On "On what there is"

All sides in the recent debates over the Quine-Putnam Indispensability thesis presuppose Quine's criterion for determining what a discourse is ontologically committed to. I subject the criterion to scrutiny, especially in regard to the available competitor-criteria, asking what means of evaluation there are for comparing alternative criteria against each other. Finding none, the paper concludes that ontological questions, in a certain sense , are philosophically indeterminate.     

Student Response to Three Types of Orientation Programs

A high proportion of positive responses was obtained from students who participated in three different types of pre-college orientation programs. Small group approaches consistently elicited more favorable responses than assemblies or large groups. Greater faculty involvement resulted in participants' noting an increased academic emphasis. Participants believed they had benefited in some way from programs which varied considerably as to length, activities, organization, and purposes.     

Effects of visual aids on acquisition of selected tennis skills

The study compared the effects of supplemental visual aids on the acquisition of selected tennis skills. The forehand and backhand drive placement tests of the Hewitt Tennis Achievement Test were used to pretest, midtest, and posttest 55 subjects who were assigned to one of three treatments: control (instructor's verbal feedback only), videotaped replay viewing (with instructor's feedback), and loop-film viewing (modeling, with instructor's feedback). Each received 1200 min. of instruction. There were no statistically significant differences among groups; however, empirical evidence suggested that the use of videotaped replay and loop-film technique has merit and might be given consideration for use in instructional settings.     

MMPI profiles of adolescents charged with homicide

Study of adolescent violence has been impeded by failure to distinguish among the circumstances in which youth engage in violent behavior. The present study investigated MMPI profiles of 36 adolescent murderers and a control group of 18 adolescents charged with larceny. Homicide cases were subgrouped into those who committed homicide secondary to another crime (e.g., robbery or rape) and those who acted in the context of interpersonal conflict with the victim. While there were no significant differences between homicide and larceny groups, crime and conflict subgroups were significantly different on scales F, Hs, Hy, and Sc.     

Validity of the Threat Index.

The validity of the Threat Index was examined in a study of 42 students and 15 HIV+ clients. When completing the Threat Index, subjects rate the self and death on 30 bipolar adjectives. A count is made of the number of times the same adjective poles are used to describe the self and death. Uses of the same poles are called matches, while uses of different poles are called splits. The Threat Index is based on the assumption that splits indicate threat. Analysis showed that neither splits nor matches were usually threatening and that neither was necessary or sufficient for the experience of threat. These results did not support the validity of the Threat Index.     

Effects of preliminary perceptual output on neuronal activity of the primary motor cortex.

Observations of single neurons in the primary motor cortex of 1 monkey provided evidence that preliminary perceptual information reaches the motor system before perceptual analysis is complete. Neurons were recorded during a task in which 1 stimulus was assigned to a wrist flexion response and another was assigned to wrist extension. Two stimuli were assigned to a no-go response; each was visually similar to either the flexion or the extension stimulus. When a no-go stimulus was presented, neurons responded with weaker versions of the discharge patterns exhibited to the visually similar stimulus requiring a movement, suggesting that neurons receive partial perceptual information favoring that movement. Functionally separable neuronal populations were identified, and differences in the activations of these provide evidence about the functional effects of preliminary perceptual output on movement control processes.     

A priori truth

Conclusion There are several epistemic distinctions among truths that I have argued for in this paper. First, there are those truths which holdof every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class A truths). Second, there are those truths which holdin every rationally accessible conceptual scheme (class B truths). And finally, there are those truths whose truthvalue status isindependent of the empirical sciences (class C truths). The last category broadly includes statementsabout systems and the statements they contain, as well as statements true by virtue of the rules of language itself.At the risk of anachronism, I'll describe the positions of Carnap (1956); Quine (1980); Grice et al. (1956); the various Putnam's and myself in terms of the above distinctions: both Carnap and Quine (pretty much) think there are no class A or class B truths. Both Putnam (1975) and Putnam (1983c) think there are class A and class B truths, and that these classes overlap. I deny there are class B truths but affirm the existence of class A truths (although I haven't given explicit examples of the latter here). Finally, everyone here but Quine (1980) thinks there are class C truths (of one sort or another). Putnam (1975) attempts to show that certain class C truths are simultaneously class A and class B truths. Grice et al. (1956) take pains to distinguish the claim that there are class C truths from the claim that there are class A truths, and claim (against Quine, 1980) that no argument showing there are no class A truths shows there are no class C truths.On my interpretation of Quine (1980) he thinks that the nonexistence of class A truths shows there are no class C truths-given the extra bit of argument that a notion of true by convention or true by virtue of meaning without epistemic content, is a distinction without significance. But that issue, which is the one Grice et al. (1956) are concerned with, has not been the focus in this paper-and so in a sense I have shifted the terms of the original debate.Here I have been primarily concerned to distinguish epistemic notions and sort out how and in what ways they relate to each other. A primary tool in this exercise has been the explicit recognition that formal models of truth make universality an unlikely property of our conceptual schemes. If I have not convinced anyone that the epistemic notions sort out the way I think they do, I hope at least that some burden-shifting has occurred: that philosophers do not either take it for granted that certain notionsmust be expressible in any conceptual scheme or treat the fact that conceptual schemes must be (in some sense) limited as of little (philosophical) moment.On the other hand, if I am right about the epistemology, it follows that previous attempts to mark out the necessary structures in rationally accessible conceptual schemes via a priori truths is hopeless. What I think must replace their role, what I call globally incorrigible sets of sentences, is a topic for another time.My thanks to Arnold Koslow and Mark Richard for their helpful suggestions. I also want to thank the City University of New York Graduate Center for inviting me to be a visiting scholar academic year 1989–90, during which time this paper was written. While there I was partially supported by a Mellon fellowship from Tufts University, for which I am grateful.     

Representation by counsel: Right or obligation?

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California (1975), courts have generally permitted defendants to represent themselves, as long as they are competent to do so. The problem lies in the definition of competency to waive counsel, which has been vaguely defined by the courts. Little is known about the frequency of, or reasons for, attempts to waive counsel, about the process of forensic evaluation of such competency, and about the success of such attempts. The authors briefly review the case law on competency to waive representation, report on a longitudinal prospective study of these issues in a population of defendants referred to an inpatient forensic facility for evaluation of all types of competency related to their criminal prosecutions, and discuss the significance of the issue for forensic clinicians. A key question for courts, lawyers, and clinicians is whether a competency evaluation can be invoked to overcome a defendant's constitutional rights to self-representation and bail.