Moral Reasons: Internal and External1

The view defended is one sense externalist on the relation between moral reasons and motivation: A's having a moral reason to do X does not necessarily imply that A has a motivation that would support A's doing X via some appropriate deliberative route. However, it is in another sense externalist in holding that there are the kind of moral reasons there are only if the relevant motivational capacities are generally present in human beings, if not in all individuals. The process of socialization is an attempt to embed the recognition of what we have moral reason to do in the intentional content of one's feelings. E.g., learning that about others' suffering embeds their suffering as a reason to help in the intentional content of incipient compassionate feelings. This endows the reason with motivational efficacy while conferring further direction to the feelings in ways that shape us for social cooperation.     

DUTIES OF JUSTICE TO CITIZENS WITH COGNITIVE DISABILITIES

Abstract: Many social practices treat citizens with cognitive disabilities differently from their nondisabled peers. Does John Rawls's theory of justice imply that we have different duties of justice to citizens whenever they are labeled with cognitive disabilities? Some theorists have claimed that the needs of the cognitively disabled do not raise issues of justice for Rawls. I claim that it is premature to reject Rawlsian contractualism. Rawlsians should regard all citizens as moral persons provided they have the potential for developing the two moral powers. I claim that every citizen requires specific Enabling Conditions to develop and exercise the two moral powers. Structuring basic social institutions to deny some citizens the Enabling Conditions is unjust because it blocks their developmental pathways toward becoming fully cooperating members of society. Hence, we have a duty of justice to provide citizens labeled with cognitive disabilities with the Enabling Conditions they require until they become fully cooperating members of society.     

Performance Assessment: Is Creative Thinking Necessary?

The study examined the relationship between creative thinking ability of 13 to 14‐year old female students and their ability in tackling problem solving situations in the science laboratory. The latter has been variously labeled as hands‐on problem‐solving tasks, scientific investigations, and performance assessment. No tutoring or guidance concerning how to solve the problem was provided. The scientific concepts embedded in the tasks are within the scope of the 13 to 14‐year old students, but the setting for the tasks are novel and not likely to be dealt with by their class teacher during the course of instruction. The solution process for these tasks is likely to involve the following components: preliminary trialing, planning, performing, communicating, interpreting and reflecting on the task to provide feedback for further refinement of the task (Department of Education & Science, U.K., 1987; Toh, 1990). The paper looks into the correlation of creative thinking ability and each of the six performance components, as well as the overall performance.     

WHAT WILLIAMSON'S ANTI‐LUMINOSITY ARGUMENT REALLY IS*

Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his argument is not a sorites argument; I explain why he has not given us any reason to accept the claim.