Perceived racism and cardiovascular reactivity and recovery to personally relevant stress.

This study evaluated cardiovascular responses (CVR) to an active speech task with blatantly discriminatory (BRC) versus neutral (NRC) stimuli and an anger recall task in a sample of Black men (N = 73; age 18 to 47). Diastolic blood pressure scores were higher for NRC versus BRC stimuli during anger recall (p = .05). Moreover, persons in the NRC group who perceived high levels of racism (vs. no racism or BRC group) during active speech showed larger increases in blood pressure across postspeech rest, anger recall, and subsequent rest (p = .03). The notable elevation in CVR in response to an ambiguous event extends current models of racism suggesting that subtle racism is a psychosocial stressor that erodes health through chronically elevated CVR.     

Negative Consequences of Felt Violations: The Deeper the Relationship,the Stronger the Reaction

Drawing from past research suggesting that high prior commitment leads to stronger reactions to unfairness in the workplace (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper‐Schneider, 1992), we predicted that those forming relational as opposed to transactional psychological contracts would exhibit stronger detrimental effects of felt violation on job satisfaction, turnover intentions, and job performance. We also predicted a combined effect of personality and violation on these outcomes. Self‐ and supervisor‐reported data (N= 331 dyads) collected from a variety of organisations supported our predictions. In general, relational contract terms were associated with stronger violation–outcome relationships, and transactional contract terms were associated with weaker relationships. Similarly, four of the Big Five dimensions (extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, and openness to experience) moderated the violation–outcome relationships such that it was stronger for higher levels of these traits.     

On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism

Beginning with Descartes' caution not imprudently to take some other object in place of myself, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by variousamnesiacs, both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting thatcogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of body-switching thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of psychological connectedness or unity of consciousness as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if person is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes'res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the (metaphysical) genusres, distinct fromres extensa and only problematically in interaction with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine.