Premenstrual syndrom

Premenstrual syndrome is a condition with cyclical mood changes occurring in 30 % of the female population of fertile ages. The symptom development is very closely related to the luteal phase indicating the existence of one or more factors during the luteal phase that provoke mental symptoms in sensitive patients. This is further supported by the fact that hysterectomized women with no menstrual bleedings but with the ovarian hormone cycle continue to show cyclical mood changes without having the cycle phase. The nature of the symptom provocating factor is still unknown but the ovarian hormones progesterone and/or estradiol are suspected. This as certain women taking oral contraceptives and sequential postmenopausal estrogen-progestagen treatment achieve mood changes. Psychological and personality factors are probably also involved, at least in the degree of the mood change and the type of mood experienced.     

The AB Identification Survey: Identifying Absolute versus Relative Determinants of Happiness

This article introduces a simple survey method to distinguish between two types of variables that affect happiness—type A, which exerts an absolute effect on happiness, and type B, which affects happiness only through social context. The authors validate the method by comparing its findings with the findings of a theoretically superior but less practical experimental method, and use the method to identify the AB nature of a variety of naturally-occurring variables among both college students and people with work experience. We conclude by discussing the limitation of this method as well as its potential to inform policymakers about where to invest resources in order to improve people’s happiness over time.     

When Is More Better?

Abstract— We examine three determinants of the relationship between the magnitude of a stimulus and a person's subjective "value" of that stimulus: the process by which value is assessed (either by feeling or by calculation), the evaluability of the relevant magnitude variable (whether the desirability of a given level of that variable can be evaluated independently), and the mode of evaluation (whether stimuli are encountered and evaluated jointly or separately). Reliance on feeling, lack of evaluability, and separate evaluation lead to insensitivity to magnitude. An analysis invoking these factors provides a novel account for why people typically become less sensitive to changes in the magnitude of a stimulus as magnitude increases.     

Dazed and confused by choice: How the temporal costs of choice freedom lead to undesirable outcomes

We propose that individuals underestimate the costs of making choices relative to the benefits of finding the best option. Specifically, we demonstrate that research participants make systematic mistakes in predicting the effect of having more, vs. less, choice freedom on task performance and task-induced affect. Even when participants have the information to understand that the costs of choice freedom outweigh its benefits, they still predict that choice freedom will lead to better performance and more positive affect. As a result, those who have the option to choose exercise it, yet end up performing worse and feeling worse than those who do not have that option.     

The art and science of guessing

This research examined how one affectively reacts to others' guesses at a value one cares about, such as one's income. Conventional wisdom suggests that people will feel happier upon receiving more favorable guesses (e.g., higher income) than less favorable guesses. We found the opposite pattern. We propose a model to explain the effect and identify its boundaries and report experimental evidence for the model. This research enriches existing literature on self-enhancement and yields practical implications for how to approach guessing in interpersonal communications.     

Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy?

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest among psychologists and other social scientists in subjective well-being and happiness. Here we review selected contributions to this development from the literature on behavioral-decision theory. In particular, we examine many, somewhat surprising, findings that show people systematically fail to predict or choose what maximizes their happiness, and we look at reasons why they fail to do so. These findings challenge a fundamental assumption that underlies popular support for consumer sovereignty and other forms of autonomy in decision-making (e.g. marriage choice), namely, the assumption that people are able to make choices in their own best interests.     

Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation

This research identifies a new source of failure to make accurate affective predictions or to make experientially optimal choices. When people make predictions or choices, they are often in the joint evaluation (JE) mode; when people actually experience an event, they are often in the single evaluation (SE) mode. The "utility function" of an attribute can vary systematically between SE and JE. When people in JE make predictions or choices for events to be experienced in SE, they often resort to their JE preferences rather than their SE preferences and overpredict the difference that different values of an attribute (e.g., different salaries) will make to their happiness in SE. This overprediction is referred to as the distinction bias. The present research also specifies when the distinction bias occurs and when it does not. This research contributes to literatures on experienced utility, affective forecasting, and happiness.     

Risk as feelings

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.