amounts of size change measured by the two kinds of tests was investigated.     

A primate restraint and handling system for auditory research

A set of devices is described that enables daily handling and restraint of large primates. The animals live in cages and wear a special collar that fits into a modified primate restraining chair. A chain and pole arrangement simplifies the daily chairing procedure. A method of head restraint and earphone mounting is also described.     

Adaptation in the constancy of visual direction measured by a one-trial method

Adaptation to field displacement during head movements in the direction with the head rotation and in the direction against it was produced under otherwise identical conditions and compared; the field displacement rate was also varied. A rapid training procedure was used, and a novel one-trial test was employed that could measure the adaptation well enough to compare the effects of various training conditions. The one-trial test measured the magnitude of one of the manifestations of adaptation, the apparent displacement of a stationary target during head movements. This apparent horizontal target displacement was transformed into an oblique one by having the head movements that brought forth the apparent target displacement simultaneously cause an objective vertical target displacement. The slant of the resultant apparent motion path varied with the magnitude of the apparent horizontal target displacement. It was measured by having S reproduce its slant angle. It was found that adaptation to field displacement in the direction with the head rotation was consistently greater than adaptation to the opposite displacement conditions. An explanation for this result is offered.     

Does the autistic child have a metarepresentational deficit?

This study examines the claim that autistic children lack a “theory of mind” because of an inability to metarepresent. We argue that if autistic children have a “metarepresentational” deficit in Leslie's (1987, 1988) sense of the term, then they should have difficulty not only with mental representations such as false beliefs, but also with external representations such as photographs. Autistic children's understanding of photographic representations was tested using Zaitchik's (1990) task. This task is modelled on the false belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985: Wimmer & Perner, 1983) but involves “false” photographs where a photographic representation does not conform with the current state of the real world. Like Zaitchik (1990) we found that normal 3 and 4-year-olds found this task as difficult as the false belief task. In sharp contrast, however, the autistic children in our study passed the photograph task but failed the false belief task. As both tasks require the ability to decouple, this evidence challenges the view that autistic children lack “metarepresentational” ability in Leslie's sense. However, the results leave open the question of whether autistic children have a metarepresentational ability in the different sense of the term intended by Pylyshyn (1978), that is, representing the relationship between a representation and what it represents.