Creating new memories that are quickly accessed and confidently held

In two experiments involving a total of 542 subjects, a series of slides depicting a burglary was shown. After the initial event, subjects were exposed to one or more narratives about the event that contained some misinformation or neutral information about four critical details. Finally, subjects were tested on their memories of what they saw, and their reaction times and confidence levels were measured. When subjects took a standard test in which the misinformation item was a possible response option, they responded very quickly and confidently when making this incorrect choice. Misled subjects responded as quickly and confidently to these "unreal" memories as they did to their genuine memories. It does not seem, then, that the misinformation effect arises from a large proportion of subjects who must resolve a conflict between two memories when they are tested, a conflict that would be expected to take time. When subjects took a modified test in which the misinformation item was not a possible response, misled subjects were as accurate as were controls, but they responded more slowly, regardless of whether they ultimately chose the right or wrong option. These findings indicate that misinformation does introduce some form of interference not detected by a simple test of accuracy.     

How much is an icon worth?

We report a new technique for assessing the amount of information extracted from the icon that follows a briefly presented picture. The problem of how to measure such information was formulated in terms of how much physical exposure of a picture an icon is worth. Consider two types of stimulus presentations, each with a base duration of d ms. The first is a d-ms picture followed by an icon, and the second is a d + a-ms picture not followed by an icon. How large does a have to be so that equivalent amounts of information are extracted in the two cases? To answer this question, we showed people pictures and later tested their memory for the pictures. We found that the physical exposure duration needed to reach a particular level of performance was approximately 100 ms longer when an icon was not permitted versus when the icon was permitted. This value was independent of the base duration and the luminance of the picture. Moreover, the same value was obtained using three different kinds of memory test and four different sets of pictures. We conclude that an icon is worth approximately 100 ms of additional physical exposure duration. A reasonable explanation for this robust equivalence between icon and stimulus is that the same encoding processes are responsible for extracting information from the icon and from the physical stimulus. Therefore, any variable that affects these encoding processes must affect extraction of information from the icon and the physical stimulus in an identical manner. This prediction was confirmed for one such variable, picture luminance.     

Time went by so slowly: Overestimation of event duration by males and females

In three experiments, 469 subjects watched a short videotape of a bank robbery and later estimated the duration of the tape. Subjects invariably overestimated the durations. Accuracy of time estimation was unrelated to amount of free recall (Experiment 1) or accuracy of memory (Experiment 2). Females overestimated to a greater degree than males (Experiments 2 and 3). A more stressful version of the event produced greater overestimates than a less stressful version (Experiment 3). The relationship between induced arousal and time estimation appears to be different for men and women.     

Discrepancy detection and vulnerability to misleading postevent information

When people are exposed to misleading details after a witnessed event, they often claim that they saw the misleading details as part of the event. We refer to this as themisinformation effect. In four experiments, involving 570 subjects, we explored the role that discrepancy detection plays in the misinformation effect. Experiment 1 showed that subjects who naturally read a post-event narrative more slowly were more resistant to the effects of misleading information contained in the narrative. In Experiment 2, subjects who naturally read more slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy between what they were reading and what was stored in their memory. In Experiment 3, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more likely to detect a discrepancy than were those who were instructed to read quickly. In Experiment 4, subjects who were instructed to read slowly were more resistant to misleading postevent information. Taken together, these results suggest that longer reading times are associated with a greater scrutiny of postevent information. This leads to an increased likelihood that discrepancies will be detected and that the misinformation will be resisted.     

Eyewitness testimony and memory distortion

Abstract: Do memories change as we acquire new information? Recent research on memory distortion using implicit tests along with research using confidence is reviewed and new studies are presented. Two new studies asked misinformed subjects to provide reasons for their answers. In each study 15% to 27% of subjects said they remembered seeing items they had only read about. In another study subjects were asked to identify the source of misleading items they had seen in slides or read in misleading questions. Subjects were more likely to say they had seen in slides something they read about in the questions than they were to confuse information from two nearly identical sets of slides. Recent work shows that, not only is it possible to distort memory for events, it is possible to implant an entire memory for something that never happened. The evidence is now clear that we can become mentally tricked into making large as well as small changes in the way we recall the past.     

On interpretation of interactions

The principle focus of this paper is on interpretation of interactions that are obtained when response probability is used as a dependent variable. It is argued that results obtained with probability [or any dependent variable) are only interesting insofar as they reflect something about a corresponding theoretical component. It follows that the functional mapping of response probability [which is measured) onto the state of a theoretical component (which is inferred) must be somehow specified if conclusions are to be meaningful. Depending on the nature of such a mapping, various types of results, particularly results involving interactions, may or may not be interpretable.     

Comprehending compass directions

Two experiments investigated the processes by which compass directions are comprehended. In both experiments, the task was as follows. A compass direction (e.g., 210 deg) was visually presented. The subject drew a representation of the direction and then pressed a key. Reaction time from onset of the stimulus to the keypress was measured. The results suggested a model of direction comprehension involving two steps: first, computing the nearest cardinal direction to the target direction, and then “rotating” from the cardinal to the target direction. Rotation could be performed equally well clockwise or counterclockwise. Additionally, north-south. tended to be comprehended faster than east-west, confirming past results that have shown an advantage of up-down over left-right in discrimination tasks.     

PLE: A high-level multiprogramming language for psychology

This paper describes a software system called PLE that is designed to turn a Data General Corporation computer system into a sophisticated infinite-channel tachistoscope. We describe hardware and software characteristics of the PLE system and evaluate its performance in comparison to a typical tachistoscope. Additionally, we describe two example experiments that have been implemented in the PLE system.     

Resolving legal questions with psychological data.

Psychologists are ever finding new legal arenas for their psychological data and concepts. Findings about the character and operation of stereotyping have been introduced in sex discrimination litigation in the United States. Findings about conformity, obedience to authority, and bystander apathy have been introduced into death penalty cases in South Africa. These concrete and detailed applications of psychological science demonstrate the expanding role that psychology is playing in the legal world.