NAGEL VS. NAGEL ON THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS

In a footnote to his ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’, Thomas Nagel sketches a promising account of phenomenal concepts that purports to explain why mind‐body identity statements, even if necessary, will always seem contingent. Christopher Hill and Brian McLaughlin have recently developed this sketch into a more robust theory. In Nagel's more recent work, however, he suggests that the only adequate theory of phenomenal concepts is one that makes the relation between phenomenal and physical states intelligible, or ‘transparent’. Developing such a theory, however, appears to be no easy task. In this paper I argue that the Nagel‐Hill‐McLaughlin proposal is preferable – and that a serious problem with it, noticed by Stephen Yablo, can be avoided by revising the proposal according to some further suggestions made by Nagel himself.     

INTEGRATING GENDER AND ETHNICITY INTO PSYCHOLOGY COURSES

In this introduction to the special issue on teaching about gender and ethnicity in psychology, we consider the assumptions underlying an inclusive curriculum that pays attention to gender and ethnicity and address why such a curriculum has merit. We review empirical studies, assessing whether existing curricula are inclusive, and present an overview of the articles and the recurrent themes. These themes include the complexity of the interaction between ethnicity and gender; the difficulty of deciding which of the many possible ethnic groups to include in course material; the dominance of evaluative comparison in discussions of differences among groups; the interdisciplinary nature of research on ethnicity; and the tendency in psychology to ignore the importance of the power differences that confound analyses of the effect of ethnicity and gender.