Hearing a Still-Ticking Bomb Argument: A Reply to Bufacchi and Arrigo

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the recent anti-Ticking Bomb argument offered by Bufacchi and Arrigo is unsuccessful. To adequately refute the Ticking Bomb strategy, I claim, requires carefully addressing both policy questions and questions involving exceptional conduct.     

MOTILITY,AGGRESSION, AND THE BODILY I: AN INTERPRETATION OF WINNICOTT

Among the central ideas associated with the name of Winnicott, scant mention is made of motility. This is largely attributable to Winnicott himself, who never thematized motility and never wrote a paper specifically devoted to the topic. This paper suggests both that the idea of motility is nonetheless of central significance in Winnicott's thought, and that motility is of central importance in the development and constitution of the bodily I. In elaborating both these suggestions, the paper gives particular attention to the connections between motility, continuity, aggression, and creativity in Winnicott's work.     

Ally Aesthetics

In this article I discuss what I am calling “ally aesthetics.” I suggest a set of necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, considerations for the creation of successful instances of ally art. Focusing on three case studies, I propose some key characteristics of ally aesthetics, such as its contextual/temporal nature and how that relates to success and the importance of understanding the place of the ally aesthetic within the larger movements they are allying with.     

On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology

We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic—that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing to the role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving a principled argument for KA, based on the inference rule KB: if a subject knows that A is the best thing she can do, she is rational to do A. In the second half of the paper, we consider and reject the two most promising objections to our case for KA, one based on the Gricean notion of conversational implicature and the other based on a contextualist maneuver.